


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ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
N A T O S E C R E T

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To : Secretary General
c.c. : Deputy Secretary General
ASG for Political Affairs -
From : Executive Secretary

Summary Record of Private Sessions of the Council
held on Monday 15th, Tuesday 16th, Thursday 18th and
Monday, 22nd December, 1980

I. POSSIBLE ACTION BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN THE EVENT OF
A SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND

T. OZÇERI

This document consists of : 4 pages

N A T O S E C R E T

TEL : 241.00.40 - 241.44.00 - 241.44.90 TELEEX : 23-867

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ATTENDANCE

:

Ambassadors + 1

plus

Deputy Secretary General
ASG, Political Affairs
Executive Secretary
Mr. J.N. Gibault
Acting Directeur du Cabinet

plus

Chairman, Military Committee
1

AGENDA

:

No

MEETING PLACE

:

Conference Room 2

N A T O S E C R E T

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I. POSSIBLE ACTION BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A
SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND

In the Communiqué issued after the Ministerial Meeting on Friday, 12th December, 1980, Ministers agreed that "the Soviet menace which hangs over Poland gives cause for grave concern to the members of the Alliance and to the entire international community" ; that, in the event of an intervention, they "would be compelled to react in the manner which the gravity of this development would require" and that therefore the Council would "keep the situation under close and continuous review"

2. Also, during their discussions in private session, Ministers took the view that in the event of a Soviet intervention they should hold an emergency meeting to agree on a coordinated reaction and instructed the Council in Permanent Session to draw up a list of measures in the political and economic fields from which they could make a choice in the light of the situation in Poland.

3. In response to this two-fold mandate, the Council held four private meetings beginning on 15th December, 1980, during which it heard intelligence reports on developments in the threat and on Warsaw Pact troop movements along the Polish frontiers.

4. Its main concern, however, was to prepare the list of measures requested by Ministers. To guide it in this task, the Council was able to draw, firstly, on the indications given by Ministers themselves during the private session ; secondly, on two working papers ; the first circulated by the United States on 4th December, 1980 and the second by the United Kingdom immediately after the Council's first meeting on 15th December.

5. The Council first had a discussion on the best way to fulfill its mandate in the speediest way. Several Permanent Representatives would have been prepared to entrust the Senior Political Committee with the task of preparing a list of detailed measures on the basis of broad guidance given by the Council and with the advice of experts. Others expressed the view that it would not be proper to shift to the SPC a responsibility which Ministers had placed on Permanent Representatives in a personal capacity, and that time was of the essence. This latter view prevailed and it was also understood that the SPC might be asked later on to study the technical aspects of measures which could not be implemented without prior preparation and elaboration.

6. As for the format of the report, there was general agreement that trying to draw up a complete list of scenarios covering all possible forms of intervention in Poland would serve no useful purpose and that it would be enough to mention in the report three cases in which an emergency meeting of the Council at Ministerial level would be justified.

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7. The Council subscribed to a suggestion by the German and Canadian Representatives that there should be an introduction to the list of measures, explaining the Western objectives and the purpose of the envisaged action, a distinction being made between pre-intervention and post intervention measures. The Canadian Representative produced a draft introduction, which was adopted.

8. The list of possible political measures was discussed on the basis of a draft prepared by the International Staff, combining the United States and United Kingdom proposed lists. The Council approved for submission to governments eleven concrete political measures which Ministers could decide to apply in totally or gradually, according to the degree of gravity of an intervention in Poland.

9. As for the rather detailed list of economic measures prepared by the Economic Division, the German Representative said that he was unable to subscribe to measures which had legal implications and involved the responsibility of other Ministers than Foreign Ministers.

10. This view was supported by the Netherlands Representative, who pointed out that economic measures could only be implemented after careful preparation and after consultation with specialised organizations such as the OECD ; that there was the special case of the EEC countries ; and also that the special economic relationship between the FRG and the GDR had to be taken into account.

11. The Council agreed to a suggestion by the United Kingdom Representative that there should be a list of possible actions in the economic field under the following broad headings ; trade restrictions, COCOM and technology, air traffic, shipping and transport, fishing, energy, foreign exchange problems, to be considered by governments at a later stage ; as well as a list of suggestions in each of these fields, to be annexed to the main report. A draft prepared along these lines by the International Staff was finally accepted and the whole report was circulated as FO/80/133.

12. On various occasions during the meetings, several Permanent Representatives, in particular the Canadian, French, German and Norwegian Representatives, deplored the leaks which had occurred about their discussions. The Council was in complete agreement that every effort should be made to maintain the strict confidentiality of the proceedings in order to avoid speculation on measures which for the time being were contingency planning and to comply with Ministers' instructions that the action within the Alliance should be of an unprovocative and precautionary nature and should not serve as a pretext for the Soviet Union to intervene in Poland.

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