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Brussels, July 18th, 1983.

Reg. PA
Mr. Cella
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Serbrieff
Mr. Solil
Mr. Abrahamson

REG. P. A.	
ACTION SLIP	
No 10029	83

P. A. Sub - Registry File No 19-10-01
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(Poland).

Dear Mr. Cella,

Enclosed for your information please find a report by the Eastern-European Working Group of the Political Committee, of the European Communities (Athens 11-12.7.83), entitled "The Situation in Poland after the Pope's visit".

Following a decision by the E.C. Political Committee and upon instructions from my authorities, I am sending copies of this report to all members of our Political Committee.

Sincerely,

George SAVVAIDES
Counsellor of Embassy

Mr. Glenn R. CELLA
Chairman, Political Committee
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Brussels, Belgium

Enclosure : As stated

cc : Members, Political Committee

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THE SITUATION IN POLAND AFTER THE POPE'S VISIT
- WRITTEN REPORT BY THE EASTERN - EUROPEAN WORKING GROUP -

I. SUMMARY

The Pope's visit to Poland was a clear affirmation of the power which the Catholic Church wields in that country. Although too many uncertainties do not yet permit a definitive analysis of the situation in Poland, there are signs indicating that his trip gave the nation renewed moral courage and strengthened the potential for reform. The Pope's speeches, which had an astonishingly pronounced political accent, did not make things easy for General Jaruzelski in terms of both the domestic situation and loyalty to the Warsaw Pact.

At present, it is hard to say whether the Government can or wants to exploit the impetus imparted to the nation by the Pope's visit for the purpose of securing national reconciliation.

II.

1. THE POPE'S VISIT

The Pope's second visit to Poland [16-23 June 1983] entailed risks for the Polish Government; it may have even more extensive consequences than the Government assumed when weighing up the pros and cons.

The religious and moral nature of the trip, which was intended as a pilgrimage; acquired an increasingly powerful political accent with the audience, predisposed in their wishes, acting as a kind of filter. The political accent was reinforced by the echo in the western media.

The Pope, who was welcomed as a "messenger of peace" by the Chairman of the Council of State, Jablonski, did not

spare the Government; he did not give his blessing to the oppression and used firm language. Among other things, he urged gradual implementation of the accords of August 1980 which were worked out with representatives of society on equal terms and have been made a yardstick for social reform and renewal. He mentioned Poland's difficult "geopolitical situation", a term that particularly irritates Moscow; he fully backed the social demands voiced by the Polish bishops; he repeatedly spoke up for human rights and in particular for worker's rights, as rights attributed to mankind by natural law. His address to young people, whose attitude to the regime is one of apathy and rejection, and his appeal for education that fosters solidarity and hope provoked, not unsurprisingly, a strong reaction by the Government; he insisted on a meeting with Walesa. The Pope expressed the hope that the Polish Government set up the conditions necessary for cooperation with western countries.

Jaruzelski said many friendly things about the Catholic Church, yet the Pope never spoke of socialism, but of "the will of society being ignored", of democratic freedoms and duties, of freedom of association and activity for cultural, ethical and religious groups.

Even though they centred on religious and ethical questions, all of his sermons also concerned above all the nation's hope for more freedom, dignity, respect for all human rights and for more justice and truthfulness in public life. His appeals for circumspection were on the whole heeded by the 8 to 10 million Poles who heard him, but it remains to be seen how long his warnings will remain effective.

It is hard to predict how after being stifled by martial law for one and a half years the nation will exploit its newly acquired feeling of strength i.e. whether pursuant to the Pope's moral appeals it will sublimate the strength and transform it into tolerance, trust, cooperation and - newly motivated in this manner - into a readiness for greater exertions or whether this strength will culminate in another round of confrontation

At any rate, this feeling of strength will for the time being probably be accompanied by further and perhaps increased paralysis of the Polish United Worker's Party [PUWP], which is marked by persistent infighting, and of the organizations set up by the Government as substitutes [PRON, New Trade Unions].

For Jaruzelski's Government, which reacted nervously from the outset of the trip [cf. statements by Rakowski, Olszowski and Urban], things have probably become more difficult both at home and vis-a-vis Poland's allies as a result of the Pope's visit. The Government is now once more faced with national aspirations that have been newly rekindled by the Pope; fulfilling these aspirations will surely be difficult since any concession would inevitably benefit the Catholic Church either directly or indirectly, which has, as it is, never been as powerful in Poland as at present. The population's expectations have risen and will continue to do so.

Though the internal effects of the visit have been on the whole negative for the regime, the external effects have - because of the limited criticism from Moscow - reinforced the regime's position and strengthened the potential for reform. Long-term developments cannot be defined yet but the parameters for both sides have clearly emerged. The regime will therefore be compelled once more to steer a middle course between two evils. Vis-a-vis Moscow this will probably mean, as was the case after August 1980, declarations of loyalty, pledges that are hard to honour, and the assertion that the Pope's visit was a success in that, among other things, it strengthened the readiness of those among the Ten who do not maintain normal relations with Poland to normalize them, both in the political and the economic field, [thus relieving Moscow of a burden]. Vis-a-vis its own population, the Polish regime might attempt to stem the tide of expectations by certain gestures [termination of martial law, amnesties on the national holiday [22 July] etc.] in the hope that the current feeling of

elation will again gradually be reduced to resignation by the constraints of everyday life and can thus be brought under greater control. The lifting of martial law, though no major step after its suspension, will be of symbolic importance. It remains to be seen, albeit with some scepticism, whether, above and beyond this, the Government has the determination and ability to exploit the momentum imparted to the nation by the Pope's visit for the purpose of achieving national reconciliation. Even though notably the position of the hardliners in the Polit Bureau, the persisting unclear position of Walesa and the opaque events in the Osservatore Romano cannot totally exclude a deterioration of the situation, the impetus for reforms in the future seems strengthened.

2. PUWP, PRON

At the 12th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, General Jaruzelski secured a short-term success for himself by means of a tactical victory over the Orthodox Party members. Whether he can consolidate his position and policy by the autumn will depend on how he manages to persuade Moscow that the Pope's trip was a successful product of the "policy of normalization" and thus neutralize the clearly audible criticism in orthodox circles. On the other hand, if Jaruzelski is unable to register any success in the social, economic or even foreign sphere [vis-a-vis the West] by the 13th Plenary Session of the Central Committee in the autumn, he might come under great pressure to adopt a tougher course.

The Polit Bureau's meeting 25 June has shown the amount of dissenting opinions between hardliners and the reformist group. Against the background of the Pope's visit, the PUWP will probably find it even more difficult to fulfil its leading role. Especially among workers, commitment to the party increasingly calls for a martyr's outlook.

Even more than the development in the PUWP, PRON, which is the successor to the "National Front", demonstrates the lack of social success by the Government. PRON, whose membership is stagnant at about 500,000 is largely composed of old-age pensioners. Although sections of the PUWP continue to distance themselves from PRON because they consider it detrimental to the party, PRON is largely controlled by the party's apparatus. PRON has not managed to achieve any progress on major domestic issues. It is very questionable whether the hope injected by the Pope has got through to PRON as well.

3. TRADE UNIONS, AUTONOMOUS BODIES, OTHER SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Trade Unions, which are likewise largely made up of old-age pensioners, have scarcely become more attractive, especially in large factories. The possible impact of the talks between the Pope and Jaruzelski regarding Trade Unions is, at present, not discernible.

The Government's constant assurances of its will for reform have been largely discredited by the continuing effects of the militarization of factories, autonomous bodies have been divested of their principal rights, reform has been manipulated by the party, and there is growing administrative pressure to undermine the independence of factories. The concept of "autonomy as a factor of social integration" has dissipated.

The regime's efforts to settle the problems of the artists associations by inducing them to change their composition and statutes have had only very limited success. On the last day of the Pope's visit the main artists' association was dissolved owing to a lack of positive initiatives by its executive committee. June 29th the Association of Writers was suspended for a further period. But almost all the "Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals" have received permission to operate again.

4. THE ECONOMY

a) ECONOMIC SITUATION

Even though Poland's economic situation continued to improve in certain sectors until May 1983, the country is still a long way from overcoming its economic problems. [On 22 June Jaruzelski stated: The results of the economic reform thus far have not produced the anticipated results in the management of factories].

From August 1983 onwards, according to Polish data, industrial production rose steadily compared with the corresponding months of the previous year, but the figure for 1982 as a whole was still less than that attained in 1981.

The Polish endeavours for economic consolidation are reflected above all in

- Efforts for comprehensive, long-term debt arrangements and western loans.
- The three-year plan [1983-85] which was adopted at the end of 1982 and is designed to improve the standard of living, housing construction, exports and the fight against inflation.
- Constant reviews to determine whether capital projects that have already been initiated but are now quiescent should be continued.
- The plans for membership of the International Monetary Fund [IMF].

According to official statistics, the Polish rate of inflation is 61.5 per cent at present.

In the agricultural sector there are signs that the supply of basic foodstuffs for the population, which still poses problems, is steadily improving. However, the supply of poultry has dropped by 56.8 per cent owing to the discontinuation of American fodder supplies.

b] EXTERNAL TRADE

According to the Polish data, Poland's external trade developed in a positive manner between January and May 1983 [exports rose by 15.2 per cent, imports by 17.8 per cent]. In 1982, Poland's external trade reached a volume of 1,809.4 billion zloty [approx. 20,000 million US dollars]. According to Polish data, a surplus of 1,300 million US dollars was achieved in trade with western countries in 1982 [6 per cent rise in exports, 17 per cent decline in imports]. Between January and May 1983, exports to capitalist countries rose by 7.2 per cent and imports from these countries by 9.5 per cent. There is at present a trade surplus of 39,700 million zloty [approx. 420 million US dollars]. In the same period, exports to socialist countries rose by 15.9 per cent and imports by 22.6 per cent. [Total trade with these countries in 1983 amounted to 1,161.9 billion zloty [approx. 13,000 million US dollars].

There are signs that the Soviet Union is trying to link Poland to itself more closely in economic terms [cf. Soviet-Polish economic talks in Moscow on 11 April 1983, signature on 14 April 1983 of an agreement on cooperation in the construction of nuclear power stations]. The trade figures published by the Soviet Union show that Poland is the Soviet Union's largest customer in COMECON and that Soviet imports from Poland rose by 32.9 per cent in the first quarter of 1983. On the other hand, Poland is largely dependent on western technology [spare parts and supplementary equipment for machinery and plant obtained from the West].

5. ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION

As far as can be made out at present, the Pope's visit was, from the Soviet point of view, a negative event for Jaruzelski [massive audience at all sermons, Pope's criticism of the legitimacy of the existing Polish Government] and will therefore have caused great displeasure in the Soviet Union. With Poland in mind, Andropov voiced strong condemnation on 16 June of a "bourgeois and reformist course of development"; on 17 June Gromyko lamented that the "class enemy" was trying to weaken and divide the socialist community, but at the same time emphasized that "Poland is and remains an inseparable part of the socialist community". There is the danger that, following the Pope's visit, the Soviet Union will again apply greater pressure on Poland to pursue a policy of repression. But the Soviet Union will wait for further developments in Poland before taking a clear position as the lack of reactions to the papal visit in the Soviet media demonstrates.

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