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Canadian Delegation
to NATO

Délégation du Canada
auprès de l'OTAN

Reg. PA
Mr. Cella
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Serbriakoff
Mr. Jolil
Mr. Abrahamson

REG. P.A.
ACTION SLIP
No 2225/83

CONFIDENTIAL

Brussels,
14 February 1983

SUBJECT: Poland - Where Does NATO Go from Here?

Dear Mr. Cella,

P. A. Sub - Registry
File No 19-10-01

At last week's meeting of the Political Committee, you will recall there was a brief discussion of the need to fulfil a Council instruction last December that the Committee prepare a new appreciation of the situation in Poland, following the suspension of martial law, and of the implications for the Alliance. (Poland)

As an aid to orderly consideration of the issue, we have prepared a series of questions which we believe address the main considerations which should inform alliance policy on the issue. It is our hope that Allies might see some value in preparing their contributions in such a way as to respond, directly or otherwise, to the questions posed.

Mindful of John F. Kennedy's observation: "I can evade questions without help; what I need is answers", we have answers too.

I am copying this letter and attachment to other members of the Political Committee.

Yours sincerely,

Paul H. Chapin,
Counsellor

Attachment

Mr. Glen R. Cella,
Acting Chairman, Political Committee,
NATO Headquarters,
Brussels.

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DISCUSSION PAPER

Poland - Where Does NATO Go from Here?

1. In assessing NATO policy towards Poland, there are questions of fact, principle and strategy to be considered.
2. The principal question of fact is whether Poland has met our three criteria. For instance:
 - Have all the internees been released, and does the existence of political prisoners and "political" conscripts affect our judgement as to the degree of Polish compliance with our criteria?
 - Is the suspension of martial law, the withdrawal of much of the army and police presence, and the lifting of most constraints on daily life tantamount to compliance, and if not what more is required? How does the institutionalization of certain constraints through permanent changes in Polish law affect the situation?
 - To what extent has the criteria of "dialogue" been met, insofar as the Church and Solidarity are concerned?
3. A second question is whether Poland has moved significantly in the direction of meeting our criteria. For instance:
 - If the record is less than fully satisfactory, does it nonetheless represent substantial change from the situation in January 1982?
 - Does it constitute the positive "signal" whose desirability we were urging upon the Poles?
4. A third question is whether the Polish authorities can be expected to undertake any further measures of relaxation. For instance:
 - Is it likely that there will be an amnesty for many or all political prisoners, or a complete lifting of martial law?
 - Will the Polish authorities ever give up their tight control of the media?

- Will they be willing eventually to re-legalize Solidarnosc?
- Will they be willing to permit a return to the situation in December 1981?
- Will there ever be a time when we can say that all that we have hoped for has been accomplished?

5. A fourth question is whether Western sanctions can be expected to have a material effect on future course of events in Poland. For instance:

- How much scope does the Jaruzelski regime, or any conceivable replacement, have to undertake significant improvements in the situation within the next year or two?
- Would the imposition of tougher sanctions, the maintenance of present ones, or their termination likely influence the situation, for good or ill?
- Has the time come when we can say that sanctions have achieved all they are going to?

6. The main question of principle is whether we are determined to insist on real and complete fulfilment of our criteria as a condition for any move on our part toward restoration of more normal relations with Poland. A subsidiary question is whether by our criteria we mean a return to the freedoms of December 12, 1981, and before.

7. If so, a number of related questions arise:

- Are we prepared to write off our relations with Poland as long as the régime there is more repressive than it was before the imposition of martial law?
- Even indefinitely?
- What are the implications of this position for our relations with other, generally more, repressive régimes in the Soviet bloc?

8. If, on the other hand, we are willing to consider changes in our policy to reflect some amelioration in the Polish situation, a number of questions of strategy require answers:

- In which of the three categories of our sanctions would changes be appropriate (denial of new credits, refusal to reschedule, collateral measures)?

- What would be the best timing for such changes, bearing in mind the political and psychological impact these changes would have on the Polish government, the Polish population, and international public opinion?
- Should these changes be linked to specific instances of improvement in the situation in Poland and be reversible in the event of new repressive measures?
- How could we prevent these changes from looking like some kind of seal of approval for the Polish government's recent acts of harassment or for the status quo?