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POLAND: NAC MEETING 20 OCTOBER 1982

As seen by the United Kingdom, the main objectives are:

- (a) to avoid Soviet military intervention in Poland;
- (b) to preserve as many as possible of the gains made by Solidarity and to keep alive the prospect of a return to renewal and reform;
- (c) to preserve Poland as a divisive element in the Warsaw Pact and COMECON;
- (d) to keep open Poland's windows to the West;
- (e) to do nothing which might prejudice eventual repayment by Poles of their international debt.

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P. A. Sub - Registry  
File No *19-10-81 (Poland)*

POLAND:

MEETING OF NAC: 20 OCTOBER

REG. P. A.  
ACTION SLIP  
No 14698/82

### PURPOSE OF MEETING

1. My Government hope that today's meeting may form a valuable part of the preparation for the meeting of Foreign Ministers in December, when we would envisage the need for a strong public statement on Poland to mark the first anniversary of martial law on 13 December. Such a statement could either form part of the main communiqué or be issued separately.

### MINISTERIAL STATEMENT

2. In the UK's view, it will be important that such a statement should spring from firm agreement of the Allies on our long-term objectives towards Poland, what we can realistically expect to achieve and what will be the right policy to effect these aims. We hope that in the period leading up to the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, we can compare analyses and jointly assess the best and most effective way of bringing our influence to bear on the situation in Poland in the longer term.

/LONGER TERM NATURE

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## LONGER TERM NATURE OF PROBLEM

3. The present crisis in Poland seems to us to be different both in quality and in scale from previous crises in Eastern Europe. Poland has traditionally been the least receptive of all Eastern European states to the Communist system imposed since 1945. The present acute phase of the crisis has lasted since August 1980, although it changed in December 1981 from an attempt at political and economic revolution to simmering rebellion against martial law. But in a sense Poland has been in a state of crisis for many years. Western policies should take account of the long term nature of the problem. We need to formulate our policy towards Poland in this perspective and within the overall framework of our policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This we judge to be part of 'the spirit of La Sapiniere', although as I have made clear we believe that consideration of the Polish issue, which concerns us now, can and should be separated from the follow-up to La Sapiniere.

OBJECTIVES

4. As seen by the UK, our main objectives are:

- (a) to avoid Soviet military intervention in Poland;
- (b) to preserve as many as possible of the gains made by Solidarity and to keep alive the prospect of a return to renewal and reform;
- (c) to preserve Poland as a divisive element in the Warsaw Pact and CMEA;
- (d) to keep open Poland's window to the West;
- (e) to do nothing which might prejudice eventual



repayment by Poles of their international debt;

WESTERN POLICY

5. It is important that our policy should be based on realism and consistency and should avoid piecemeal decisions and piecemeal public statements. Realism must consist in recognising what the West can achieve by outside pressure and in distinguishing between measures intended ~~outside~~ to demonstrate disapproval and those which could promote our concrete objectives. Consistency will lie in adopting policies which are sustainable over the longer term and which match our aims. The West should adopt policies aimed at evolutionary, not revolutionary, change. They should be reversible when, and if, conditions improve.

ACTION

6. My Government believe such a policy should seek to <sup>and where possible</sup> maximise points of contact with the Polish people and maintain pressure on the Polish authorities to enlarge the areas where the majority of the Polish people have a say in the way in which their country is run.

7. Elements of a policy to achieve this could include:

- (a) Public Statements. We should continue to hold the Polish authorities to their promises to return to the path of dialogue and renewal. The West should

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continue to condemn repression in Poland and call for the lifting of martial law - perhaps we should say 'military rule' since martial law could be technically lifted but its substance maintained by other means - and the release of all <sup>the</sup> of/détainees and political prisoners. While it <sup>technically</sup> may be/unrealistic to call for dialogue with an <sup>nevertheless</sup> organisation now formally dissolved,/we should continue to insist on normal trade union freedoms, on dialogue with the elected representatives of Solidarity, and that the spirit and wishes that inspired Solidarity should be permitted free expression in Poland.

- (b) International Organisations. We should continue to press the Polish regime in fora such as the ILO and the resumed Madrid CSCE Review meeting... The International Trade Union movement is playing a leading role in the ILO which governments should support.
- (c) Contacts with the Polish Government. At high levels these should be limited while martial law military rule persists and no bilateral ministerial visits of a political nature should take place. Any resumption of official contacts should take place on the basis of consultations and coordination within the Alliance; such contacts being used as a means of reinforcing

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Alliance views with the Polish authorities.

- (d) Links with the Polish People. We must build bridges to the Polish people and demonstrate that the West cares about their plight. Efforts should be made to maintain a high level of broadcasts and other information to the Polish people and direct cultural links should be maintained and exploited to the full. Humanitarian aid to the Polish people should be continued.
- (e) Economic. The Poles should at some point be called to account for their debts. The UK attaches importance to the Creditor Governments meeting on 25/26 October to establish the present facts of the Polish economic situation and to consider the financial implications of various possible courses of action and of possible developments. The West should make it clear that it is prepared to resume a more normal economic relationship with Poland when the authorities are prepared to return to the path of dialogue and conciliation with their own people

SOVIET UNION

8. The UK will maintain in place the national measures taken against the Soviet Union and announced on 5 February. We will continue to make it clear to the Soviet Union that any

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more direct intervention in Poland would have major repercussions for East/West relations as a whole. We will criticise Soviet complicity in the imposition of martial law and any Soviet attempts to put pressure on the Polish authorities.

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