

cc: DSG
PH
Exec

UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Brussels

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~~ACTION SLIP~~
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NATO SECRET

Dear Joseph:

Secretary Haig has written to other Allied Foreign Ministers with regard to Saturday's Council meeting. Noting that the situation in Poland has not improved since the issuance of the Alliance Declaration -- and, if anything, actually has deteriorated -- the Secretary underscores the importance of reaching concrete decisions at our January 23 meeting on political and economic measures.

I have been asked to brief you on the points made by the Secretary to his colleagues and enclose for this purpose a paper containing the substantive elements of his letters to Allied Foreign Ministers.

Yours very sincerely,

Taf

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure: As stated

His Excellency
Joseph M.A.H. Luns,
Secretary General,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Brussels.

NATO SECRET

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U.S. Delegation
January 21, 1982

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Letters to Allied Foreign
Ministers Regarding January 23 Council Meeting

-- As we approach the January 23 Reinforced Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, to take measures in response to the situation in Poland, it is important to recognize that conditions in Poland have actually deteriorated since the Ministerial meeting on January 11. Severe repression appears now to be a reality for the indefinite future. Large numbers of political prisoners continue to be held. If anything, the human rights situation is considerably worse, with heightened secret police activity, large scale arrests and firings, dismissals of ordinary workers, and intense pressure on workers to renounce solidarity and, in effect, their own aspirations for a more open, just and productive society.

-- At the same time, Soviet officials have told us that the restoration of dialogue in Poland is out of the question, because that would mean placing Solidarity on the same level as the government. They are attempting politically to decapitate Solidarity by relegating Walesa to the status of a political non-person, and some are even insisting that while a union in some form may be able to survive, it could not even use the name "Solidarity". This not only again gives the lie to Soviet claims of non-intervention, it is a tragic commentary on the likely future direction of events in Poland if the Allies stand idly by.

-- It is therefore all the more important to emerge from the January 23 meeting with decisions in hand on political and economic measures which can help to achieve our objectives in Poland. To do otherwise would be a disservice to the Polish people and to what we stand for as Allies. It would frankly raise the prospect for the United States of being forced to take additional steps to ensure that the overall message sent by the West is sufficiently clear and forceful to have a chance of influencing events.

-- We have of course set out in our Declaration the general areas in which we will be working to effect these measures. What is needed now is to translate

those general principles into specific actions. On the political side, these hopefully would include such national decisions as additional restrictions on the size and movements of Soviet and Polish diplomatic missions and on reduction/non-renewal of exchanges. In the economic field, hopefully we can reach agreement on visible, significant and demonstrative measures. At a minimum, this should include the announcement that notice is being given that certain steps will be taken or that certain agreements will be suspended or allowed to lapse. The crucial point is that these national decisions have immediate impact on Soviet and Polish decision-making and maintain a maximum of Allied unity and credibility.

-- Advantage should also be taken of the opportunity provided by the January 23 meeting to begin a longer term discussion of where the Allies are going in East-West relations as a result of the new Polish reality and Soviet conduct. This discussion should deal with such difficult issues as agricultural commodities, the security dimension of technology transfer to and energy dependence on the Soviet Union, and financial dealings with the East.

-- It is crucial to act now to maintain the momentum and the credibility established with the Alliance Declaration on January 11. The Polish people and Allied publics look to us to give substance to the earnest of good intentions contained in the Declaration. The Allies can only deter the Soviet and Polish authorities, and bring about a return to democratic renewal in Poland, if they are willing to act on those intentions.