

REG. PA
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REG. P. A.
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No 2 8 AVR. 1982



Canadian Delegation



7 JAN. 1982 to Reg.
Reg. PA

cc: DSG
REG/PA
3285

Délégation du Canada

SECRET

X (81) 2993

Brussels,
23 December 1981

P. A. Sub - Registry

File No 19.10.01 *Poland*

Dear Secretary General,

At the Council meeting today, I said I would be circulating copies of the proposals I made for measures which might be taken in respect of the situation in Poland. I am doing so as an aid to reflecting on decisions which might be made at the Council meeting anticipated for December 30.

Attached is a copy of the proposals in question. Similar material is being sent to other members of the Council.

Yours sincerely,

John Halstead
J.G.H. Halstead,
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

Enclosure (1)

H.E. Joseph M.A.H. Luns,
Secretary General,
N A T O.

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TALKING POINTS

1. The present Canadian approach to the situation in Poland takes as its starting point recognition of the tragic character of what has been happening in that country.
2. But we should not let understandable emotion blind us to the realities of the situation with which we are confronted. Part of these realities is the geopolitical situation of the Poles.
3. Given these realities, it is our policy as reiterated by the Prime Minister on December 18 that the Poles should be left to resolve their own problems without outside interference. We have maintained the hope, that with restraint and good judgment by all concerned in Poland, this would be possible without triggering overt Soviet intervention. We deeply regret that the process of internal reconciliation has been interrupted by the imposition of martial law, and we hope that there will be an early return to dialogue between the principal parties.
4. Realistically, however, we must recognize that under the present circumstances our choices do not lie between the good and the bad, but rather between the bad and the worse. Worst of all would be civil war and overt Soviet intervention. Our main effort, therefore, should be exerted to preventing this eventuality. We should base ourselves for the time being on the assumption that there is still a possibility of a

moderate outcome, and we should do our best to discourage continuance of the repressive regime.

5. None of us is naive enough to think there is no Soviet complicity in the events in Poland; but such complicity is an unavoidable fact of life in Eastern Europe. However, if we try to make the Russians pay a price for their intervention before they actually do so directly, we will have used up our leverage and the Russians will have little to lose. So we believe it is important to maintain a distinction between the way we treat the Polish and Soviet authorities at the present time.

6. In light of these considerations, it seems to us it would make sense at the present juncture to take the following steps:

- (a) to maintain food aid to the Poles in the interest of short-term stability
- (b) to continue to fulfil existing contractual commitments for longer-term economic aid for time being, but to undertake no new initiatives under current circumstances
- (c) to consider what package of positive economic measures would be appropriate in conditions where the Poles repeal

martial law, release prisoners, permit the re-establishment of Solidarity, and begin reconciliation talks

- (d) to take no economic measures against the USSR for the time being
- (e) to make high-level démarches in Warsaw expressing concern over the situation, urging the Polish authorities to exercise restraint and to seek a broad national consensus, and asking them how they intend to fulfil their promises and to solve the crisis in a manner consistent with the financial and human rights commitments Poland has entered into
- (f) to make further high-level démarches in Moscow to reiterate the principle of non-interference and to warn of the grave consequences of intervention, and
- (g) to keep a close watch on developments in Poland, including particularly efforts of the Catholic church to restore a dialogue, and withholding any plans for an emergency NATO ministerial meeting for the time being.