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POLITICAL SITUATION IN AND AROUND POLAND

( SPEAKING NOTES OF THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE  
IN THE COUNCIL MEETING OF JULY 8TH, 1981 )

On the basis of assessments of the Italian Embassy in Warsaw, our appraisal of the political developments in and around Poland can be synthesized as follows:

The Soviets appear to be increasingly looking for valid and possibly steady and symmetrical " guarantees " as an alternative to any kind of direct intervention, that can not be excluded " a priori ", but that seems to be unlikely in a near future and will represent for Moscow the last, the very last " ratio ". More and more these guarantees are presented as a kind of " legitime defense " against the intervention of " imperialistic " forces based on the Poland and aimed to overthrow the East-<sup>W</sup>Est balance.

Ideological guarantees. Certainly, the project for a new Statute of the Party prepared under the direction of Olszewski is not revolutionary but not either excessively conservative and " reactionary ". It rather appears as a compromise of the Polish " specificity " within which are admitted a series of variants ( freedom, publicity and transparency of the debates, but not fractionarism, democracy from the bottom and free elections, but under the

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control of the " democratic centralism "; national values but also proletarian internationalism; cooperation with the social groups and the church but under the Party's hegemony in the framework of a new and enlarged " national front ", rotation of offices but without excesses and with exceptions and so on ..)

The " Tribyna Ludu " reports accordingly that the Polish " reality " is a compromise of marxists and believers aimed at creating a political and moral unity exclusively composed of democratic methods capable to <sup>harmonizing</sup> ~~contrast~~ contrasting views and interests. We do not want the kind of unity imposed from the exterior by <sup>force</sup> ~~the strength~~ and producing social pressures.

Only a democratically <sup>ly</sup> elected Party is credible for its own basis ".

Parties' leaders continue to do their best in order to diminish the anxiety of Moscow. Jaruzelski speaks of a " return to Leninist rules " ; Rakowki avoids - for the moment - to speak again of " Polish socialism " and invites Solidarnosc to strictly limit itself to the competences relevant to trade union. Kania said that the structures able to increase Politburo capacity of control should be strenghtned during the Congress itself and afterwards ( examples: "two levels of meetings at the Congress, a plenary one and one composed of sixteen working groups"; " a time limit of 15 minutes for every speaker " ; the setting up of a Praesidium of the

Central Committee and of its Commissions in order to assure a better coordination ".

The fact that the invitations to attend the Congress have been limited to the delegations of the Warsaw/<sup>Pact</sup> Parties and of Yugoslavia may certainly be explained - on technical ground - by the fact that the Congress is an extraordinary one. However, it confirms the closing vis-à-vis Eurocommunism, in spite of Eurocommunism undoubted influences on the right wing of the Party. The effects of these influences can actually be found in the principles inspiring the new Statute.

Moscow seems to be worried because the very high percentage of new people ( well above the expected figures ) among the two thousands delegates to the Congress ( roughly 80% ) can eliminate the present members of the two top bodies of the Party - the Politburo and the Secretariat - which seemed to form a compact group and gives the way to those " social-democratic " and " christian-democratic " tendencies which Grabski denounced in the theses of the basis.

Whatever could be the number of delegates belonging to Solidarnosc ( the most recent figure - perhaps in order not to increase Moscow worries - seems to be only 25% ) or to the Intelligencia ( so largely represented ) , there is the feeling that realism will prevail and that it will be approved a statute which can receive the green light or - at least - the yellow light by Moscow.

This feeling is spread both in Party and Government circles and in Solidarnosc : " milieux ". This lightens the situation and justifies a certain optimism.

Economic guarantees.

The unofficial comments of Warsaw about the Sofia's COMECON Meeting, presented with the angle of a new orientation of the Polish Economy towards the COMECON Countries are known: Jaruzelski said that the umbrella of the East is not only a military but also an economic one; the idea, was also introduced, of a better use, by the Allies, of the Polish productive capacity considered partially inactive.

The Jaruzelski's declarations at Sofia, which have been widely publicised in Warsaw, are all of this kind.

Military guarantees.

The military exercises which took place in Slesia, unusually publicised considering their entity qualified as "modest" by the Western Military Attachés, and the rumors about new military Warsaw Pact exercises for the half July, seem to be, a part from their possible effects of intimidation, sophisticated signals of a reinforced military integration between Poland and the Warsaw Pact.

Political guarantees.

The visit of Czyrek to Belgrade and of Gromiko to Warsaw seem to be part of the effort that Moscow is presently making

for a more active participation of Poland in the " diplomatic counter-offensive " of "peace and detente" aiming at the consolidation of a military , but also political , status quo in Europe which appears to her as threatened by many Western initiatives.

The genuine interest of Warsaw for a renewed Est-West dialogue in several areas (Missiles, Madrid, Desarmement ) helping the consolidation of its " new trend " is once again for Moscow a point of force.

The Polish government, subject to pressures of URSS on one side and well aware, on the other, of the necessity of avoiding violent moves presenting the risk of explosions tries to gain time and to space difficulties.

The main part of the austerity policy has been already postponed after the Congress and Kania said that the Congress may last longer than the foreseen 4 days and could be divided in two phases. It is also possible that Kania thinking of the creation of the function of Party Chairman in conjunction with that of Secretary General is aiming at a possible compromise with OLSZOWSKI. Such a compromise could lead, in his perspective,

to a centrality more rigid and restrictive than the present one but always very far away from the "hard line" of a Grabski or Zabiski.

But nor Solidarnosc neither the Church can push too much the policy of moderation: the moods of the country would not allow it.

Kulaj was ~~accused~~ of saying in private, terrible things about the Russians.

At the inauguration of the monument for the "fallen of Poznan" the Church as well as Solidarnosc were very firm on the defence of the national values and on the unity symbolized by the monument (a warning to dispel illusions on the possibility of dividing the radicals from the moderates, ~~to exert a repression on the Kor was made~~).

Moreover Solidarnosc is against an immediate adoption of the package of economic reforms by the Parliament: this despite Rakowski's statement/ according to which this could be the only way to avoid anarchy and wild strikes when powerful unions tend to force the law.

Solidarnosc can not admit, in fact, the principle of

"unconcern for policy" to be interpreted in a most reductive way.

The Solidarinocs bulletin has strongly criticised the visit of Gromiko as " having di aim of preventing a totalutarian organisation from becoming a democratic one".

3. It is therefore possible to speak in view of the Congress of a certain "stabilization within the instability" of the Polish situation. But this stabilization requires sense of moderation, realism, awareness of the limits not only by Solidarnosc, which is to say by the Country, but also by Moscow.

We should moreover keep in mind that in Warsaw it is very clear the elaboration of the "Poland strategy" under way in Moscow: an alternative but also a substitute of a direct and global intervention. This strategy tends in fact to reinforce an Eastern integration in all the sectors within the context of a diplomatic counter-offensive of peace and détente.

In this perspective two factors in particular must be taken into account. The one concerning the economic measures taken by Moscow to condition Poland and the <sup>OTHER</sup> ~~element~~ relevant to the <sup>CONNECTION</sup> ~~relationship~~ made by Warsaw between the East-West dialogue and the strengthening of the new course of the Country.

As to the first one of these two factors, it must be noted that the Eastern press campaign on the paralysis of the Polish production and the non-fulfilments of Poland <sup>commitment</sup> towards its socialist partners appears too symptomatic to be casual; and in this same meaning it should be understood the wording of those that, at the occasion of the meeting of the COMECON's Chiefs of Government in Sofia, have indicated the non-availability of the "brothers" countries to burden themselves with the economic problems of ~~the~~ Poland. At this regard it can be pointed out that the Bulgarian Ambassador in Warsaw has gone so far with his Italian colleague to say that is not even thinkable to continue with food supplies to Poland if this latter will not resume regular coal deliveries to the Eastern European countries, and some allusions to the burden of the economic assistance to Poland and to ~~the~~ its scarce productivity <sup>of the work</sup>, together with a standard of life incompatible with the country's resources, have appeared in the occasion of various talks of the same Italian Ambassador with Soviet representatives. However, a possible economic block, even if it would result from a Polish non-fulfilment

in the exchanges and from the parallel - and in itself legitimate - attitude of the socialist partners of Poland, it would raise in that Country a new anti-Soviet wave, and because of the risk of stirring up uncontrollable reactions, it would have to come into the Moscow's plans only if, worsening the situation, it would be looking for some other kind of intervention. Intervention that, on the other side, would test out the Western Countries, by exposing them to aid requests largely higher than some important refinancing.

As to the second element to take into account, that is the one relevant with the connection made by the Poles between the resumption of the East-West dialogue and the strengthening of the new course in Poland, we consider very meaningful some considerations expressed to the Italian Ambassador in Warsaw by the Polish Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dobrosieski, who has affirmed that "are wrong those who esteem that keeping on at Madrid they help Poland; in the facts they can only damage it because so are fed the Soviet global worries of a rupture of the present East-West balances". "From a technical point of view - Dobrosieski said - the various proposals and formulas brought up at Madrid can offer a good margin of compromise. From a political point of view, it is not necessary to postpone in order to have a clear vision of the future of the Poland. <sup>of this</sup> ~~It is~~ the ruinous hypothesis, that the Polish Governemtn "doesn't believe", should have to take place, there would be time and way to cancel, because of a new situation, all the Western engagements".

Certainly the topic of a connection between the resumption of the East-West dialogue and the strengthening of the new Polish trend, also as a defence against any revocatory or restrictive intention of Moscow, is not a new one: it is a constant element in the Polish diplomacy, and it is particularly strengthened in time of tension. It appears just worthwhile to note that in this unchanging attitude there is, as always, a ~~fixed~~ <sup>constant</sup> bivalence: that is, the support of the Eastern general strategy together with the defence of the national Polish interest to safeguard or to re-establish an international situation of East-West dialogue and cooperation, capable to deter Moscow - by raising the price - from the temptation to solve by strength the Polish "question".

In these outlines, and with all the ambiguities marking them, the developments of the new Polish course appear to be destined to last further ~~on~~ the Poup Congress. This, in the light also of the recent visit in Poland of Gromyko (that seems to have resulted if not in a "green light" at least in a "yellow light" as to the political compromise that is surfacing within the Party), will probably be considered not as a dead-line for alternative and more or less reversible developments, but as a further and obliged stage of a long and hard process of political maturity to whose prolongation we must be prepared to adjust ourselves.