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**POLISH SITUATION IN THE WAKE OF THE 11th PARTY PLENUM**

The Polish crisis has moved from one of confrontation between Solidarity and the Government to one of confrontation between the Polish party and the CPSU. If Walesa remains at home to control the minority of hot heads within Solidarity and if the Church continues, as it did in the past week, to exert strong influence on behalf of compromise, labor calm may prevail through the mid-July party congress. The period, however, will be marked by increasing Soviet pressure on the Polish party -- pressure aimed at change in Party leadership, reversal of reforms and postponement of the Congress.

The Soviets will do their utmost to work their influence on the current Central Committee, because they recognize that the Party Congress will bring major turnover in the Central Committee, transforming it into a more worker-oriented body less amenable to Soviet pressure. Brezhnev's June 5 letter, combined with Kulikov's threats in Warsaw, forced the Special Plenum June 9-10. At that plenum, hardliners spearheaded by Grabski and evidently egged on by the Soviets, clearly failed after a struggle which may have added to Kania's stature, at least temporarily. The hardliners lack any real constituencies and appear to be in no position to force a postponement of the Party Congress.

Kania has declared his intention to proceed with the Party Congress, with reforms and peaceful negotiation of disputes. He should enjoy increased cooperation from Solidarity now that he is seen as the clear target of Russian opposition -- a definite plus in the Polish mind. At the same time, he will, as he did in his opening report to the Plenum, attempt to mollify the Soviets with tough words about combatting "counter-revolutionary" forces. Indeed, he quickly moved to follow-up these words with action. Following his closing speech of June 11, Kania reshuffled the party's media cadre. This has been followed by a conciliatory speech by Walesa, in which he eschewed a political role for Solidarity and urged cooperation with the Government.

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The June 11 announcement to the Sejm by Prime Minister Jaruzelski that five ministers have asked to be relieved of their duties is but another sign of the improved position of Kania and Jaruzelski and their intention to tighten economic management. Four of those relieved (Planning Commission President Kisiel, International Trade Minister Kowalik, Telecommunications Minister Rudnicki, and Minister-in-Charge of the Price Commission Gawrysiak) have economic responsibilities, suggesting that the Government will be getting more serious about addressing the country's economic problems. The sacking of Justice Minister Bafia will be welcome news to Solidarity and should lead to further consolidation of labor calm.

A wide range of scenarios is possible in the next two months. There could be major domestic unrest if the Soviets are able to engineer repressive measures by security elements, even if Solidarity and the Polish leadership continue to pursue a non-confrontational course. Only if there is such unrest could martial law or a state of emergency be justified; if this did happen, further chaos could develop, justifying Soviet intervention. The present economic scene is very gloomy, and the reform efforts may well be further slowed by the present political problems; however, the food situation at least will presumably not get worse during the summer, reducing one ground for additional discontent. All in all, a most likely situation may be one of considerable continuing turmoil in which, however, the present Party and Solidarity leadership maintain control, the party congress goes forward on schedule, and the Soviets decide that intervention could have incalculable consequences, leading them to settle for a lesser solution such as an increased Soviet military presence along communication lines to the GDR.

We assume that the Soviets, rebuffed for the moment, will increase their pressure. Pressures could take the form of new letters, more explicit reiteration of the Brezhnev doctrine, visits of Soviet hardliners to Warsaw, the summoning of the Polish leadership to Moscow, joint meetings of the Soviet-Polish Politburos, a Warsaw Pact summit, and new maneuvers.

We have heard several rumors of a high-level Pact meeting but it is possible that no agreement has been reached on one. There are indications that some, notably Hungary and Romania, may be wavering on the question. At the same time, we have seen a harder press line on Poland, even in Budapest. With

this in mind, we have been lobbying in Eastern European capitals, reminding the host governments of the dire consequences for our bilateral relations of their participation in a Soviet intervention, and questioning their motives in permitting anti-Polish articles. Initial responses to these demarches have been reasonably encouraging, but we must assume the Soviets will be able to garner sufficient Pact support against Poland if they use sufficient pressure. We are encouraged, too, with the reaction in Allied capitals to our suggestion that other Allies make demarches of their own in Eastern Europe.

We have also used opportunities of meetings in the past week with Dobrynin and Bessmertnykh to point out again the cost to the Soviets of an intervention. Our press guidance chides the Soviets more strongly about their political interference in Poland's internal affairs, hoping thereby to counter any reassertion of the Brezhnev doctrine and to buck up those Polish CC members who would resist Soviet pressure.

It will be important in the next month to maintain an Allied show of unity and to do what we can to promote calm and stability within Poland. We firmly believe the promise of stern Allied countermeasures has been important as a deterrent. Allied unity will continue to play a major role in the Soviets' evaluation of the Polish situation in the weeks and months to come.