

*à mettre immédiatement sous  
le caduc*

*Reg. P.A.  
3105*

UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
(USNATO)  
Brussels

REG. P. A.  
ACTION SLIP  
No 6510/81

May 13, 1981

NATO SECRET/SENSITIVE

P. A. Sub - Registry  
File No *19-10-01 (Secret)*

Dear Joseph:

Further to Mr. Glitman's letter of April 6 on the same subject, enclosed is a report of the recent Allied contact trio meeting in Washington at which the Japanese response to our earlier approach on Polish contingency measures was made known.

I have sent copies of this letter and its enclosure to our colleagues.

Yours very sincerely,

*Wap*

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.  
Ambassador

His Excellency,  
Joseph M.A.H. Luns,  
Secretary General,  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,  
Brussels.

This Document Consists  
of three Pages

USNATO/AMB/OUT/NS/81-59  
CY 16

NATO SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

Japanese Response on Polish Contingency Measures

Japanese Embassy officers at Counselor level met with the NATO contact trio group (US, FRG, Canada) in Washington April 28 to convey the Japanese response to the Allied group's briefing on April 3.

The Japanese made the following points to the Allied group:

NATO's basic recognition with regard to the general framework of possible actions by the West in the event of Soviet and/or other Warsaw Pact military intervention in Poland ("Western objectives") coincides with that of Japan in general. On the other hand, as to the "possible political actions" and the "possible economic actions," it is difficult for Japan at the present stage to make concrete comments on each specific item since the details are still ambiguous and further careful study is needed.

However, Japan's tentative notions at present are that, apart from basic problems concerning the measures that would be in conflict with obligations under existing treaties and agreements (mainly with respect to economic actions), it seems that, in the field of "political actions," Japan can in general take concerted actions so far as they are agreed upon by the industrialized countries of the West except for those measures Japan is not related to, such as those which are concerned with CSCE; and that, in the field of "economic actions," they appear to include certain measures difficult for Japan to apply, such as measures in the area of fishing since the degree of Japan's dependence upon Soviet fishing resources is so great.

It is anticipated that in the event of Soviet intervention, measures against the Soviet Union would need to extend for a considerably long period. Upon such assumption, it is important to bear in mind that actions to be taken by the West must be feasible for the countries of the West to apply in concert and for a long duration. And it would be meaningless to apply measures that cannot prevent backdoor dealings by such means as round-about trade through non-NATO West European countries, East European countries as well as through the Third World countries.

At any rate, considering the nature of the Polish problem, Japan's decision on specific measures depends greatly upon the extent to which NATO countries will actually implement concrete measures in cooperation. It is to be hoped therefore that Japan receives as soon as possible and as precisely as possible relevant information in the case that NATO countries discuss in advance in NATO the contents of feasible measures to be concertedly taken, which would greatly facilitate the study on the part of Japan.

In expressing appreciation for the briefing the Allied representatives suggested that the venue for future meetings might be rotated among the Canadian and German embassies as well as the State Department. The Japanese Counselor undertook to report this to Tokyo but recalled his instructions call for holding all meetings at the State Department.

In response to queries about when to meet again, the Japanese suggested it would be good to meet again if and when NATO wished to pass them more detail on Allied views on the measures. It was then noted by Allied reps and not rejected by Japanese that after the NATO Ministerial it might be timely to compare notes.