




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17 February 1981

Dr J M A H Luns
Secretary General
NATO HQ



P. A. Sub - Registry
File No 19-10-01

My dear Secretary-General,

(Poland).

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ABOUT POLAND

In preparation for our meeting tomorrow to review contingency plans on the basis of the paper agreed by the Council on 23 December 1980, I am enclosing a short paper by my authorities on Measure A4 in the list included in that paper, the possible recall of Ambassadors from Moscow, and possibly from other Warsaw Pact capitals, for consultations. I hope to circulate before tomorrow's meeting, or my Ambassador will circulate at the meeting, similar papers on one or two of the other measures on the list.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to my colleagues on the Council and to the Chairman of the Military Committee.

*Yours sincerely,
Kenneth Scott.*

K B A Scott

cc: Ambassadors of
Delegations

Admiral R H Falls, CF
Chairman
Military Committee

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CONTINGENCY PLANNING ABOUT POLAND

MEASURE A4: RECALL AMBASSADORS FROM MOSCOW, AND POSSIBLY, OTHER WARSAW PACT CAPITALS FOR CONSULTATIONS

1. Withdrawal of Ambassadors, especially on a concerted basis, would have considerable public impact. On the other hand the advice of Ambassadors on the spot in Moscow could be greatly needed in the especially difficult period in East/West relations which would follow an intervention in Poland.
2. Moreover, the political impact of withdrawing Ambassadors for a relatively long period has to be weighed against the fact that their subsequent return to post might be seen as evidence of a return to business as usual.
3. But the recall of an Ambassador for consultations and new instructions may be desirable. It could be made clear at the time of recall that the Ambassador was returning to take part in a policy review and would go back to post afterwards. It would be desirable for all the Allies to act similarly in this matter, to avoid an appearance of disunity.
4. The policy adopted with regard to Ambassadors in Moscow could also be applied to Ambassadors in other Warsaw Pact countries participating in an intervention.
5. Ambassadors in Warsaw should be withdrawn if the USSR installed a puppet leadership. In other situations Western policy would depend on the circumstances. It would be important to avoid appearing to express disapproval of Polish efforts to resist Soviet forces, and there would be a particular need for Ambassadors' advice from Warsaw in a period of flux.

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