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GERMAN DELEGATION
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

DÉLÉGATION ALLEMANDE
AU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE-NORD

I-322.POL RESTRICTED

Brussels, 13 Februar 1981

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| REG. PA |
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Dear Glenn,

P. A. Sub - Registry
19-10-01 (Poland)

With reference to the discussion in the Political Committee's meeting of 10 February 1981 please find enclosed Speaking Notes concerning the situation in Poland.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to all members of the Political Committee and to the representative of the IMS.

Ys sincerely
Reinert

Encl.

Reinhart W. EHNI

Mr. Glenn R. CELLA
Chairman of the
Political Committee
N A T O - I 207

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Brussels, 13. February 1981

SPEAKING NOTES

Subject: Situation in Poland

1. The détente which has recently characterized the constant struggle between the Party and State leadership on the one hand and the free trade Union movement on the other hand will not last long. This is probably the only prognosis which can claim any degree of reliability in the eyes of the observer. While the free trade union movement officially still demands that the Party and State leadership should make concessions in the most important social fields, the Polish society has in reality begun the march towards a pluralist system, and it is difficult to see how it can be effectively stopped by tactical manoeuvring or even repressive action. The movement is about to transform itself into a political force which has set out to change the whole system.

2. After the PUWP had at first - although perhaps only half-heartedly - professed support of the concept of fundamental reform, it is now untiring in its warnings against anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary activities, anarchy and chaos. The Polish United Workers' Party is facing internal strife and has great difficulty in organizing the 9th Party Congress with up-to-date perspectives likely to restore confidence.

3. The Party itself has been strongly infected by the new movement and its ideas, starting from its rank and file and moving up into its higher hierarchical levels. Owing to the large number of dual memberships, the spirit

of "Solidarity" has entered the local organizations of the Party. It is from this direction that the radical proposals are coming - proposals which represent frontal attacks on the "democratic centralism" of the old school. The Party machinery is offering obstinate resistance, while the Politbureau is trying hard to agree on a line which might reduce the political pressure from the various directions.

4. The consolidation of Olszovsky's position as the representative of the hard line has in recent weeks apparently been overestimated. In his recent collisions with "Solidarity", he made tactical mistakes which unnecessarily worsened the situation. It is to be noted that Kania who is acting skilfully and flexibly at present appears to possess a stronger backing. In particular, he enjoys the unrestricted support of Yaruzelsky who, for his part, has the armed forces firmly under control.

5. A serious danger lies in the fact that too much time passes before the Party leadership is again able to act in a homogeneous manner. The translation of concrete decisions into practical politics by the Government is also meeting with problems which are causing irritation. Severe criticism of the Government could be heard from reformers within the Central Committee because of the Government's authoritarian attitude towards Solidarity. The Government was called upon to "learn as quickly as possible how to treat the pluralist forces as equal partners". This criticism naturally also refers to the Olszovsky wing in the Politbureau.

6. In confidential talks, the reformers openly admit that their views, too, amount to a change in the system. The rôle of the Party is no longer seen by them to consist in the more or less skilful playing-off of power positions against each other but rather in a kind of spiritual leadership.

7. Solidarity has won another round on points.

Walesa and his team are now trying to get the highly active regional unions under control and to prevent the further penetration of the political field by local protest actions. The Roman Catholic church can do little about it, because the militant rank-and-file trade unionists no longer have full confidence in it. In any case, even the Church is beginning to feel the first repercussions of the new movement. It will in future hardly be able to regard itself as an exclusive sanctuary of conservatism.

8. Apart from its difficulties with its own organization, Solidarity is faced with new and highly political disputes with the Government. Solidarity has already taken sides in the question of the agricultural trade union. The law on censorship and the trade union law offer possibilities for controversy. It will be difficult to prove the declared non-political character of the trade union in practice.

9. If the process of fermentation of the Polish society should develop in the direction of a partnership model, as desired by the reformers, experience shows that, even in the absence of outside interference, this will take so long that a fatal burden of the country can hardly be eliminated: the rapidly worsening economic situation. It is, unfortunately, impossible to say when everybody will roll up their shirtsleeves to pull the cart out of the dirt.

10. In view of the trends towards radical changes in the system, the question must indeed be asked once more: will and can this be tolerated by Poland's allies, especially the Soviet Union, in spite of the medium-term risks to the whole system? The propagandistical artillery barrage is more violent than ever. But perhaps Moscow knows that the enemy is no longer called "Solidarity" alone, that the movement now reaches much further and that the right time

for an outright intervention is long past. There are some surprising indications that Moscow has recently even exercised a moderating influence on the hardliners within the PUWP. Apart from a few Poles whose pessimism serves a specific purpose, the actors on the Polish scene have apparently closed their eyes to the danger of a Soviet intervention.