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Subject: Western Objectives in the Polish Crisis

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

REG. P. A.
ACTION SLIP
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1. The high state of readiness into which Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces have been put around Poland permits the Soviet Union

- (1) to exert pressure on Poland by the threat of force so as to make Poland comply with Moscow's demands to counteract the recent development towards more diversity in the social and political structure of Poland, or
- (2) to intervene militarily, either directly and in full scale or in a more subtle manner - as circumstances warrant.

2. The Polish government and the leading political forces in Poland (the Communist Party, Independent Trade Unions, Catholic Church, peasants) are united by strong national feelings and the desire to avoid overt Communist suppressive action either by the pro-Moscow elements of the Polish Workers Party or by Moscow itself. It is questionable whether the liberal forces and movements striving for objectives

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going beyond the present achievements (agents provocateurs?) can be contained.

3. Thus the situation remains highly instable.
4. What are the objectives of the West in this situation in the event that growing and continuing Soviet pressure reaches a point at which the text and the spirit of the Final Act of Helsinki and the UN-Charter are directly violated?
 - (1) As the Communiqué of the last Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 12 December stated, "Poland should be free to decide its own future."

Intervention by Soviet Union must not take place. The West should seek to make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to continue to exert pressure by threat of force or by the direct application of force. Warnings with strong indications emphasizing the serious consequences of such actions for the whole future of the East-West relationship have been made and will be made at various levels.

- (2) The political and other forces in Poland seeking to consolidate their achievements are aware of the Western moral support for their cause. They certainly have no doubts as to the limits of the support they can get from us, the West.

Our help consists primarily in the pressure we are able to bring to bear on Moscow to show self-restraint.

The West may have to decide in the event of critical developments short of the direct use of military force to take recourse to the United Nations Security Council under the chapter "Threat of Use of Force".

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- (3) In order to strengthen the forces of moderation in Poland, Western countries should - on a bilateral basis and/or through the European Community or through other international organizations - supply additional economic aid (credits, food, grain). This could help towards avoiding a further deterioration of the situation under the pressure of a discontented population, faced with severe food shortages.
- (4) The West will have to observe carefully the development of the situation in order to determine when, where and how the Soviet Union is in fact violating international law and the Final Act of Helsinki and crushes what has recently been achieved in Poland. Political steps suitable in such a contingency as well as the measures which eventually may constitute the new basis of the Alliance members' relationship with Moscow would have to be undertaken at the time. Our policy would have to address itself to the new conditions of East-West relations, taking into account the fact that the Soviet Union has once again suppressed the right of a whole people to determine its own future, in spite of international law and the Final Act of Helsinki. This would require political decisions at a high governmental level.
- (5) The objective of Western policy would be to denounce this form of Soviet policy, to reduce contacts and exchanges in many fields and to lay the groundwork for a new phase of realistic policies towards Moscow, guided by the readiness to resume East-West relations should the Soviet Union restore its respect for international law and the Final Act of Helsinki.

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