

*Reg. PA*

Brussels, 14 October 1980

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ACTION SLIP
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*RRDS*

P. A. Sub - Registry
File No. <i>19.10.01</i>

*(Poland)*

*Dear Glenn,*

In continuation of our discussion on political subjects in the Political Committee's meeting of 14 October I should like to enclose my Speaking Notes on

- a) our assessment of the present situation in Poland
- b) Statements of the Federal Government regarding unilateral increase of exchange quotas by the GDR *→ 19-10-01 (GDR)*
- c) the assessment of our Embassy in Moscow of the Soviet-Syrian Treaty. *→ 18.8.09*

I have been sending copies of this letter and its annexes to all colleagues on the Political Committee and the representative of the IMS.

*Yr sincerely*  
*Reinhart*

(Reinhart W. EHNI)

3 Encl.

Mr. Glenn R. CELLA  
Chairman of the  
Political Committee

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Annex a

GERMAN NATO DELEGATION

Brussels, 14 October 1980

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## SPEAKING NOTES

P. A. Sub	19-10-01
File No	19-10-01

Subject: German Evaluation of the situation in Poland and of the Soviet reaction

1. The internal political crisis in the People's Republic of Poland is not yet over. The groups involved have so far been able to avoid confrontations, although the means chosen, the strikes and the solutions found up to now, the agreements concluded in Danzig, Stettin, and in Upper Silesia represent a novelty in a socialist system. Nevertheless, the risk of a confrontation between the developing new trade union movement and the Party leadership with all its unforeseeable consequences seems to be growing. In spite of the fact that the concessions made by the Polish leadership have been integrated with the wider socialist framework, with the Polish CP's claim to leadership and with Poland's commitments towards the other members of the WP, these concessions may develop their own dynamics.

2. In other respects, the Polish CP under Kania is using more or less traditional methods of crisis management, such as charges of corruption and personnel changes. As his predecessor Gierek, Kania presents Poland's situation in a remarkable honest and sober manner. He is announcing innovations in the economic organization of the country, but within the framework of the socialist model. It remains doubtful whether he has thus convinced the politically effective forces in Poland and the population of the country.

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3. The new trade unions are seeking to enlarge their political freedom of movement. The one-hour strike on 3 October which they had intended as a warning against administrative interference was apparently not completely followed. Further protest action, such as a general strike, is possible. Should the new trade union seriously call into question the power monopoly of the Polish CP, a confrontation with the Party leadership is inevitable.

4. The Soviet Union is concerned about further developments in Poland. The attacks on anti-socialist forces which were allegedly being supported by the West (see the commentaries by "Petrov" in PRAVDA on 1, 27 and 29 September) are apparently designed by the Soviet leadership as clear public warnings to the Polish leadership which have been followed by other WP states (most recently Honecker on 6 October).

5. The Soviet Union is trying to influence developments in Poland through the Channels which are at her disposal. There have so far not been any signs of Soviet preparations for an intervention which could, however, militarily speaking, be carried out at a relatively short notice. The Soviet leadership would not hesitate to intervene if it had the impression that the basis of communist power in Poland was at stake, even though she is aware of the risks involved (resistance in Poland, implications for détente). If faced with a choice between Poland and détente, the Soviet Union would choose Poland. At the present time, such a situation does not seem to exist but may develop in case of a serious confrontation between the Polish leadership and the trade unions.

6. Our diplomatic missions in the Soviet bloc have been instructed to react along the following lines whenever they are approached by WP sources for comments on the situation in Poland:

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(a) All CSCE participants believe that the process of détente also has the function of managing and controlling crises. This attitude will have to stand its test also and especially in connection with the events in Poland. While our public is following these events with great sympathy, the Federal Government is showing the greatest political self-restraint and advocates, simultaneously with others and in line with a corresponding Polish request, stronger economic cooperation within the limits of mutual possibilities. We are of the opinion that what is happening in Poland is a matter for the Poles themselves and that this should remain so, in accordance with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

(b) We are not surprised that the events in Poland are meeting with the special interest of the leaderships in the other socialist states. However, semi-official comments in the Soviet media have caused a certain stir on our side and have led to questions. These questions relate especially to any possible future action by the Soviet Union.

(c) We are convinced that, just as the other CSCE participants, the Soviet Union is aware of her responsibility for the continuation of the process of détente. She will, as we do, realize that a substantive abandonment of the self-restraint shown by her up to now is bound to lead to a radical change in the East-West relationship and would do unforeseeable damage to the policy of détente and cooperation in all fields. We consider it indispensable that all European powers should act in such a manner that the present policy of peaceful accommodation and peaceful cooperation can be continued.