

Canadian Delegation  
to NATO



12 SEP. 1980

Délégation du Canada  
auprès de l'OTAN

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BRUSSELS, September 11, 1980

P. A. Sub - Registry

File N° 19-10-01 (Poland)

*Glenn*  
Dear Glenn,

... Further to the meeting of the Political Committee of September 9th, I am attaching the following reports concerning the situation in Poland:

- (a) a report from our Embassy in Warsaw of new Foreign Minister Czyrek's views on international affairs which were conveyed to the Head of the Canadian New Democratic Party on August 29;
- (b) a report from our Embassy in Moscow on the initial Soviet reaction to the Polish leadership changes and
- (c) a report from our Embassy in Warsaw on the new Polish First Secretary Stanislaw Kania.

I am circulating copies of this letter and its attachments to my colleagues on the Political Committee as well as the representative of the IMS.

Yours sincerely,

G.J. Smith,  
Counsellor.

Mr. Glenn Cella,  
Director and Deputy to  
Assistant Secretary General,  
Political Directorate,  
NATO Headquarters, Room I 206,  
BRUSSELS.

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BROADBENT MEETING WITH THE  
NEW POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER

On 29 August the leader of the Canadian New Democratic Party, Mr. Edward Broadbent, had a surprisingly long (one and three-quarter hour) meeting with Jozef Czyrek, former Vice-Minister for Western Europe, named Foreign Minister 24 August in a major party and government shakeup. As far as we know this was the first meeting the new Foreign Minister had with Western guests or diplomats. Czyrek appeared energetic, self-confident and not obviously pre-occupied with the current political crisis, which we now know was at a particularly critical stage at that time. The Minister gave a comprehensive statement of his views on the current situation which, while containing nothing novel, struck us as being somewhat tougher than the comments we have received in recent conversations with senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. This is not surprising since during the period of apparently radical domestic policy reorientation the Poles will obviously be seeking ways to reassure the USSR that basic foreign policy commitments will remain unchanged. We suspect the unusual length of the meeting and the ready willingness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have Embassy representatives present was a deliberate attempt to make this point.

International Situation

Minister Czyrek said that we had entered a period of a certain imbalance in the world security system, a system which underlay the process of detente. Detente had found its fullest expression in the Nixon-Brezhnev statement that in the nuclear age there was no alternative to peaceful co-existence and shared responsibility. This then formed the basis for SALT. Recently there had been contradictory developments in various spheres which had undermined this sense of shared responsibility. The super powers had achieved parity but this meant that each side had to keep

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up with the other. The recent NATO decision to modernize "Euro-Strategic Forces" thus meant that the WPO had to respond. The Minister laid blame on the USA for departing from earlier agreed principles and now each of the Presidential Candidates were calling for American military superiority. This was a departure from the process of dialogue between equal partners and was an attempt to gain a position of strength. Recent developments in the USA and NATO (Europ-Strategic Weapons), and other steps showed that major powers in the West were steering the situation from one of balance to one of confrontation. Other destabilizing problems included the Middle East situation, China "Syndrome" (intent to establish a Peking-Tokyo axis with Pakistan implicated), Iran (an autonomous development which nevertheless was the result of erroneous Western policy of not respecting the culture of the people), Afghanistan (led to sanctions against the USSR which have only served to increase tensions). Nevertheless, events over the last half year have been moving from "stabilized tension" to efforts to seek a return to the policy of co-existence. These efforts included the Brezhnev-Schmidt meeting, the Giscard-Brezhnev meeting and also the Declaration of the WPO (at the time of the 25th Anniversary). There was now a search for solutions through dialogue and with the exception of the UK, European nations were ready to allow detente to continue. Efforts to bring non-European areas into the detente process, however, simply complicated the whole situation.

CMDDE

Czyrek said the WPO has also put forward a proposal for a Conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe as a logical follow up to MBFR. Such a conference would meet the concerns of Northern and Southern flank states who also wish reductions in their areas. The first stage of this conference should consider confidence building measures (CBMS) since agreement on these would facilitate progress not only in the Vienna talks but also in the rest of Europe. The West was saying that CBMS should cover the area up to the Urals and that this was a precondition to holding the WPO proposed Conference. While this may be reasonable as it would cover all of Europe, only some kind of observation satellite could adequately monitor the whole area. Observation posts set up on borders, however, would

be much more limited in their capacities. Poland believes that in keeping with the Helsinki Agreement, CBMS should be voluntary and not obligatory. In response to a request from Mr. Broadbent for clarification on why voluntary measures were considered more important, the Minister said that obligations accepted voluntarily would have greater value than those imposed; that is, they would more likely be honoured. He allowed that the difference in terminology may appear academic but this point seemed important to him. Poland wanted the Madrid CSCE Review Conference to agree on a mandate for a Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament to establish a link with the CSCE and to ensure that Madrid ended successfully.

Further on the Madrid Meeting, the Minister said it was his hope that it be free of confrontations over differing views and attitudes. Discussions or differences should be kept within reasonable limits and should not endanger a constructive atmosphere. There should be progress in all three baskets. Poland wishes to see an increase in contacts as a further development of the infrastructure of detente and peace.

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POLISH LEADERSHIP CHANGES: SOVIET REACTION

The Soviets have reacted quickly to the replacement of Gierek by Kania at the Head of the Polish Communist Party (PUWP). September 7 Pravda front-paged a message of congratulations from Brezhnev to Kania and Kosygin to Pinkowski together with a biography and picture of Kania. Until the report of his illness and replacement, Gierek's name had been absent from the Soviet press for several days and rumours of his political demise gained currency in Moscow. Somewhat unusually however, TASS reported on September 7 that the Soviet Ambassador in Poland had conveyed to Gierek "sympathy and wishes for earliest recovery" from Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership.

The Brezhnev message to Kania is complimentary, stressing particularly Kania's devotion to PUWP, to proletarian internationalism and to friendship between Poland and the USSR and other socialist states. The message expresses "firm confidence" that Poland will overcome existing difficulties. Stress is placed on the leading role of PUWP and its identification with interests of the Polish workers. The message also emphasized Soviet/Polish friendship and CPSU/PUWP unity, identifying the latter as an important link in cohesion of the socialist community and the communist movement.

Weekend TASS reports from Warsaw reproduced by Pravda appear reasonably full and candid coverage of Kania's initial statements and Pinkowski's speech at the

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recent session of SEJM. At the same time, the Soviets continue to develop the notion of outside interference in Polish events. Authoritative statement by the pseudonymous Petrov was supplemented September 6 by another brief Petrov item focussing on the financial assistance from the USA unions to the alleged anti-socialist elements in Poland. Despatch of funds is alleged to have been approved by President Carter and Labour Secretary Marshall and arranged through AFL-CIOS Kirkland and UAW's Fraser. Petrov goes on to cite approvingly Trybuna Ludu editorial insisting that the workers' actions must accord with Poland's existing socialist and governmental system and cautioning against the political aims of circles in the West in connection with Polish developments. Petrov closes with his own warning to the USA that they would be mistaken to believe that their interference in Polish affairs will go unnoticed.

Whatever role the Soviets may have had in Gierek's replacement by Kania, they have now to deal with new leadership team in Warsaw. So far, despite fluidity of situation, the Poles seem to have sounded the right notes in their statements and Soviet reaction has been reasonably correct, though cautious; but their fundamental concerns, with implicit warnings, have been made evident. Inherent tension in the events has not disappeared and evolution of "Warsaw autumn" will remain the subject of close scrutiny in the USSR as well as in other East European socialist states. The potential impact of the Polish reforms is great and echoes of the Polish workers outside Poland would be very serious for the Soviets' control of events in Eastern Europe. Thus it is partly to maintain the option of further interventions in the Polish crisis that the Soviets are determined to see subversive western hand involved in Polish events.

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NEW PUWP FIRST SECRETARY: STANISLAW KANIA

Following the announcement in the SEJM on September 5 that Gierek was seriously ill with a cardiac condition PUWP CC convened at 2300 hours on September 5 and released him from his positions of Party First Secretary and Politburo member. However, he still remains a member of the Council of State and a SEJM Deputy. Rumours are circulating in Warsaw to the effect that he may replace Jablonski as President and continue to pursue his role as a broker in East-West relations. Certainly Kania's wishes for a speedy recovery (as well as Brezhnev's) allow Gierek to depart the scene with some dignity.

New First Secretary, Stanislaw Kania, is at 53 the youngest party chief in the communist bloc. There is no reliable information available as to why Kania was chosen over Olszowski, but the prompt and unambiguous welcome from Moscow of Kania's appointment suggests that the party made the "correct" choice. Kania is not likely to be as dramatic a leader as Olszowski would have been, and the Politburo can be expected to continue the recently acquired collective approach. Personal acceptability aside, Moscow may therefore feel more comfortable with a less charismatic leader. Internally, Kania has not had a high profile and one can assume he has made few enemies. Internal security responsibilities have obviously allowed him to develop a power base (which Olszowski lacked) but he has not been seen as a sinister figure. While this kind of function would obviously give him some appeal in Moscow at a time when everything in Poland gives the appearance of becoming unstuck, we would not expect a sudden and dramatic crack-down as a result of his election. His acceptance speech

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stressed the need for the party to restore an atmosphere of trust while at the same time moving decisively and quickly to correct admitted policy failures made clear by the recent wave of strikes. He did, however, also stress the need to combat anti-socialist "opponents". If his acceptance speech is a reliable indication Kania is probably an orthodox communist with a conservative bent, whose pragmatism is more a product of circumstance than of conviction. He has a reputation as a good administrator and it is likely that he will preside over a Politburo which will be "democratic" rather than one in which he will dominate through force of personality or position. To the best of our information, he has neither experience nor any great interest in international affairs.