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N A T O C O N F I D E N T I A L

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL : 23RD DECEMBER, 1981

The UK agreed with a statement by the Secretary General in his opening remarks that the Council should not meet at Ministerial level before a possible Soviet invasion in Poland but only after the event. Neither did the UK want for the Council to decide upon measures before or in the absence of an invasion.

The UK circulated the text of a demarche made in Warsaw on behalf of the Ten. The demarche had been rejected as constituting interference in Poland's internal affairs and as not being based on facts.

The UK emphasised that the demarche centres on the respect for the Helsinki Final Act. In the view of the Ten "the current repression in Poland constitutes clear violation of the fundamental principles of this Act which they cannot ignore". This, in the opinion of the UK government, was what it was now all about.

Therefore the UK wished to circulate an option paper concerning the interrelation between the Polish situation and the resumption of the Madrid Conference scheduled for 9th February. The governments of the Sixteen should consider these options with a view for a decision in early January and should consider seeking NNA support. Public reference to the connection between resumption in Madrid and developments in Poland might be made without delay. The EEC had decided not to suspend food aid (8,000 tonnes of beef) but contracts for delivery would not be signed yet as Polish assurances concerning the non-military destination were to be sought first.

No UK commitment had been made for rescheduling of aid in 1982. Disbursement on existing credit lines continues. Situation to be reviewed.

Denmark did not wish for concrete measures to be taken yet nor did it want any demonstrative actions. One should wait and see whether the military regime lived up to its promises. In the meantime humanitarian and economic assistance should continue. The Danish government had appropriated some \$300,000 for emergency relief through the Red Cross and decided to continue underwriting export credits. However it had suspended signature on a new government loan to Poland.

The Danish Ambassador would seek instructions on the UK's proposal concerning Madrid.

Germany stressed the overriding importance of close continued consultations within the Alliance. It regretted the false impression that NATO was not sufficiently concerned and would therefore like the Secretary General to underline the continuing consultation process in a background briefing. The text of the Bundestag resolution of 18th December and a paper dated 23rd December concerning a talk between Foreign Minister Genscher and the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Bonn was circulated. Prominent in the German position is criticism of the Soviet propaganda campaign against the Polish Reformist policy and the overt or covert threats of the use of force from outside against Polish independence. This is seen as a violation of international law and particularly of the Helsinki Final Act because it is interference in the internal affairs of another state and lack of respect for its sovereignty. It is therefore contrary to the interests of security, co-operation and peace in Europe. The German position on governmental economic aid is, that what is in the pipeline should be implemented, whereas decisions on further aid should be delayed. The Polish Chargé d'Affaires had rejected the Bundestag resolution as interference and the German Ambassador in Warsaw had been called to the Vice Minister who had also protested interference. In the German view these protests only underlined the importance of making high level demarches and Germany would suggest that more could be made in Warsaw possibly also in Moscow and in other Warsaw Pact capitals and that it should be considered trying to include NNA countries in this activity. Germany wished this to be the subject of consultation in the Council. It was also ready to consult on the UK proposal concerning resumption in Madrid but would not wish any outward initiative in this matter before consultations had been held. In the German point of view the role of the Church and the on-going Papal initiative was of crucial importance and the Allies should not risk to interfere with it through any precipitate action. The framework agreement on rescheduling of debts had a cancellation clause which was relevant but it was not advisable to use it for the time being. German (EEC) food aid credits were used 80-90%.

Germany did not favour an interruption.

Italy no longer saw the Polish development as an internal affair but judged it in the framework of the Helsinki Final Act. The Italian government had made a demarche in Warsaw on this basis and the demarche had been accepted.

The best way to assist the Vatican in its efforts were not to talk about them.

Italian food and humanitarian aid continued but the channelling was under study. Financial assistance might be suspended if the dialogue in Poland was not revived.

If external support to internal suppression could be seen to equate interference a situation would exist where implementation of measures in the catalogue should begin. NATO should not decide on economic measures now but make clear the connection between the political situation in Poland and the negotiations in Geneva and Madrid.

The Italian attitude could be summed up as:

- (1) exerting political pressure;
- (2) continued aid to the Polish people;
- (3) threat to suspend economic aid;

The Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans had made a declaration in Parliament concerning the gravity of the Polish situation and had summoned the Polish Ambassador. The emphasis had been on respect for the Final Act, for human rights, for trade union rights and for the Vienna Convention. The Polish Ambassador had responded that all these rights would be respected and that only the excessive demands made by Solidarity in the last two weeks before the application of Martial Law could not be granted. The Belgian government would insist that the distribution of private food aid should be monitored by the Embassy in Warsaw. Official aid would be given through proper channels such as the Red Cross. Financial aid was to be decided upon by the 14th February, 1982 and a concerted policy should be sought before then.

The Belgian government found it of the utmost importance that NATO be aligned with the trade unions in their concern. Alliance statements as such would be premature but the Secretary General could express regret concerning the recourse of the Polish government to force and insist that it keeps its promises for

resumption of the dialogue, for reconciliation and for the speedy lifting of martial law which were all promises which had been emphasised by the Polish Ambassador vis-a-vis Mr. Tindemans.. In the Helsinki framework there were clear violations of union rights and of the press through censorship and obstruction. Besides this the Vienna Convention was being violated. The Soviet Union should be put on notice while avoiding giving the smallest pretext or alibi for intervention. The Belgian government found that the time was right for some measures, for instance, strict enforcement of COCOM rules and a stop for specific technology transfers.

Canada wanted intensified consultations before any measures were decided upon. It was not realistic to hope for anything more than a slow movement towards a pluralistic society in Poland firmly placed within Warsaw Pact political limits and with only limited respect for human rights. It was therefore necessary to accept a bad situation in order to avoid a worse development. The Allies could express regret that martial law had been imposed and express hopes for an early return to the dialogue but they had to avoid any charges of interference. On the other hand Soviet interference was unavoidable and it would be useless to exert pressure against this. The only hope was to avoid outright intervention and it was towards this end pressure should be applied. Canada counselled:

- (1) maintenance of food aid;
- (2) no new initiatives to give long term contractual aid. Continuation of help in pipeline;
- (3) decision concerning concessions to be given if reconciliation process was re-established;
- (4) no economic measures against the Soviet Union for the time being;
- (5) high level demarches in Warsaw concerning restraint and implementation of promises given by the military government;
- (6) demarches in Moscow concerning interference.

The Canadian Ambassador had doubts about the UK proposal concerning Madrid, as only one CSCE participant was guilty of breaches but he would seek instructions.

France wondered whether warning time was not now reduced to zero and asked the Military Committee to comment. Instructions would be sought on the UK proposal. The French Representative recalled information given in POLADS concerning statements by the President and the Prime Minister expressing, among other things, the wish for speedy liberation of detainees and reconciliation with Solidarity. Humanitarian aid and food aid was continuing, for instance, through the Red Cross. There was not yet a decision on rescheduling of economic assistance. The French Authorities doubted whether the military regime would in any case be an adequate negotiating partner. Continuation should be tied to a satisfactory Polish policy. France wished to consult on this in the Council on 30th December or sooner.

Luxembourg was in agreement with the use of high level demarches but cautioned that the content, particularly as regarded Soviet responsibility, should be carefully deliberated. It would be alright to talk to the NNA countries about the Madrid meeting but a break-off should not be contemplated now.

The US circulated a paper on the last developments in Poland and a paper on refugees. The US found that a critical juncture had been reached where the whole range of East-West relations were in question. They doubted Jaruselski's sincerity and thought that the Soviet Union was quite prepared to step in. Either way it seemed by now almost irrelevant whether the repression was carried out by the Polish army or by Soviet forces as the West would be seen to suffer defeat. The pattern of Soviet pressure and intimidation had been and was unmistakable. It was time to take action now and to decide upon further action if escalation became necessary. One should be specific about the means and the yardsticks so that pressure could be brought upon Poland and the Soviet Union with signals for escalation. At the same time it should be signalled that a relaxation would take place if the policy in Poland changed towards relaxation. Overall it should be clear that the door was closing. The US had suspended export/import bank insurances; had encouraged private banks to give no new loans; had suspended shipments of surplus dairy products and consideration of a \$740M agricultural

assistance programme.

The yardsticks that could be suggested were:

- (1) achievement of reconciliation encompassing the three parties in the Polish political constellation;
- (2) release of political detainees;
- (3) restoration of Solidarity's rights and possibilities to function as a union.

President Reagan had made communications about this to Poland and the Soviet Union and would address the topic in a major speech tonight (23rd December).

The US welcomed the UK proposals on Madrid and the German suggestion on high level demarches. It agreed with the Belgians on the importance of the trade union aspect. NATO should be seen to be on the same side and to be active in this respect.

NATO should also strongly protest the violations of the Vienna Convention. In summing up the US Ambassador again underlined the joint Polish-Soviet responsibility for the unacceptable events in Poland, described the situation as being fluid and of utmost gravity, underlined the importance of rapid responses from the capitals and NATO and of close consultation, if possible in advance of decisions.

The Netherlands expressed satisfaction with the consultation process undertaken by the US and wished to see the NNAs drawn into it so that future actions would be of a less specific NATO character. The Allies should act together but NATO as such should not act.

The US suggestions that Poland's IMF application should be suspended and no exceptions should be given from COCOM rules were being seen in Holland as moderate suggestions and were under study. The Dutch government was however not convinced whether Jaruselski acted as a proxy or as a Pole and did not wish to see actions towards the Soviet Union before this was clear. If clearly established that he was a proxy it would be time to decide what economic or political action should be taken.

Turkey underlined that a realistic assessment of the situation was that the Allies were practically impotent in the present situation.

The Turkish Prime Minister had at his first appearance in the new Consultative Assembly expressed deep concern for the developments in Poland and said that they threatened stability in Europe and constituted a general set-back in East-West relations.

Norway wished continued pressure on the military regime to lift the emergency and to respect basic human rights as undertaken in the CSCE.

No NATO action should be undertaken which could give the Soviets any pretext for intervention and as long as no direct Soviet intervention took place the situation should be regarded as an internal Polish problem.

Humanitarian assistance continued with certain checks on the recipients. 150M Norwegian crowns in non-utilised credits for 1981 had been transferred to 1982. New applications for commercial credits were being held-up for later consideration.

Portugal referred to its continued firm line and added that vigorous protests had been made concerning disruption of the Portuguese Embassy's communications.

Greece referred to a government statement that Greece expects the Final Act to be observed and all states to abstain from interference in the Polish situation which the Poles should solve on their own.

Iceland referred to concern and indignation expressed by government and Parliament. Humanitarian aid would be continued.

Nearly all delegations made reference to a letter from Secretary of State Haig which their governments found contained a well balanced view of the situation. All delegations agreed that no Council meeting at Ministerial level should be held before a possible Russian intervention. They also agreed that a regular meeting of the Council should be held on 30th December with a view to decisions concerning the UK proposal on Madrid, high level demarches, possible implementation of measures and other suggestions made at the meeting.