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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

REG. P. A.  
ACTION SLIP  
No 31 OCT 1981

Subject: Poland

The Secretary General, accompanied by the Deputy Secretary General (Ambassador Eric da Rin) and the Directeur du Cabinet (Dr. S.I.P. van Campen), received today at 9.30 a.m. the United States Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleberger, who was accompanied by Ambassador Tapley Bennett.

Mr. Eagleberger came to brief the Secretary General about the evolution of thinking in Washington. Mr. Haig increasingly feared that even if the Russians would not militarily invade Poland, the success of Jaruzelski (even if it only lasted a few months) would mean a defeat for the West. Washington was, therefore, thinking about measures and options, contained in NATO Contingency Planning, but only foreseen in the "Soviet invasion" case. In this situation, Mr. Eagleberger, who was visiting European capitals, had reason to fear an Afghanistan-type of separation of certain European states and US action, which might possibly be of a unilateral character. Dr. Luns contested the thesis that success for Jaruzelski would mean defeat for the West. Of course, it was true that the Soviets were involved in this whole thing as from the beginning; but Jaruzelski's success could only be considered a defeat for the West if one proceeded from the totally wrong and unrealistic assumption that one could profit from the Polish complication to change the geo-political state as created by the Second World War. This was impossible, as all thinking people must realise; and, therefore, one could not speak of a defeat for the West. The Secretary General also warned that any NATO Ministerial meeting mentioned by Mr. Eagleberger might create more harm than good if such a meeting would not result in something impressive and tangible.

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Mr. Eagleberger replied that he did not necessarily disagree with the conclusions of this cautious analysis of the Secretary General; on the other hand, Dr. Luns had to understand that things were moving and that Washington might go it alone. The Secretary General interrupted at this point insisting strongly upon the desirability that Washington in such an eventuality would fully and timely consult with its Allies. Mr. Eagleberger also mentioned that Mr. Colombo, who he had seen in Rome, was in favour of considering the Geneva negotiations as an appropriate subject for retaliation, a point of view with which Dr. Luns also sharply disagreed. If we would break-off either Madrid or Geneva, far from punishing the Russians, we would actually please them. The Secretary General concluded the talk by saying that he regretted his caution; but that, unfortunately, was the way it was in the Alliance.

  
S.I.P. van Campen