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CENTRE DE SITUATION OTAN

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NADA/ASSESSMENT/NOV 001/JIC/051630Z
THE FOLLOWING IS AN ASSESSMENT BY JIC.
POLAND.

1. THE POLISH LEADERSHIP HAS DECIDED AGAINST IMMEDIATE CONFRONTATION WITH SOLIDARITY OVER SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE. INSTEAD THE SEJM (PARLIAMENT) HAS APPEALED FOR AN END TO STRIKES AND ENDORSED A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO BRING A BROADER RANGE OF PEOPLE INTO THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT. PARTY, CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY LEADERS HAVE MET FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A BASIS FOR CONCILIATION.

2. THE SEJM SESSION ON 30-31 OCTOBER WAS NOT ASKED ENDORSE THE STRIKE BAN PROPOSED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM IN MID-OCTOBER. INSTEAD, AS IN THE SPRING, IT ADOPTED A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN END TO STRIKES. AT THE SAME TIME JARUZELSKI TABLED A DRAFT LAW ON "EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES TO PROTECT THE CITIZENS AND THE STATE" WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD ASK THE SEJM TO CONSIDER IF THE RESOLUTION PROVED INEFFECTIVE. THE SCOPE OF THE DRAFT LAW, IS NOT YET KNOWN BUT IT PROBABLY INCLUDES THE SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND PERHAPS MORE FAR-REACHING MEASURES. JARUZELSKI ALSO PROPOSED A NUMBER OF CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS, INCLUDING PERSONNEL CHANGES WHICH BRING INTO THE GOVERNMENT SEVERAL NEW NON-COMMUNIST MEMBERS INCLUDING THE HEAD OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND A PRO-REGIME CATHOLIC: THE CREATION OF A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL ACCORD INCORPORATING REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SMALL PARTIES, UNIONS AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS, WHICH WOULD HELP DRAW UP PLANS FOR A REMODELLED NATIONAL UNITY FRONT (THE PRESENT COMMUNIST-DOMINATED ELECTORAL ORGANISATION): THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADVISORY CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL WHICH WOULD PUT FORWARD SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLVING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: AND, AS PROPOSED EARLIER, THE SETTING UP OF A PERMANENT JOINT COMMISSION COMPRISING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ALL THE TRADE UNIONS. THE REGIME'S AIM IN PUTTING FORWARD THESE SUGGESTIONS APPEARS TO BE TO DRAW SOLIDARITY INTO SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING ECONOMIC AND OTHER PROBLEMS WITHOUT GIVING IT REAL POWER, AND THEREBY TO REDUCE

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consists of three pages.

ITS INDEPENDENCE. SOLIDARITY FOR ITS PART IS PUSHING FOR A SOCIAL COUNCIL ON THE ECONOMY WHICH WOULD OPERATE OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT, OVERSEEING THE LATTERS ACTIVITIES AND HAVING SOME KIND OF VETO OVER ITS DECISIONS. SOLIDARITY HAS SO FAR REACTED NEGATIVELY TO THE GOVERNMENTS PROPOSALS, BUT BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO DISCUSS EACH OTHERS IDEAS. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE REGIME IS PREPARED TO CONCEDE TO SOLIDARITY THE ROLE THE UNION BELIEVES TO BE ITS DUE AS THE WORKERS CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE AND THE ONLY ORGANISATION IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE ENJOYING POPULAR CREDIBILITY. THE MEETING BETWEEN JARUZELSKI, WALESA AND ARCHBISHOP GLEMP ON 4 NOVEMBER WAS PROBABLY AN ATTEMPT TO USE THE CHURCH TO HELP BRIDGE THE GULF OF MISTRUST BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE UNION. JARUZELSKI IS SAID TO HAVE OFFERED FURTHER TALKS ON ANY SUBJECT.

3. SOLIDARITYS NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORTEDLY DECIDED AFTER THE TRIPARTITE MEETING TO CALL FOR AGREEMENT WITHIN THREE MONTHS ON A RANGE OF ISSUES INCLUDING THE SOCIAL COUNCIL FOR THE ECONOMY, ACCESS TO THE MEDIA, REFORMS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS, AND TO SUSPEND STRIKES FOR THIS PERIOD. SOLIDARITYS LEADERS FEAR THAT STRIKES REDUCE THE UNIONS POPULARITY WITH THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND UNDERMINE THE UNIONS COHESION. THE UNION HAS BEEN CONSIDERING DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST THOSE PROMOTING UNOFFICIAL STRIKES, BUT HAS BEEN UNABLE SO FAR TO AGREE ON SPECIFIC MEASURES. SOLIDARITYS LEADERS ARE DIVIDED OVER TACTICS AND HAVE DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING THE RANK-AND-FILE OF THE UNIONS MORE RADICAL ACTIVISTS.

AS THE LEVEL OF POPULAR FRUSTRATION RISES IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL WHETHER EVEN SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE COULD SUPPRESS STRIKE ACTION ENTIRELY. SOLIDARITY IS NOW CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF "ACTIVE STRIKES", IN WHICH FACTORIES CONTINUE TO WORK NORMALLY BUT WORKERS TAKE OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF OUTPUT. THIS VARIANT WOULD BE LIKELY TO BE EVEN MORE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE AUTHORITIES THAN ORDINARY STRIKES: JARUZELSKI WARNED AT THE SEJM SESSION OF THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES LIKELY TO FOLLOW FROM SUCH ACTION. SOLIDARITY ALSO HAS TO DECIDE HOW TO REACT TO THE INCREASED LEVEL OF POLICE ACTION AGAINST SOLIDARITY ACTIVISTS, MOSTLY FOR ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES. THE MOST PROMINENT SOLIDARITY FIGURE TO BE INVOLVED SO FAR IS JUREZYK, HEAD OF THE SZCZECIN BRANCH AND RUNNER-UP TO WALESA IN THE SOLIDARITY ELECTIONS LAST MONTH.

4. POLISH PROPAGANDA IS MAKING MUCH OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SMALL MILITARY "OPERATIONAL GROUPS" WHICH

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ARE SUPPOSED TO BE OPERATING IN 2,000 MAINLY RURAL LOCALITIES, THOUGH THEY ARE NOT SO FAR MUCH IN EVIDENCE ON THE GROUND. ONE OF THE GROUPS'S MAIN TASKS IS SAID TO BE TO IMPROVE THE FLOW OF PRODUCE FROM THE FARMS TO STATE COLLECTION POINTS. BUT THIS IS MORE LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE OFFICIAL SYSTEM OF BARTER NOW OPERATING IN SOME AREAS, UNDER WHICH PEASANTS CAN OBTAIN ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES OR SCARCE CONSUMER DURABLES ONLY IN RETURN FOR DELIVERIES TO THE STATE.

5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE "OPERATIONAL GROUPS" IS A FURTHER STEP IN THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITARY IN THE RUNNING OF POLAND. THE ROLE OF ARMY PERSONNEL HAS BEEN INCREASING STEADILY SINCE JARUZELSKI'S APPOINTMENT AS PREMIER IN FEBRUARY, WITH SOLDIERS NOW OCCUPYING POSTS IN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF HAS JUST BECOME A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE ARMY IS TAKING OVER POWER, BUT RATHER THAT THE PARTY IS USING THE ARMY TO PROP UP ITS OWN AUTHORITY. THE PARTY IS WEAK AND DISCREDITED, AND IS UNABLE TO EXERCISE ITS LEADING ROLE IN THE TRADITIONAL MANNER. IT IS THEREFORE MAKING USE OF THE ONLY DISCIPLINED AND ORGANISED FORCE IN THE COUNTRY WHICH (UNLIKE THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES) COMMANDS POPULAR RESPECT. ALTHOUGH THIS MUST BE OBJECTIONABLE ON IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS TO THE POLISH AND SOVIET PARTY LEADERS, BOTH PROBABLY REGARD IT AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE NECESSITATED BY EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE AND PREFERABLE TO A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, IF THE ARMY SHOULD BECOME DISCREDITED THROUGH ITS INVOLVEMENT IN CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION THIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE ONE REPUTABLE ASSET AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE PARTY.

6. DESPITE HIS UNPRECEDENTED POSITION AS A MILITARY LEADER WHO HAS ALSO TAKEN OVER BOTH PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP, JARUZELSKI HAS NOT TAKEN ANY RADICAL NEW POLICY DECISION TO DEAL WITH THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN POLAND. HE HAS HOWEVER PRESENTED AT LEAST A SEMBLANCE OF MOVEMENT, BY TAKING ACTION AGAINST SOLIDARITY ACTIVISTS INVOLVED IN ANTI-STATE AND ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES, SENDING OUT THE "OPERATIONAL GROUPS", AND SPELLING OUT HIS PROPOSALS FOR BROADENING PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT. HIS MEETING WITH WALESA AND GLEMP IS OF SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE AT LEAST, AND PERHAPS OFFERS SOME HOPE OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE GENERAL CLIMATE IN THE COUNTRY. BUT JARUZELSKI'S ABILITY TO ACT IS CIRCUMSCRIBED BY DEEP DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP AND ITS INABILITY TO AGREE EITHER ON ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION WITH SOLIDARITY OR ON THE KIND OF FAR-REACHING CONCESSIONS THAT WOULD MEET SOLIDARITY'S ASPIRATIONS.

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