

NATO SITUATION CENTRE  
CENTRE DE SITUATION OTAN

COMCENTRE NAQ/MC

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NADA/ASSESSMENT/OCT 005/JIC/161500Z  
THE FOLLOWING IS AN ASSESSMENT BY JIC  
POLAND

1. THE POLISH AND SOVIET LEADERS, AND THOSE OF SOLIDARITY, MUST BE ASSESSING THE OUTCOME AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOLIDARITY CONGRESS AND CONSIDERING STRATEGY AND TACTICS TO DEAL WITH THE POST-CONGRESS SITUATION. POLISH PARTY POLICY MAY BE ELABORATED AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM WHICH IS TO BEGIN ON 16 OCTOBER. MOSCOW IS TRYING TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE THROUGH THE THREAT OF ECONOMIC MEASURES.
2. THE SECOND STAGE OF THE SOLIDARITY CONGRESS AVOIDED SOME OF THE MORE PROVOCATIVE MOVES OF THE FIRST STAGE. IT PROBABLY WENT LESS WELL THAN THE POLISH LEADERSHIP HAD HOPED, BUT COULD NEVERTHELESS HAVE BEEN WORSE. THOUGH RADICALS WERE VOCIFEROUS AT THE CONGRESS, WALESZA WAS RE-ELECTED. THE NEW 19-MAN PRESIDUM APPARENTLY CONTAINS A PREPONDERANCE OF RADICALS, BUT WALESZA WAS PLEASED WITH THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION AND THE MEMBERS ARE PRESUMABLY PEOPLE WITH WHOM HE FEELS HE CAN WORK. THE UNION PROGRAMME CONTAINS FAR-REACHING POLITICAL DEMANDS, BUT IT SETS ONLY A FEW TIME-LIMITS FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, AND WALESZA HAS ALREADY INDICATED THAT HE INTENDS TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH IN PURSUING THEM. NEVERTHELESS, THE COURSE OF THE CONGRESS AND THE DOCUMENTS ADOPTED AT IT MAKE EXPLICIT WHAT HAD HITHERTO NOT BEEN EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED; THAT SOLIDARITY IS NOW ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL OPPOSITION FORCE THAT SEEKS CHANGES IN POLAND'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD INELUCTABLY LEAD TO A SITUATION WHERE THE LEADING ROLE OF THE PARTY WAS NO LONGER MORE THAN A FACADE.
3. THE SOVIET UNION HAS CLEARLY FOUND THIS FORMAL AND BLATANT CHALLENGE TO PARTY AUTHORITY HIGHLY UNPALATABLE. FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE DECEMBER PRAVDA HAS PUBLISHED AN AUTHORITATIVE ARTICLE ON POLAND BY PETROV, A PSEUDONYM USED FOR HIGH-LEVEL KREMLIN COMMENT. THIS ACCUSED SOLIDARITY OF ADOPTING A PROGRAMME WHICH AIMED AT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM OF SOCIALISM IN POLAND, AND FORMALLY REITERATED THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. BUT, IT STOPPED SHORT OF MAKING ANY DIRECT THREATS OR SUGGESTIONS AS TO FUTURE POLISH ACTION. MOSCOW CAN HAVE LITTLE HOPE THAT SUCH FULMINATIONS WILL PRODUCE RESULTS. A WHOLE SERIES OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, MESAGES AND MANEUVERES HAS SO FAR HAD LITTLE EFFECT ON THE POLICIES OF THE POLISH LEADERSHIP, AND IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT FURTHER ATTEMPTS OF THIS KIND WOULD BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL. AT PRESENT THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS TO BE USING ONE OF ITS FEW REMAINING OPTIONS, THREAT OF ECONOMIC MEASURES, TO PERSUADE THE POLISH AUTHORITIES TO CRACK DOWN ON SOLIDARITY. ONE MORE SPECIFIC REPORT STATES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS THREATENING TO INSIST ON STRICT

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TRADE BALANCING FROM 1982. SUCH A MOVE WOULD MEAN A SHARP REDUCTION IN POLISH IMPORTS OF ENERGY AND RAW MATERIALS, WHICH WOULD HAVE A CATASTROPHIC EFFECT ON POLAND'S SHAKY ECONOMY AND INEVITABLY DAMAGE THE REST OF THE CMEA. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ONLY IMPLEMENT THIS THREAT IF IT WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES; A PROBABLE BREAKDOWN IN ORDER AND A WAVE OF ANTI-SOVIET FEELING WHICH WOULD IN TURN NECESSITATE THE MILITARY INTERVENTION MOSCOW HAS SO FAR APPEARED KEEN TO AVOID. THE SOVIET UNION PROBABLY HOPES THAT THE THREAT ALONE WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE POLISH STATE AND UNION LEADERS TO MODERATE THEIR POLICIES. WALESZA CLEARLY BELIEVES THE THREAT TO BE REAL AND HE IS PREPARED TO ADJUST SOLIDARITY'S ACTIVITIES ACCORDINGLY, BUT UNION RADICALS APPEAR INCLINED TO DISREGARD ALL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET THREAT.

4. THE POLISH LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERING A NEW STRATEGY; TO OFFER SOLIDARITY A HIGHLY VISIBLE ROLE IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE IN RETURN FOR THE PLAYING DOWN OF UNION DEMANDS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE AND UNION CO-OPERATION IN GETTING THE ECONOMY GOING AGAIN. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY PROPOSED THE SETTING UP OF A PERMANENT JOINT COMMISSION WITH THE TRADE UNIONS TO DISCUSS AND REACH AGREEMENT ON QUESTIONS OF MARKET SUPPLIES, RATIONING, AND PRICE CHANGES. THOUGH SOLIDARITY HAS SO FAR REJECTED THIS SUGGESTION. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE DISCUSSED INTERNALLY WAYS OF "BROADENING THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENT" SO THAT IT RESTS ON ALL FORCES WHICH ARE NOT HOSTILE TO SOCIALISM. THIS IDEA HAS RECENTLY BEEN GAINING WIDER CURRENCY AS A MEANS OF INVOLVING SOLIDARITY IN GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY - BUT AS ONLY ONE VOICE, AND NOT NECESSARILY THE DECISIVE ONE, IN A BROAD-RANGING FORUM. SOLIDARITY MIGHT PREFER TO AVOID THIS KIND OF RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT POWER, BUT WOULD FIND IT HARD TO REFUSE SUCH AN APPARENTLY REASONABLE SCHEME. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO DRAFTING A NEW ELECTION LAW WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR WIDER PARTICIPATION IN THE NATIONAL UNITY FRONT WHICH CAN ALONE NOMINATE CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION AT THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL. THIS IS PARTLY AN ATTEMPT TO COUNTER SOLIDARITY'S OWN DECISION TO DRAFT A NEW ELECTORAL LAW. WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS WILL PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO SOLIDARITY WILL DEPEND ON THE TERMS UNDER WHICH THE UNION WOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS. THE FORTHCOMING CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM MAY CLARIFY EXACTLY WHAT ROLE THE PARTY ENVISAGES FOR SOLIDARITY IN THE FUTURE. THERE MAY WELL BE DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP OVER THIS ISSUE, AND WHATEVER IS EVENTUALLY OFFERED MAY WELL PROVE UNACCEPTABLE TO WALESZA OR TO SOLIDARITY RADICALS, NOT TO MENTION THE SOVIET UNION.

5. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WE ARE LIKELY TO SEE A PERIOD OF RENEWED NEGOTIATION BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND THE AUTHORITIES, FIRST OF ALL ON THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF PRICES AND MARKET SUPPLIES. BILATERAL TALKS ARE SCHEDULED TO OPEN ON 15 OCTOBER AND SOLIDARITY HAS THREATENED A PROTEST STRIKE IF THE OUTCOME IS NOT SATISFACTORY. THE PROGRESS OF THE TALKS SHOULD GIVE SOME INDICATION OF HOW THE SOLIDARITY LEADERSHIP INTENDS TO PROCEED IN THE POST-CONGRESS PERIOD.

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