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NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE  
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

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## IMMEDIATE

Record - MC-CBX-29-81 (Restricted Session)

17 July 1981

### S U M M A R Y R E C O R D

#### 29TH MEETING OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN 1981

Held on Thursday, 2 July 1981 at 1000 hours  
in the Situation Centre, (Presentation Room),  
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium

#### PRESENT

Chairman:	Admiral R.H. Falls
Belgium:	Lieutenant General Y. Dedeurwaerder
Canada:	Lieutenant General R. Gutknecht
Denmark:	Lieutenant General P.O.W. Thorsen
Germany:	Lieutenant General E.D. Bernhard
Greece:	Lieutenant General E. Papaefstathiou
Italy:	Brigadier General C. Crucilla
Luxembourg:	Colonel P. Bergem
Netherlands:	Lieutenant General J.C. Zoutenbier
Norway:	Major General Ole Miøen
Portugal:	Lieutenant General J. Ferreira Valente
Turkey:	Vice Admiral S. Ergin
United Kingdom:	Admiral Sir Anthony Morton
United States:	General R.L. Lawson
Deputy Chairman:	Lieutenant General Sinclair L. Melner
Director, IMS:	Rear Admiral H.J. Uurbanus

#### ALSO PRESENT

French Military Mission: Général de Corps d'Armée P. Crousillac

  
J.D. Spottiswood  
Air Commodore, RAF  
Secretary, IMS

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Item 1     ACE RESPONSES TO AN INTERVENTION IN POLAND (NC)

The Chairman drew attention to SACEUR's letter(1) containing proposed ACE responses to an intervention in Poland. He said he considered that the first three paragraphs of the letter, which referred to SACEUR's intentions, did not necessarily involve the Military Committee. In paragraph 4, SACEUR asked that nations should consider a series of options which he might request authority to implement. This list of options contained part of or variations of options which were already contained in the Matrix paper(2) which the Committee had approved.

The United States Member said he was pleased that SACEUR had addressed his proposals to the Committee. He pointed out that it was only the previous week that Members had agreed to conclude their intelligence appreciation of the situation in Poland by adding a paragraph containing military considerations. He said that in recent discussions with SACEUR and with his own Authorities, some additional factors had become apparent and required consideration. He enumerated various recent occurrences which had affected the intelligence assessment(3) of the situation in Poland. These had led to a discrepancy between the Committee's recent military appreciation(3) and the later views expressed by SACEUR in his letter(1). Some of these events could cause the Polish leadership to prepare to react to internal unrest and, in his view, it was judicious of SACEUR to have acknowledged that fact and for him to have prepared accordingly. His Authorities strongly supported SACEUR's proposals and the opportunity for the Committee to comment on them since they merited early consideration by Ambassadors.

The United Kingdom Member said he welcomed SACEUR's proposals both because they were a prudent precaution and because they enabled the Committee to give full military consideration to the problem before his letter was forwarded to Ambassadors.

He said he was sure that his Colleagues would agree that mid-July 1981 was likely to be a period of particular concern to the Soviet leadership. Although he knew of no major military preparations he understood that Marshal Kulikov and some other key figures had returned to Poland, and the possibility of the Soviet Union holding an exercise in Poland had been announced. For these reasons, he thought it was correct that SACEUR's proposals should be studied but he did not believe that, at the present stage, the Committee need do more than to inform Ambassadors firstly that a letter had been received from SACEUR and secondly to point out that it would be appropriate for the authority which it had delegated to SACEUR in December 1980 to be re-affirmed. This would confirm that the previously delegated authority remained valid, including the authority to request AWACS aircraft. He believed that staff discussions should take place as soon as possible on all parts of the letter other than paragraph 2, and he pointed out that there were

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(1) SACEUR's letter, 30 Jun 81 (NS)  
(2) MCM-EKD-86-80, 17 Dec 80 (NS)  
(3) CMCM-11-81, 30 Jun 81(NS)

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matters connected with air defence which possibly conflicted with the decisions taken by the DPC in December 1980. He also pointed out that there were other questions to be answered such as whether certain measures were required before or after an intervention and what type of naval surveillance was required in the Baltic. He foresaw that there were many other similar questions which should be put to the MNCs; the answers would need discussion both by the staff and by national authorities in order that political and military guidance could be formulated before the meeting of Ambassadors. Although it was right that the Committee should be putting their own and SACEUR's military views to the Ambassadors, it must be recognised that the political views may differ from the military advice and this would require resolution.

He considered the Alliance was facing a highly political situation and it was essential that the Military Committee's recommendations were well thought out and precise.

The Norwegian Member said that his Authorities appreciated the request by SACEUR for a study of measures to speed up the decision making process in the event of an intervention in Poland. Referring to the Matrix(1), in which the Committee had set out possible options for military measures in the event of the actual occurrence of any of the contingencies then prevailing, he said that it would have simplified matters if SACEUR had referred to it when formulating his proposals. It was the view of the Chief of Defence of Norway that only those measures which had already been cleared should be considered and he had the following military comments on the detailed proposals:

- Paragraph 3. As the Air Defence measures were not contained in the Matrix, its inclusion was warranted and Norway was prepared to adjust its Air Defence alert status according to the situation.

- Sub-paragraph 4a. This measure was listed within the Matrix under the group of High Responses after intervention. It was a visible measure and its acceptability rested principally with the nations involved.

- Sub-paragraph 4b. The Maritime Surveillance measure could possibly be placed within the selected readiness exercises which were included in the majority of options in the Matrix. Implementation of OPLAN GLASS FLIPPER, which had still not received approval, required a number of Norwegian frigates. Norway had important tasks in the North where monitoring and shadowing operations of the Northern Fleet would require its resources. Thus Norway was not at present prepared to produce the forces required.

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(1) SACEUR's letter, 30 Jun 81 (NS)

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- Sub-paragraph 4c. This measure, concerning notice to deploy, was in the Military Vigilance Group MV3 and was both a medium response after intervention and a high response before intervention option. It could also fall under selected readiness exercises, at Annex C of the Matrix(1), possibly even under Low Key exercises not requiring approval.

- Sub-paragraph 4d. STANAVFORCHAN had been discussed in December 1980 and was mentioned in Annex B of the Matrix(1) and paragraph 4 of the Matrix(1), which covered sustained operations. As it was not clear for what purpose the force would be used, Norway was not inclined to extend its participation of one ship beyond the planned date of 10 July 1981.

- Sub-paragraph 4e. STANAVFORLANT had been included in the Matrix(1) under all options and response levels. In order to meet the requirements for notice to sail, the Force would have to be in European waters and not in Westlant. Norway had no ships in the force at present and, because of the other tasks which had already been mentioned, it was not considered feasible to make any earlier attachment than was currently planned.

He remarked that these comments, although representing the Norwegian Chief of Defence's military views, had not been cleared by his political authorities; this would be necessary before a decision could be reached at Ambassadorial level.

The German Member said that in his view discussion of SACEUR's proposals should initially concentrate on the discrepancy which existed between the military appreciation(2) recently forwarded to the DPC and SACEUR's latest assessment that there was an increasing possibility of an intervention taking place; SACEUR's comments on this would be helpful. He said that the Committee's assessment of the situation should include a short summary and its own appreciation of the current situation in Poland. The attitude of the other nations of the Warsaw Pact towards Poland continued to be characterized by a desire to influence the federation of the Polish Party Congress in order to strengthen the Marxist-Leninist orthodox forces. However there were various indications of irresolution on the steps required to solve the crisis. The Soviet Union was obviously encouraging Bulgaria and Hungary to take a harder line on the Polish situation, at least in their news media and official statements. A more uniform response by all the Warsaw Pact countries, except possibly Roumania, would enable them to enforce their mutual interest more effectively. For this reason he thought it was important to clarify the discrepancy to which he had referred.

Turning to paragraph 2 of SACEUR's letter(3), he said he was authorized to re-affirm the preconditioned precautionary measures as decided by the DPC in December 1980. He drew attention to some of the conditions attached to this decision and use of them should only be within the integrated command structure; he also emphasised that these conditions would also apply to any similar measures.

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Regarding the measures contained in the other paragraphs of SACEUR's letter(1), it was the German view that they should be discussed after they had been staffed.

The Chairman pointed out that the United States Member had drawn attention to several points which in his own view and probably in SACEUR's view, explained the apparent discrepancy between SACEUR's letter(1) and the intelligence assessment(2). He continued that SACEUR had given him the impression that he would like the Committee to deal with the matter expeditiously and in order to achieve this, he was prepared to recall the Committee as often as was necessary prior to the meeting of the Council to discuss Poland.

The Belgian Member said that he was grateful that SACEUR had provided the Committee with another opportunity to consider measures resulting from the situation in Poland. He fully supported SACEUR's contention that there was an increasing possibility of a Warsaw Pact intervention. The Committee would recall that at its meeting on 4 June 1981 he had given his view that the question was not whether there would be an intervention but when it would occur, and he had mentioned mid-July 1981 as being a critical period because of the planned Congress of the Polish Party. He also recalled that a number of military measures included in the Matrix(3) had been delegated to SACEUR. Regarding the paragraph on the air defence measures, he pointed out that the reason these had been omitted from the Matrix(3) was because it was considered that SACEUR already had authority to implement them.

Saying that he had not yet received instructions from his Authorities, he asked for a short delay but recommended that SACEUR's letter(1) should again be considered by the Committee before the meeting of Ambassadors on 8 July 1981. He suggested that the Matrix(3) should be brought up to date because there were various changes required, for example those made necessary by the present location of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic.

The Netherlands Member said that a balance should be struck between the threat as it was now perceived and the urgency to forward SACEUR's proposed measures to Ambassadors. He said he thought it was necessary to re-define the measures already delegated to SACEUR. As there were various questions a staff meeting should be held as soon possible in order to address them.

The Danish Member said that he had not yet received instructions from his Authorities. He supported his Netherlands Colleague's proposal as a staff level paper should be prepared as soon as possible setting out new proposals for consideration by Ambassadors and he appreciated the opportunity being afforded to formulate military advice on them. He drew attention to the

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sensitivity of measures affecting the Baltic and said his Authorities were alert to the problems which might occur in that area. Undertaking to obtain his Authorities' views as soon as possible, he recommended that staff work should immediately be initiated to combine and bring up to date the contents of the Matrix paper(1) and SACEUR's new proposals(2). He also agreed that a more detailed intelligence input was required.

The Canadian Member said he had not yet received instructions but, speaking personally, he supported the recommendations of his Netherlands and United Kingdom Colleagues for the study to be started as soon as possible. He emphasised the effect which the discrepancy between the recent military appreciation(3) and the timing of the letter containing SACEUR's proposals(2) could cause. Although he felt that his United States Colleague had produced some valid reasons why the discrepancy had occurred, he said that in his view it was important that any discrepancy should be resolved before a recommendation was forwarded to Ambassadors.

The Turkish Member said that he was awaiting instructions from his Authorities but he appreciated SACEUR's addressing his letter to the Committee.

The United Kingdom Member said he thought it important for the Committee to formulate its advice on SACEUR's proposals before the meeting of Ambassadors on 8 July 1981. He believed it was vital for the delegation of authority to SACEUR to be re-confirmed. He did not recommend that the Committee should relate its advice too closely to the advice contained in the Matrix(1). He pointed out that as the Matrix(1) had not yet been considered by the Ambassadors, this might present an opportunity to ensure that the Matrix(1) did receive consideration. He did not consider that the recently produced appreciation(3) differed too significantly from SACEUR's assessment(2), particularly if SACEUR's proposals were regarded as precautionary measures.

He proposed that a staff meeting should take place on 6 July 1981 in order to prepare preliminary advice for the meeting of Ambassadors on 8 July 1981.

The Chairman said that he agreed that it was necessary for the Committee to have its views prepared in time for them to be presented at the meeting of the NAC on 8 July 1981. He said he also supported the views of some members that the discrepancy was not particularly significant; it had principally been caused by differences in interpreting recent political events within the Warsaw Pact. He considered that it could be assumed that the authority delegated to SACEUR remained valid although it would be possible to ask for it to be re-affirmed in necessary. There were two specific problems which should be addressed, those affecting STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORCHAN.

He drew attention to the fact that SACEUR had not referred to the Matrix(1) in his proposals and asked SACEUREP to explain the reasons for this.

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SACEUREP said that the Matrix(1) had been taken into consideration when the proposals were being formulated; SACEUR's proposals were a refinement of certain of its contents.

The United States Member agreed with his Colleague that the Matrix(1) had not yet been placed on the Agenda of the DPC and he did not know whether it had even been circulated unofficially to Ambassadors. For that reason, he said it had occurred to him that there might be advantages in referring to the Matrix(1) when providing military advice on SACEUR's proposals. He said he had reviewed the intelligence available to the IMS carefully and asked Members to contribute any additional intelligence which became available as quickly as possible. His nation was doing its best to ensure that it provided the IMS with the latest intelligence available in order to build up a bank of intelligence data, as it was important for nations to resolve the apparent discrepancy and to reach an agreed position. Commenting on the point made by his Belgian and United Kingdom Colleagues concerning air defence, he said that SACEUR had been re-stating some of the measures which had already been delegated to him in current directives. It might be that some further guidance on air defence matters should be formulated. This could be included in the military advice which was being sent to Ambassadors.

He said he was in complete agreement with the views expressed concerning the requirement for staff meetings and the intention to produce military advice for Ambassadors on SACEUR's proposals in time for their meeting on Poland.

The Canadian Member, referring back to his earlier intervention, said that the reasons for the discrepancy had now been fully explained by his United States Colleague. When SACEUR's proposals were forwarded to Ambassadors, he considered that the factors which had caused the discrepancy should be explained even if they were not of a military nature.

The Belgian Member quoted from paragraph 4 of the Matrix(1) which showed SACEUR had received authority from the DPC to implement some of the measures of military vigilance even though the DPC had not yet considered the full contents of the Matrix paper(1).

The Chairman asked Members to confirm that they agreed with his own view that the Committee had an obligation to ensure that SACEUR's proposals reached the Ambassadors before the start of their meeting on 8 July 1981 and Members signified their agreement.

There followed a discussion in which various Members participated on the most suitable timings for the staff meeting and the next meeting of the Committee. It was agreed that a staff level meeting would be held at 1400 hours on 3 July 1981 and that the Military Committee would meet at 1400 hours on 6 July 1981.

THE COMMITTEE TOOK NOTE.

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(1) MCM-EKD-86-80, 17 Dec 80 (NS).