



NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

IMMEDIATE HAND CARRY

MCM-EKD-41-81

7 July 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SUBJECT: ACE responses to an intervention in Poland ^{OR INSPECIM} (NS) CIRCUMSTANCES

References: a. CMCM-11-81, 30 June 1981
b. SG/80/571, 9 December 1980
c. MCM-EKD-86-80, 17 December 1980

(SEE CORE 1)

1. (NS) SACEUR has asked, in the letter at enclosure, for advance consideration by nations of some of the issues which would arise in the event of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland. The Military Committee, while aware of the considerations expressed by SACEUR in paragraph 5 of the enclosure, agrees that it is prudent to examine such issues with a view to reducing, as far as possible, the time which would be needed to obtain approval for military precautionary measures if these became necessary. While for the time being indications of Soviet/Warsaw Pact military activities in and around Poland are considered to be at a normal seasonal level, political and economic indications give some cause for concern that a Soviet decision for a military intervention in Poland could be taken in the near-term.

2. (NS) As indicated in the recent Intelligence Division assessment of Soviet capabilities for military intervention at reference a., such a move by the Soviets could be initiated with very little advance warning, inasmuch as the preparation time required by Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces is expected to be progressively reduced from the beginning of the current military training cycle which began early in May. Since that time the forces which would need to be employed for a military intervention have achieved higher levels of training, proficiency and experience. Thus, a 2-3 week preparation time which might have been necessary in mid-June, could be expected, by the first week of July, to have decreased to approximately 2 weeks. If significant numbers of troops were to be deployed to the field in July, this period could be expected to be further reduced to less than one week. There might be little time for Allied consultation on those precautionary measures which take some time to prepare.

3. (NS) The precautionary measures on which the DPC has already taken a view are those referred to in reference b. The DPC has agreed that SACEUR may, with no restriction as to timing:

- a. Order the activation of SHAPE War Headquarters with skeleton manning.
- b. Order MSCs to continuously man situation centres.
- c. Order the review of contingency plans and the testing of ACE communications.

Distribution completed at 11:00 hrs
on 7 JUL 1981 by 100 AK DS
532 542

This document consists of a total of 7 pages including an Annex A of 1 page and an Enclosure of 2 pages

MCM-EKD-41-81

-1-

IMS Control No. 0041

d. Implement the following:

- (1) Preparation for communication support.
- (2) Preparation for implementation of communication security.
- (3) Preparation and initial implementation of circuit activities.
- (4) Intensify collection and reporting of Intelligence.
- (5) Operate War Headquarters with skeleton staffs.
- (6) Prepare Alert plans and check mobilization plans.

4. (NS) The Military Committee notes that, in addition to the above, SACEUR remains authorized to request the US Authorities to provide AWACs aircraft support when the situation so requires. The method of executing the measures at sub-paragraph 3.d. above, and indeed any measures whose content falls within the NATO Alert System, has been refined to avoid the formal employment of the structured NATO Alert System, to provide means of limiting their public visibility, and to be confined to the integrated NATO command structure.

5. (NS) SACEUR's intention concerning air defence at paragraph 3 of the enclosure, and as amplified by his paragraph 5, is prudent should intervention appear imminent. Given that SACEUR already has the authority(1) to change the states of readiness of his air defence force it is supported by the Military Committee. Rapid action may be needed subsequent to a perceived intervention with the possibility of defections by Polish aircraft and the consequent risk of violations of NATO airspace by Warsaw Pact aircraft.

6. (NS) The measures set out in paragraph 4 of the enclosure relate to possible responses post intervention and raise the question of overt action in connection with the Polish situation. Given the current position, the suitability of these measures cannot be adequately assessed at this stage though, of course, they fall within the spectrum of the Matrix of possible options which was forwarded by the Military Committee in reference c. and which therefore could clearly be considered should the situation deteriorate. This Matrix, with its associated Annexes, takes account of the degree of visibility and the appropriateness of each action, and defines the two situations at which various levels of response might be implemented:

- a. "Options before intervention" to be immediately considered if NATO were fortunate enough to secure definite intelligence that a decision to intervene had been taken.
- b. "Options after intervention" to be considered as soon as the physical fact of intervention became generally apparent.

7. (NS) Some clarification of the issues raised by SACEUR in paragraph 4 of the enclosure, including their relationship to the already established Matrix options in reference c., is given below, with some initial observations on their applicability. The Military Committee will continue to keep these measures under review and will offer their further advice as the situation warrants.

(1) MC 53/1
MCM-EKD-41-81

8. (NS) ACE Mobile Force (Air). The use of the AMF(Air), envisaged by SACEUR in sub-paragraph 4.a. of the enclosure, corresponds to the Matrix options B4, G4, D5, E4 and F6, elaborated in Annex G of reference c. SACEUR envisages a more specific option covering two squadrons only, one Canadian and one US, rather than the five squadrons of the whole force. He also specifies contingency area N2 (Denmark) rather than the formulation in the Matrix "deploy to AFNORTH for exercises". However the option envisaged by SACEUR is generally consistent with that shown in the Matrix. The military view of the Danish Authorities is that national air forces can achieve the required presence in the Baltic in the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland.

9. (NS) Maritime Surveillance. The levels of maritime surveillance referred to in sub-paragraph 4.b. of the enclosure are definitions from the relevant agreed Military Committee document. The practical commitment of forces for surveillance remains in the hands of nations. Surveillance of the maritime situation is shown as option F7 in the Matrix and elaborated in Annex H of reference c., but does not envisage the implementation of a Contingency Operation Plan such as SACEUR OPLAN 10703 "Glass Flipper". This operation plan has not finally been formally approved by nations. The military view of the nations primarily concerned with surveillance in the Baltic, Denmark and Germany, is that national forces can achieve the required level of surveillance in the Baltic in the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland.

10. (NS) Notice to deploy of ground reconnaissance units. The option envisaged at sub-paragraph 4.c. of the enclosure corresponds to a limited and specific part of Military Vigilance Group MV3 "Operational Posture", which is concerned with "bringing units to an appropriate degree of readiness". It is therefore consistent with Matrix options D1, E1 and F1 which envisage taking such measures outside the framework of the structured NATO Alert System. SACEUR's proposal represents a limited part of an existing option, and does not imply any movement or recall of troops.

11. (NS) STANAVFORCHAN. The possibility of employing STANAVFORCHAN is considered at Annex B, paragraph 4, of reference c. as a possible augmentation of the option for employment of STANAVFORLANT. Denmark and Germany consider, as in paragraph 9 above, that from a military point of view they have sufficient national forces to contain the situation in their immediate vicinity in the event of a Soviet intervention in Poland, unless this developed into a direct threat. The current programme and readiness of STANAVFORCHAN are shown in the Annex to this memorandum.

12. (NS) STANAVFORLANT. The proposal at sub-paragraph 4.e. of the enclosure equates to the Matrix options concerning STANAVFORLANT which are A2, B3, C3, D4, E3 and F5. In addressing this option the expected warning time, decision time and ship transit time will need to be considered. The current programme of STANAVFORLANT, and transit considerations, are shown in the Annex to this memorandum.

13. (NS) As advised in paragraph 7 above the Military Committee will

continue to keep these measures, together with the measures proposed under reference c., under review and will offer their further advice as the situation warrants.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

L. J. Davies

A.C. DAVIES
Air Marshal, RAF
Director
International Military Staff

ENCLOSURE

- 1. Annex A
- 2. SACEUR Letter of 30 June 1981

COPY TO: MILREPS
CFMM

CMC	SACEUR
D/CMC	SACLANT
DIMS	CINCHAN
AD INT DIV	SACEUREP
AD P&P DIV	SACLANTREPEUR
AD OPS DIV	CINCHANREP
AD M&L DIV	
SECRETARY IMS	
SECRETARIAT	
RECORDS	

One copy each
in personally
addressed envelope

Action Officer: Capt. F.D. Stanley (2918) LR
Action Division: Operations

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AC1324-N(2011)0002-AS2 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

ANNEX A

PROGRAMMES OF STANDING NAVAL FORCES (NU)

1. (NC) STANAVFORCHAN is operating in the Southern North Sea until 10 July when the Force will disperse for maintenance and leave in the home ports. During this period most ships are likely to be at 48 hours notice. The Force will reassemble on 10 August and operate in the Southern North Sea/German Bight until 1 September when it will transit to South Western Approaches where it will participate in the Exercise OCEAN SAFARI 81, 8-18 September. 19-23 September the Force will carry out a SMP in Portsmouth before transit to the Mediterranean operations. The Force will be in the Mediterranean 30 September-14 November and return to the Southern North Sea 23 November after a port visit to Leixos/Oporto. On 18 December the Force will disperse for maintenance and leave in home ports.

2. (NC) STANAVFORLANT is operating in the WESTLANT area until 4 September when it will transit to participate in Exercise OCEAN SAFARI 81. During the period when the Force is in the Western Atlantic it may take up to 10 days to redeploy to European waters from the time at which the decision to redeploy is made. After a port visit to Lisbon 19-23 September the Force will transit to the North Sea where it will operate until 7 December when it will disperse for home ports.

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AC/324-N(2011)0002-AS2 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

1110-1-1
OF 'COMB'

~~NATO SECRET~~

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
GRAND QUARTIER GENERAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIEES EN EUROPE

9030 /etc/gs/38/81

BELGIUM

ENCLOSURE

30 June 1981

Chairman of the Military Committee
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Autoroute Brussels/Zaventem
1110 Brussels

SUBJECT: ACE Responses to an Intervention in Poland (NC)

1. (NS) In light of the developing Polish situation, I believe we should improve our ability to react quickly to the increasing possibility of a Soviet/WP intervention. Therefore, I am forwarding to you my proposed intentions in that regard for consideration by the MC and the DPC with the aim of facilitating a swift response by the Alliance in the event of an intervention.
2. (NC) By previous Ministerial action, SACEUR was predelegated authority to implement certain actions either prior to or after an intervention. I would plan on implementing all or part of those actions, as suitable, at a time deemed appropriate.
3. (NS) In addition, I will instruct MSC's to be prepared on short notice to raise the peacetime alert posture of ACE Air Defense Forces at my direction. If time permits, I will advise the MC and political authorities before raising the level of alert.
4. (NS) Furthermore, in order to shorten the response time required for approval of certain other actions, I would ask that nations consider now the following additional measures for which I might seek implementing authority in the event of an intervention. This list provides some responses to a situation short of the development of a direct threat to NATO from which appropriate actions might be selected according to the scope and scale of the intervention.
 - a. Subject to the approval of the nations concerned, deploy selected force contributions for the ACE Mobile Force (Air) to contingency area N2 as follows:
 - (1) Squadron (10XCF-5 Light Attack/RECCE Aircraft) CA.
 - (2) Squadron (8XF15 All Weather Fighter Aircraft) US.
 - b. Subject to the approval of nations concerned, increase naval surveillance in the Baltic to level 2 or level 3 as considered appropriate and, in the case of the latter, including implementation of SACEUR OPLAN 10700 Glass Flipper.
 - c. Direct CINCENT to review the deployment of ground reconnaissance battalions/regiments within the Central Region, with a view initially to reducing their "notice to deploy" to 24 hours.
 - d. In concert with CINCHAN review the employment of STANAVFORCHAN to support ACE Naval Operations in the Baltic Approaches.

ENCLOSURE to
MCM-EKD-41-81

-1-

This Enclosure consists of
2 pages

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AC1324-N(2011)0002-AS2 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

2 ~~NATO SECRET~~

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
10533


NATO SECRET

SUBJECT: ACE Responses to an Intervention in Poland (NC)

30 June 1981

e. In conjunction with SACLANT consider the redeployment of STANAVFORLANT from the Western Atlantic to European waters.

5. (NS) In listing these measures, I have assumed that our political authorities will wish to take no action which would engender false hopes for the Poles or provide unwarranted pretexts for the Soviets. I believe these measures are consistent with that assumption and provide options for a prudent, precautionary, defensive response to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland.



BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, U.S. Army
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

ENCLOSURE to
MCM-EKD-41-81

-2-

NATO SECRET

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AC/324-N(2011)0002-AS2 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE