



N A T O S E C R E T

HAND CARRY

MILSTAM(OPS)-EKD-134-81

23 June 1981

(Downgraded to NATO Confidential upon removal of Enclosure)

NATO SECRET

IMMEDIATE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF

SUBJECT: Military Committee Remits on crisis management matters (NR)

Reference: Brief(P&P)-CCA-125A-81, 22 June 1981

1. (NC) When the matter covered by the Brief at reference is discussed at MC/PS 25 June, the question of military responses in the short term, relating to the German CHOD proposal at MC/CS, may arise.
2. (NC) The draft at Enclosure endeavours to reconcile the various positions. SHAPE is committed to a single set of options which precludes any useful separate short-term review.
3. (NC) The draft at Enclosure is being cleared by SACEUREP with SHAPE, since it commits SACEUR in its paragraph 4. It will also be shown to appropriate BE and GE MILREP staff officers, who at a staff meeting on 19 June agreed with the general reasoning.
4. (NC) If the matter arises in MC/PS you are recommended to respond in the light of Enclosure.

G. BALDI
Major General, ITAR
Assistant Director
Operations Division

ENCLOSURE
Draft IMSM-EKD- -81 (NS)

COPY TO: OPS DIV(2), RECORDS

Distribution completed at 0840 hrs
on 24-6-81 by 494 R3

Action Officer: Capt. F.D. Stanley (2918) LR
Action Division: Operations

MILSTAM(OPS)-EKD-134-81 -1-

IMS Control N° 0421

This document consists of a total of 4 pages including an Enclosure of 3 pages

N A T O S E C R E T

NATO SECRET

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PDN/20110002 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

IMSM-EKD-

Date

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Limited Military Response Options: Relationship to
 Matrix of Options prepared for the Polish situation (NS)

References: a. IMSWM-CAX-138-81, 22 May 1981
 b. SG/81/243, 25 May 1981
 c. MILSTAM(P&P)-CCA-180-81, 19 June 1981
 d. MCM-86-80, 17 December 1980
 e. Record-MC-CBX-23-81(Restricted Session), 23 June 1981

1. (NC) Members of the Military Committee will recall that the IMS was tasked in Annex A to Reference a., Item 4, to examine the feasibility of developing specific limited response measures, separate from the NATO Alert System, for use in situations where the use of the normal Alert System would be inappropriate. Furthermore, a remit forwarded under Reference b. necessitates a substantial military input covering options for improving the quality and timeliness of NATO's response to intelligence and warning signals, to be ready in September 1981 for incorporation in a study to be submitted to Ministers in December 1981.

2. (NS) It has become evident from discussions with MNC staffs that the two studies must be interrelated, since the limited response options envisaged under the first study must form part of any list of options aimed at improving response. Reference c., which tasks the MNCs to develop a catalogue of military response options therefore covers the spectrum of both studies. It is also evident that any proposals for new or modified military options must be very carefully related to the existing options contained within current documents, to avoid overlapping and consequent confusion, and be cleared or discussed with the authorities who would implement them. The timescale for this process is necessarily protracted.

IMSM-EKD-
ENCLOSURE to
MILSTAM(OPS)-EKD-134-81

-1-

This Enclosure consists
of 3 pages

SACEUR, as lead MNC in this matter, expects to have developed a draft catalogue of military response options by end July 1981, in time for consideration by the MC and subsequent input to the study which was called for by Ministers. It is evident that refinement of these options in the light of comments by implementing authorities will be going on concurrently with the preparation of the study for Ministers. For example, options affecting the NATO Alert System will need to be considered at the MNCs' Alert Conference in December 1981.

3. (NS) It is therefore necessary to establish what need be done in the event of tension arising before the results of the process described above are available in usable form. For the most pressing case, that covered in the Matrix of possible options detailed in Reference d., arguments for maintaining the validity of that document have already been expressed (Reference e., Item I). SACEUR, being well aware of the problems which could be caused by a too visible response if some options corresponding to the lower levels of the NATO Alert System were selected, has made arrangements for limiting and controlling the degree of visibility, as explained in paragraph 4 below.

4. (NS) Consideration of visibility level is addressed in the appropriate sections of Reference d. Furthermore:

- a. Together with the authority/order to execute the DPC will have the opportunity to give guidance on the visibility as considered necessary.
- b. SACEUR would instruct addressees of the declaring message on any limitation in implementation envisaged, e.g. not to exceed the intended minimum visibility level of implementation.

c. As stated in paragraph 2 of Reference d., the specific actions outlined in the particular itemized measures would be recommended for implementation, instead of formally employing the structured NATO Alert System.

5. (NS) The Matrix of Options given in Reference d., therefore remains valid within these limits. As stated in paragraph 3 of Reference d., there are other matters for possible consideration which are not covered in the Matrix:

a. Measures concerning Air Defence posture. It is envisaged that SACEUR would make any necessary proposals at the appropriate time.

b. Measures concerning AWACs deployment. This is likely to come under consideration at a very early stage, if tension rises, at the request of SACEUR.

c. Measures concerning STANAVFORLANT's states of readiness prior to the point at which an intervention is assessed to be imminent. For the forthcoming period until early September this would involve consideration, at an early stage of tension, of whether to redeploy the force from the Western Atlantic to European waters. It is envisaged that such consideration would be initiated by the Military Committee in response to adverse intelligence.

6. (NR) The Military Committee is invited to take note of these arrangements.

DIMS.

COPY TO: DIMS, AD INT DIV, AD P&P DIV, SECY IMS, SECRETARIAT,
OPS DIV(3), RECORDS

Action Officer: Capt. F.D. Stanley (2918) LR
Action Division: Operations

IMSM-EKD-
ENCLOSURE to
MILSTAM(OPS)-EKD-134-81

-3-