

NATO SITUATION CENTRE  
CENTRE DE SITUATION OTAN

COMCENTRE NAC/MC

Number: 012/023  
Date : 28 MARCH 1981

NATO SECRET

PRIORITY

COPY. No 115  
EXEMPLAIRE.

AS(81)031

PA  
3083  
P 271230Z MAR 81  
FM LONDON  
TO AIG 6006  
AIG 6007  
BT

P. A. Sub - Registry  
File No 19 10-21  
(P. A. Sub - Registry)

NADA /ASSESSMENT /MARCH 010/JIC /271230Z  
THE FOLLOWING IS AN ASSESSMENT BY JIC  
POLAND

1. THE SITUATION IN POLAND IS CRITICAL . THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS WILL HINGE ON THE OUTCOME OF THE RESUMED TALKS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND UNION LEADERS AND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SESSION SCHEDULED FOR SUNDAY . THE FOUR HOUR WARNING STRIKE SEEMS TO HAVE HAD NATIONWIDE SUPPORT .  
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS .
2. THE TALKS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND SOLIDARNOSC HELD ON 25 MARCH ENDED INCONCLUSIVELY , PARTLY BECAUSE THE REPORT ON THE BYDGOSZCZ INCIDENT WAS NOT YET AVAILABLE . SOLIDARNOSC PRESENTED FIVE DEMANDS : PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EVENTS IN BYDGOSZCZ AND GUARANTEES AGAINST IT HAPPENING AGAIN ; AN END TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DISSIDENTS FOR ACTIVITIES IN QOUYAIPV . SOLIDARNOSC ACCESS TO THE MASS MEDIA ; REGISTRATION OF RURAL SOLIDARITY ; AND ANNULMENT OF THE DECREE ON STRIKE PAY . THE TALKS WERE TO BE RESUMED THE FOLLOWING DAY BUT WERE POSTPONED AT GOVERNMENT REQUEST . THEY ARE NOW SCHEDULED FOR TODAY , BUT COULD BE PROLONGED . MEANWHILE THE 4 HOUR WARNING STRIKE HAS GONE AHEAD AND APPEARS TO HAVE HAD ALMOST UNIVERSAL SUPPORT , ALTHOUGH ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND INDUSTRIES , INCLUDING LONG -DISTANCE TRANSPORT , WERE NOT INVOLVED . THE GENERAL STRIKE IS DUE TO BEGIN ON 31 MARCH AND SOLIDARNOSC ACTIVISTS ARE TALKING INFORMALLY OF ITS LASTING A MONTH . SOLIDARNOSC BRANCHES ARE MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR THE STRIKE AND POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT COUNTER -ACTION , INCLUDING MOVING THEIR HEADQUARTERS INTO LARGE FACTORIES .
3. THE INCIDENT IN BYDGOSZCZ , AND PARTICULARLY THE SUSPECTED POLICE VIOLENCE AND THE ONE -SIDED VERSION OF EVENTS PUT OUT BY THE MEDIA , HAS AROUSED WIDESPREAD APPREHENSION AMONG THE POLISH PEOPLE , WHO FEAR A RETURN TO THE ABUSES NORMAL BEFORE JULY 1980 . THERE IS A WIDE -SPREAD BELIEF THAT THE WHOLE EPISODE WAS A DELIBERATE PROVOCATION BY THE POLICE OR OTHERS IN AUTHORITY . EVEN MANY PARTY MEMBERS BELIEVE THE STRIKES TO BE JUSTIFIED AND ARE LIKELY TO PARTICIPATE

This document consists  
of three pages.

- 1 -

N A T O S E C R E T

Document NOT to be removed  
from file.

DESPITE THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE POLITBURO STATEMENT OF 22 MARCH THAT PARTY MEMBERS SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN AND SHOULD ACTIVELY OPPOSE STRIKES .

4. THERE ARE SIGNS OF DIVISION IN THE POLISH LEADERSHIP OVER HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS LATEST CRISIS . THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION TENDED TO EXONERATE THE POLICE , AND THE POLITBURO STATEMENT BLAMED SOLIDARNOSC MEMBERS FOR THE INCIDENT AND DEFENDED THE REGIME'S RIGHT TO USE FORCE . DEPUTY PREMIER RAKOWSKI'S OPENING SPEECH AT THE NEGOTIATIONS , THOUGH CRITICAL OF SOLIDARNOSC'S REACTION , TOOK A MARKEDLY SOFTER LINE ON BYDGOSZCZ , SUGGESTING THAT THERE HAD BEEN ERRORS OF JUDGMENT INVOLVED AND PROMISING THAT ANY LAWLESSNESS REVEALED BY THE INVESTIGATION WOULD BE PUNISHED . SOME ACTION HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN : THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BYDGOSZCZ PROVINCIAL COUNCIL WHOSE CLOSURE OF A COUNCIL MEETING PRECIPITATED THE CRISIS HAS RESIGNED , AND THE COUNCIL IS CONSIDERING ASKING FOR THE RESIGNATION OF THE TWO DEPUTY GOVERNORS INVOLVED . IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO GO SOME WAY TO MEET SOLIDARNOSC'S DEMANDS OVER THE BYDGOSZCZ INCIDENT , ALTHOUGH HIGHER -LEVEL SACKINGS ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO CONCEDE . THE REGIME MUST BEAR IN MIND POLICE MORALE , BUT THE QUESTION OF CURBING POLICE POWERS IS A CRUCIAL ONE FOR THE UNIONS . THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING CALLED FOR 29 MARCH MAY WELL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER A POLICY OF CONCILIATION IS TO BE CONTINUED OR WHETHER , AS HARD -LINERS ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY URGING , SOME TOUGHER POLICY SHOULD BE ADOPTED SUCH AS THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY .

#### SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT

5. SOVIET MEDIA COMMENT SUGGESTS THAT THE POLICE ACTION IN BYDGOSZCZ MET WITH MOSCOW'S APPROVAL . THE HARD -LINE POLISH POLITBURO STATEMENT WAS REPORTED AT LENGTH . THERE HAS HOWEVER BEEN NO DIRECT COMMENT SO FAR ON THE FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS . THE RUSSIANS PROBABLY WISH TO AVOID COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ANY PARTICULAR LINE ON POLAND AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE . THE CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA HAVE AS USUAL BEEN VOCIFEROUS IN CONDEMNING SOLIDARNOSC , BUT EVEN THE NORMALLY RETICENT HUNGARIAN AND BULGARIAN MEDIA HAVE BEEN STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE UNION . THE HUNGARIAN , BULGARIAN , ROMANIAN AND CZECHOSLOVAK PARTIES ALL HELD CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS ON 26 MARCH .

#### FOREIGN PAYMENTS SITUATION

6. ON 26 MARCH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT INFORMED WESTERN CREDITORS THAT IT WOULD BE UNABLE TO MEET ITS REPAYMENT OBLIGATIONS AT THE END OF THE MONTH OR IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1981. TO AVOID DEFAULT IT ASKED WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO PROVIDE BRIDGING ASSISTANCE OF DOLLARS 1.3 BILLION . WESTERN BANKS ARE ALSO BEING

- 3 -

ASKED TO AGREE TO POSTPONEMENT OF REPAYMENTS . IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME THAT POLAND'S CREDIT REPAYMENTS POSITION WAS CRITICAL BUT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE LEADERSHIP HAS DECLARED THAT IT CANNOT MEET SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS . THE WEST GERMANS HAVE CALLED ON THEIR WESTERN PARTNERS TO AGREE MULTILATERALLY TO A TEMPORARY DEFERMENT OF REPAYMENT UNTIL THE MEETING OF POLAND'S OFFICIAL CREDITORS ON 9-10 APRIL . BUT IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL IF ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE IN TIME TO POSTPONE ALL PAYMENTS DUE ON 31 MARCH . IN THE PAST THE RUSSIANS HAVE PROVIDED SOME SHORT TERM FUNDS TO SEE THE POLES THROUGH : WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY INTEND TO DO SO IN THIS CASE . THE ANNOUNCEMENT , IN EFFECT OF DEFAULT BY THE POLES , COULD WELL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO OBTAIN NEW CREDIT . IN THIS EVENT THEY WOULD HAVE TO CUT WESTERN IMPORTS DRASTICALLY , WITH CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO THE ECONOMY . IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW IMPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT !

7. WE BELIEVE THAT THE KANIA.-JARUZELSKI LEADERSHIP IS STILL SEEKING TO RESOLVE THE CURRENT CRISIS BY A NEGOTIATED COMPROMISE . WE DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD WORK OUT A SETTLEMENT INVOLVING SOME ACTION AGAINST THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BYDGOSZCZ INCIDENT PLUS CERTAIN OTHER CONCESSIONS OR AN AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REMAINING ISSUES. BUT IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE MORE MILITANT SOLIDARNOSC LEADERS OR TO THE REST OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR TOUGHER MEASURES AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE COULD FIND ITSELF IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO CHOOSE BETWEEN A POLICY OF CONCILIATION OR CONFRONTATION. IF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WERE TO OPT FOR CONCILIATION AND THIS WERE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY LEADERSHIP CHANGES INVOLVING THE REMOVAL OF HARD-LINERS, THIS WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY IN MOSCOW. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS REMAIN EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN POLAND. ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PREFER THE POLISH LEADERSHIP TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE, THEY MAY WELL BE PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN ANOTHER COMPROMISE SOLUTION. THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY WOULD SHARPLY INCREASE THE RISK OF SOVIET INTERVENTION, FOR WHICH PARTIAL PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE.

BT

- 3 -