



NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE  
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

12

# IMMEDIATE HAND CARRY

MCM-EKD-86-80

17 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC  
TREATY ORGANIZATION

SUBJECT: Options for NATO Military Measures which may be considered in a Contingency Situation (NU).  
the

1. (NS) At Enclosure is a paper, agreed by the Military Committee, setting out possible options for NATO Military measures which may be considered when warning has been received of imminent Soviet intervention in Poland, or the fact of intervention has become apparent.

2. (NR) You may wish to give personal copies of this memorandum to Ambassadors and to that end, sufficient copies have been made available to your Private Office.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

Distribution completed at 09:40 hrs  
on 17.12.80 by AB  
1197 EKD

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Per Authority CMSH-053-89

By Mr A. Taelman Date 3 MAR 1981

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Options for NATO Military Measures which may be considered when warning has been received of imminent Soviet intervention in Poland, or the fact of intervention becomes apparent.

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ENCLOSURE

Options for NATO Military Measures which may be considered when warning has been received of imminent Soviet intervention in Poland, or the fact of intervention becomes apparent (NS)

INTRODUCTION

1. (NS) At present there are no indications of a Soviet or Warsaw Pact intervention to attack NATO. Nevertheless, the significantly increased military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact to conduct large scale operations should be of considerable concern to NATO. Possible options for military action, regardless whether the aims be precautionary or political, are discussed in this paper and in its Annexes. Actions which might be appropriate if, after a Soviet intervention, incidents occurred to further raise the level of tension, are not considered.

AIM

2. (NS) The aim of the paper is to provide Political Authorities with a compendium of options from which the NATO Military Authorities might select items for political approval if the situation relating to events in Poland so required. To facilitate discussion of optional actions, use is made of itemized measures from the MNCs' Alert System. This should not imply an intention to employ the structured NATO Alert System in this unique situation, but rather that the specific actions outlined in the particular itemized measures would be recommended for implementation.

MATRIX OF MILITARY OPTIONS

3. (NS) A range of possible NATO military measures, which might be considered in the circumstances envisaged, has been prepared. It is divided, on the one hand, into action which might be appropriate immediately before a large scale intervention (assuming that warning were forthcoming), and that which might be appropriate immediately the fact of intervention became generally apparent. Within each of these two categories are further divisions according to the required level of military response: low response, medium response and high response. The six resulting categories are lettered A, B (low response), C, D (medium response), E, F (high response). There is naturally, a considerable amount of duplication within this layout of the possible options. Some unnecessary duplication has been avoided by excluding the following:

- a. Measures concerning Air Defence posture.
- b. Measures concerning AWACs deployment.
- c. Measures concerning STANAVFORLANT's states of readiness prior to the point at which an intervention is assessed to be imminent.

This Enclosure consists of a total of 15 pages including  
Annex A of 1 page,  
Annex B of 2 pages,  
Annex C of 2 pages,  
Annex D of 2 pages,  
Annex E of 1 page,  
Annex F of 1 page,  
Annex G of 1 page and  
Annex H of 1 page.

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4. (NS) Those measures on which SACEUR originally requested guidance, and which the DPC agreed could be implemented when so decided by SACEUR, are included within the measures of Military Vigilance (MV) which are at item A1 of the matrix at paragraph 5.

5. (NS) It is envisaged that the options shown in the column headed "Options before intervention" would be immediately considered if NATO were fortunate enough to secure definite intelligence that a decision to intervene had been taken. Options shown in the column entitled "Options after intervention" would, it is envisaged, be considered as soon as the physical fact of intervention became generally apparent. One cannot accurately predict all the possible consequences of a Soviet intervention. Nevertheless it is considered that the options shown cover a sufficiently broad spectrum to provide military advice at this stage. Others might be added in the light of events as they occurred. Options shown against the three successive categories "Low response", "Medium response" and "High response" are graduated in terms of military response level. The extent to which the options listed might attract public attention would vary according to circumstances. This aspect is discussed in the Annexes under the heading of "Visibility". The Annexes also contain information on the aim and content of the options.

6. (NS)

## MATRIX

Level of Military Response	Options before intervention	Options after intervention
Low Response	<p>A.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Implementation of those parts of the Alerts Group MV 1 (Alertness and Intelligence) which could be carried out with minimum visibility (see Annex A).</li> <li>2. Place STANAVFORLANT at 24 hours notice to sail (see Annex B).</li> </ol>	<p>B.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Implement Alerts Group MV 1 (Alertness and Intelligence) (see Annex A).</li> <li>2. Carry out selected readiness exercises (see Annex C, para. 2.a).</li> <li>3. STANAVFORLANT at 4 hours notice to sail (see Annex B).</li> <li>4. ACE Mobile Force (Air) to be brought to 24 hrs. notice to deploy (see Annex G).</li> </ol>

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Level of Military Response	Options before intervention	Options after intervention
<p>Medium Response</p>	<p>C.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Implement Alerts Group MV 1 (Alertness and Intelligence) (see Annex A).</li> <li>2. Carry out selected readiness exercises (see Annex C paras 2.a, 2.b).</li> <li>3. STANAVFORLANT at 4 hours notice to sail (see Annex B).</li> <li>4. ACE Mobile Force (Air) to be brought to 24 hours notice to deploy (see Annex G).</li> </ol>	<p>D.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Implement Alerts Group MV 1 (Alertness and Intelligence). Implement those measures of MV 2 (Support Posture) and MV 3 (Operational Posture) which could be carried out with minimum visibility (see Annex D).</li> <li>2. Carry out selected readiness exercises (see Annex C paras 2.a, 2.b, 2.c).</li> <li>3. Activate NAVOCFORMED (see Annex E).</li> <li>4. STANAVFORLANT to conduct exercises or surveillance (see Annex B).</li> <li>5. ACE Mobile Force (Air) to be brought to immediate readiness to deploy (see Annex G).</li> </ol>
<p>High Response</p>	<p>E.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Implement Alerts Groups MV 1 (Alertness and Intelligence), MV 2 (Support Posture), MV 3 (Operational Posture) (see Annex D).</li> <li>2. Carry out selected readiness exercises (see Annex C paras 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d).</li> <li>3. STANAVFORLANT to be sailed and to conduct exercises or surveillance (see Annex B).</li> </ol>	<p>F.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Implement Alerts Groups MV 1 (Alertness and Intelligence), MV 2 (Support Posture), MV 3 (Operational Posture) (see Annex D).</li> <li>2. Implement Alerts Group SA 1 (Alertness and Intelligence) (see Annex F).</li> <li>3. Carry out selected readiness exercises (see Annex C paras 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, 2.e).</li> </ol>

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Level of Military Response	Options before intervention	Options after intervention
High Response (Cont'd)	4. ACE Mobile Force (Air) to be brought to immediate readiness to deploy (see Annex G).  5. Activate NAVOCFORMED (see Annex E).	4. Activate NAVOCFORMED and to sail for exercises (see Annex E).  5. STANAVFORLANT to conduct exercises or surveillance and to be augmented by extra ships (see Annex B).  6. ACE Mobile Force (Air) to be deployed to AFNORTH for exercises (see Annex G).  7. Intensified surveillance of Warsaw Pact Naval and Merchant ships (see Annex H).

NOTE : It should be noted that, in accordance with the Status of Negotiations Part II para 2, the decision whether or not to implement, in part or in whole, any particular Alert measure remains a national prerogative.

7. (NS) The options which are listed above make use of existing plans. It is possible that, in the difficult and dangerous situation which might occur in the Baltic, Denmark and/or Germany might need further assistance than the limited provision listed in this paper. Useful progress on clarifying the need for, and acceptability of, further assistance awaits the political guidance which was requested on 4 December 1980 (1). Guidance is also awaited on the question of a policy covering action to be taken in respect of defecting Polish ships and aircraft, other than is covered under national procedures. It is recognised that in most cases national forces will be involved and nations will act according to international law. A common policy is certainly desirable for naval forces under NATO command. Air defence forces under NATO command are largely covered by existing arrangements.

8. (NS) A further consideration which has not been addressed, because it lies outside the scope of the paper, is the question of general readiness of NATO in place forces during the Christmas period. Peacetime arrangements result in a fall in availability of personnel between 23 December and 3 January. This has an impact on some of the options listed in the matrix at paragraph 5.

9. (NS) Actions which might be taken nationally or bilaterally have not been addressed. Consultation and exchange of information within NATO on such actions would be highly desirable because of their potential effect on the overall Alliance posture.

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ANNEX A

## MILITARY VIGILANCE GROUP MV 1

### Aim

1. (NS) The purpose of the State of Military Vigilance is to reach a certain degree of readiness by the adoption of precautionary measures which have little or no political/civil repercussions. The Alert Measures in Group MV 1 are Military Vigilance measures contributing to prepare "Alertness and Intelligence".

### Application

2. (NS) These measures could be taken in one region or force, if related to a particular contingency, or might be implemented throughout Commands as an indication of NATO readiness and solidarity.

### Visibility

3. (NS) In the limited implementation envisaged at A1 in the matrix, subordinate commanders would be instructed not to exceed the intended minimum visibility level of implementation.

### Content of MV 1 Group "Alertness and Intelligence"

4. (NS) This Group prepares alertness by:
- manning War Headquarters with skeleton staff;
  - implementing progressively emergency communications plans;
  - intensifying collection and reporting intelligence;
  - checking Alert and Mobilisation plans;
  - preparing appropriate electromagnetic and radiation control plans.

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STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTICAim

1. (NS) The role of STANAVFORLANT laid down in MC 171 is to "provide a continuous NATO maritime presence, and in this manner be a constant and visible reminder of the solidarity and cohesiveness of the Alliance." The perceived role in the foreseen situation is to provide a NATO multinational force at short notice capable of being employed to:

- a. Conduct intelligence gathering and surveillance.
- b. Demonstrate the cohesion of the Alliance.
- c. React to events which might require a NATO presence.
- d. React to any perceived direct threat to NATO's interests as a result of Warsaw Pact preparedness.

Composition

2. (NS) Standing Naval Force Atlantic consists at present of destroyer/frigate vessels from the following nations:

Canada  
Federal Republic of Germany  
Netherlands  
United Kingdom  
United States

3. (NS) Implications for STANAVFORLANT of status of readiness in the different categories are as follows:

a. Matrix Measure A.2. With the readiness of 24 hours notice to sail the ships may be deployed to different ports and seasonal leaves as well as shore leave may be granted to the crews. Important maintenance work to the ships and their equipment may be carried out.

b. Matrix Measures B.3, C.3. With the readiness at 4 hours notice to sail, personnel on seasonal leave will be recalled and all major maintenance work will stop. Minor maintenance may be carried out and shore leave may be granted.

c. Matrix Measures D.4, E.3, F.4. With STANAVFORLANT at sea it is readily available to conduct exercises or other missions as ordered by operational authority. DPC approval will be required for surveillance operations and Rules of Engagement as appropriate.

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ANNEX B

4. (NS) Augmentation of the force by STANAVFORCHAN and/or any additional ships made available by nations might be desirable if sustained operations become necessary.

Visibility

5. (NS) Any measure involving STANAVFORLANT will be visible, since its activities attract public notice.

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READINESS EXERCISES

Aim

1. (NS) To demonstrate the readiness of the Alliance by carrying out exercises, some of which are planned in peacetime, that can be implemented quickly to test or increase the readiness of NATO forces.

Concept

2. (NS) Five types of exercises are considered based on the level of participation and the activities as well as their cost/effectiveness:

a. LOW key exercises, such as communications test/exercises and those exercises where loading of stocks and/or movements are excluded. No specific DPC authorisation is needed for this type of exercise.

b. MEDIUM key exercises of FIRST category

(1) Command Post exercises(CPX), loading exercises.

(2) Preplanned exercises for which an agreed operational plan exists, under the following conditions:

- limited geographic area;
- minimum participation;
- limited level specified.

NOTE: A DPC order or authorisation is required to conduct these exercises.

c. MEDIUM key exercises of SECOND category

(1) CPX exercises, loading exercises.

(2) Preplanned exercises for which an agreed operational plan exists, under the following conditions:

- specific geographic area;
- medium participation;
- medium level specified.

NOTE: A DPC order or authorisation is required to conduct these exercises.

ANNEX Cd. MEDIUM key exercises of THIRD category

(1) CPX exercises, loading exercises.

(2) Preplanned exercises for which an agreed operational plan exists, under the following conditions:

- specific geographic area;
- medium participation;
- high level activities.

NOTE: A DPC order or authorisation is required to conduct these exercises.

e. HIGH key exercises

(1) CPX exercises, loading exercises, limited Field Training Exercises (FTX).

(2) Preplanned exercises for which an agreed operational plan exists, under the following conditions:

- specific geographic areas;
- maximum participation;
- high level of activities.

NOTE: A DPC order or authorisation is required to conduct these exercises.

Visibility

3. (NS) Visibility increases according to the degree and type of exercise. Together with the authority/order to conduct the exercise, the DPC will have the opportunity to give guidance on the subject as it considers necessary.

MILITARY VIGILANCE GROUPS MV 1, MV 2 AND MV 3Aim

1. (NS) The purpose of the State of Military Vigilance is to reach a certain degree of readiness by the adoption of precautionary measures which have little or no political/civil repercussions. The Alert measures in these Groups are Military Vigilance measures contributing to prepare "Alertness and Intelligence" (MV 1 see Annex A) "Support Posture" (MV 2), and "Operational Posture" (MV 3).

Application

2. (NS) These measures could be taken in one region or force, if related to a particular contingency, or might be implemented throughout Commands as an indication of NATO readiness and solidarity.

Visibility

3. (NS) Groups MV 2 and MV 3 include the movement of considerable numbers of vehicles and troops, which in turn requires selective cancellation of leave and may necessitate recall at least of active peacetime key personnel. These actions would attract public attention.

Content of MV 1 Group

4. (NS) "Alertness and Intelligence" (see Annex A).

Content of MV 2 Group "Support Posture"

5. (NS) This Group prepares support posture by:

- preparing dispersal and protection of stockpiles and logistic facilities;
- dispersing stockpiles when necessary;
- preparing logistical support of military forces;
- reviewing appropriate meteorological plans.

Content of MV 3 Group "Operational Posture"

6. (NS) This Group prepares operational posture by:

- taking precautionary measures to prevent sabotage and key points;
- bringing units to an appropriate degree of readiness;

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## ANNEX D

- checking and completing national procedures and plans for deployment and dispersal of forces;
- reconnaissance of the dispersal areas of Air Forces.

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NAVAL ON-CALL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN

Aim

1. (NS) To demonstrate NATO's cohesion and solidarity.

Composition

2. (NS) Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) is an Allied Naval Force for the Mediterranean composed of ships of destroyer escort size or larger from the United Kingdom, the United States and the Mediterranean NATO countries.

3. (NS) This force involves participation by nations which otherwise would not have the opportunity to join in the expression of NATO solidarity which circumstances might demand. It would increase NATO's maritime surveillance capability in the Mediterranean.

Visibility

4. (NS) Activation of NAVOCFORMED would attract public attention.

SIMPLE ALERT GROUP SA 1

Aim

1. (NS) This Group of measures is the initial component of the first step towards the attainment of the combat readiness of NATO forces. DPC approval would normally be required according to MC 67/3. Actions in this step should be consistent, as far as possible, with the requirement for discretion.

Application

2. (NS) These measures could be taken in one region or force, if related to a particular contingency, or might be implemented throughout Commands as an indication of NATO readiness and solidarity.

Visibility

3. (NS) Implementation of these measures calls for selective cancellation of leaves and passes of active service personnel employed in Headquarters down to Divisional level. The necessity to recall a small number of reservists could be avoided by instructing subordinate commanders accordingly. The SA 1 Group is higher up the scale of operational readiness than the Military Vigilance Groups, although its visibility need be no higher.

Content of SA 1 Group "Alertness and Intelligence"

4. (NS) This Group improves alertness by:

- implementing appropriate communications and electronic plans;
- operation of War Headquarters and sending Liaison Detachments;
- increasing intelligence collection efforts.

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## ANNEX G

### DEPLOYMENT OF ACE MOBILE FORCE (AIR) FOR EXERCISES

#### Aim

1. (NS) To demonstrate NATO solidarity by carrying out exercises within the Northern Region.

#### Visibility

2. (NS) Deployments of squadrons are not uncommon and the public visibility would not be out of keeping with the rest of the measures in Section F.

#### Force providing nations and types of squadrons

3. (NS)

a. Canada: 1 light attack reconnaissance squadron (10 CF5 aircraft).

b. Netherlands: 1 fighter - bomber - attack squadron (18 NF5).

c. United Kingdom: 1 fighter - bomber - attack squadron (12 Harrier).

d. United States:

(1) 1 All Weather Fighter Squadron (8 F15).

(2) 1 Fighter - bomber - attack squadron (10 F4).

#### Other Considerations

4. (NS) Can be deployed very quickly (within 48 hours) after bringing the units to immediate notice.

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## ANNEX H

### INTENSIFIED SURVEILLANCE OF WARSAW PACT NAVAL AND MERCHANT SHIPS

#### Aim

1. (NS) This measure would have the aim of locating and, so far as possible, tracking all WP naval and merchant ships in selected areas, in order that information be available on all potential Polish defecting vessels and all WP vessels which could be employed to locate, harrass or board Polish defectors.

2. (NS) Ships in port would be subject also to surveillance. Such a substantial operation would convey NATO's readiness to meet some possible maritime consequences of Soviet intervention in Poland.

3. (NS) The operation would be carried out primarily by national forces, although STANAVFORLANT and NAVOCFORMED could contribute. The surveillance organisation is established as described in MC 178/1 and could be activated as required. Surveillance of WP ships in port is also addressed in IMSWM-IBO/UUC-130-80(SD1), dated 9 October (which is not yet agreed by all nations).

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