NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

08

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Record - MC/CS-CBX-75 (Private Session) IMMEDIATE

16 December 1980

SUMMARY RECORD

Private Session of the 75th Meeting of the
Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session
held on Monday, 8 December 1980 at NATO Headquarters
Brussels, Belgium

PRESENT

Chairman:	Admiral R.H. Falls
Belgium:	Lieutenant General W. Gontier
Canada:	General R.M. Withers
Denmark:	General K. Joergensen
Germany:	General J. Brandt
Greece:	General A. Gratsios
Italy:	Admiral G. Torrisi
Luxembourg:	Colonel F. Welfring
Netherlands:	General C. de Jager
Norway:	General Sverre L.B. Hamre
Portugal:	General J. Lemos Ferreira
Turkey:	General N. Öztorun
United Kingdom:	Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin
United States:	General D.C. Jones

MILREPS

Belgium:	Lieutenant General Y. Dedeurwaerder
Canada:	Lieutenant General R. Gutknecht
Denmark:	Lieutenant General P.O.W. Thorsen
Germany:	Lieutenant General E.D. Bernhard
Greece:	Lieutenant General E. Papaefstathiou
Italy:	Vice Admiral G. Fantoni
Luxembourg:	Colonel P. Bergem
Netherlands:	Lieutenant General J.C. Zoutenbier
Norway:	Major General O. Miöen
Portugal:	Lieutenant General J. Ferreira Valente
Turkey:	Vice Admiral S. Ergin
United Kingdom:	Admiral Sir Anthony Morton
United States:	General R.L. Lawson

PERSONAL & SECRET

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MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS

Supreme Allied Commander Europe:	General B.W. Rogers
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic:	Admiral H.D. Train, II
Allied Commander in Chief Channel:	Admiral Sir James Eberle

Deputy Chairman, Military Committee:	Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer
Director, International Military Staff:	Air Marshal Sir Alan Davies

ALSO PRESENT

Chief, French Military Mission:	Général de Corps d'Armée P. Crousillac

J.D. SPOTTISWOOD
Air Commodore, RAF
Secretary, IMS

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Record - MC/CS-CBX-75 (Private Session)

C O N T E N T S

Item No.	Subject	Page No.
PRIVATE SESSION		
PART I=		
2	POSSIBLE NATO PRECAUTIONARY AND PREPARATORY ACTIONS IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND AND POSSIBLE MILITARY MEASURES IN A POST-INVASION SITUATION	6

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PRIVATE SESSION

PART I

NATO SECRET

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Item 2 POSSIBLE NATO PRECAUTIONARY AND PREPARATORY ACTIONS IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND AND POSSIBLE MILITARY MEASURES IN A POST-INVASION SITUATION (NS)

The Chairman invited consideration of possible NATO precautionary measures which might be needed in the pre-invasion situation and those military options which might be used in a post-invasion situation in Poland.

The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic emphasised the variety of signals which could be given to the Soviet Union by the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. To allow the Force to disperse would clearly signal to the Soviet Union a lack of concern and indicate NATO's intention not to take any action. To leave the Force in being and in European ports would signal both NATO's alertness and its concern without being in any way provocative. A deployment of STANAVFORLANT to the Skagerrak or the Baltic would be taken as a much stronger signal of NATO's concern. He therefore thought that a decision on the deployment of STANAVFORLANT must be particularly carefully considered.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe reminded the Committee that the MNCs already had delegated authority to declare Military Vigilance either in whole or in part. He explained that some of the measures, whilst superficially of a low profile, involved significant movement of forces and stockpiles into General Defence Positions and these would result in considerable increases in traffic congestion and large troop movements; they could not therefore be considered as low key or unprovocative. The measures for which he had already sought approval were not of this type. He emphasised the importance of an early decision on the nature of the signal which the Political Authorities wished to convey to the Soviet Union. He also wished to know whether the Political Authorities wished more overt measures to be taken if a Soviet intervention in Poland occurred.

The Norwegian Member suggested that responses would be in two parts. There would be a national response to any Soviet intervention in Poland and, hopefully, a concerted Alliance response as well. From a national point of view, in the event of intervention, he would propose to his Authorities national measures such as the reinforcement of North Norway - a visible reaction he deemed important in such a situation. In that event, he hoped for united Alliance support.

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The United States Member supported the views of the Norwegian Member and said that he believed his Authorities would wish to take overt measures if an invasion took place and urged that the intention expressed by most nations to remain unprovocative, should not result in inaction. With that in view, he said that he had the deployment of dual-based units under active consideration and that the United States Authorities were preparing a paper, in the form of a Matrix, which set out possible national and NATO responses in a pre-invasion and post-invasion situation; these measures would be graded on the basis of their visibility and would be categorised from low through medium to high. The United States paper would also consider such national responses as the deployment of a carrier task group to the Mediterranean. He emphasised the importance of these additional national measures and the urgent requirement for a co-ordinated NATO response. He expressed the view that if SACEUR's requested measures were all that were authorised, then the West would be giving to the Soviet Union a clear signal of passivity.

The Italian Member, while not dissenting from the views expressed by his Colleagues, thought that a Formal Declaration of Military Vigilance in a post-invasion situation could be counter-productive in influencing public opinion. He urged that any necessary measures should be taken outside the context of a Formal Declaration. With the same thought in mind, he also proposed that one method of alerting public opinion to the difficulties of the present situation would be to include in the Final Communiqué of the forthcoming Ministerial Meetings, a reference to the thrust of the argument and the factual content of the briefings given to Ministers by the Chairman and the MNCs.

The Norwegian Member stressed the differences between the present situation and that which had occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The 1968 invasion had met little resistance and had lasted for only a short time; in Poland the situation was unpredictable and could continue for very much longer. He thought it possible that the Soviet Union might attempt to use such an invasion for other purposes and might create diversionary activities in other parts of the World such as South Korea, Iran, Turkey or North Norway.

The Netherlands Member agreed with this view and raised the question of rules of engagement for the STANAVFORLANT as they affected the defection of Polish ships. SACEUR, in the same context, drew attention to his existing permanently delegated authority to react to hostile acts in NATO airspace.

Record - MC/CS-CBX-75 (Private Session)

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PDN/2011/0002 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

The United Kingdom Member urged that the Political Authorities should be made fully aware of all implications of a Soviet invasion of Poland. He proposed that the IMS should prepare a paper for consideration by the Military Committee in Permanent Session, in the form of a Matrix setting out the options which were available to Ministers. He urged that the paper should also include a section to remind the Political Authorities of the existing delegated powers of the MNCs.

The Chairman noted the Committee's direction to the IMS to produce a paper on the military options available to the Alliance both before and after an invasion which would include a proposal from the Allied Commander in Chief Channel to take account of recent studies on NATO's Policy on Warsaw Pact Vessels in Allied Ports.

THE COMMITTEE TOOK NOTE.

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