



NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

033

MCM-EKD-84-80

4 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SUBJECT:

Options for NATO Military Measures which may be considered in a Contingency Situation (NU).
Europe and its Further Development (NS)

1. (NS) At Enclosure 1 is a Preliminary Appreciation of Possible NATO Precautionary and Preparatory Actions in Relation to the Situation in Eastern Europe and its Further Development.
2. (NS) At Enclosure 2 is a Military Committee Intelligence Assessment of the present situation in Eastern Europe and at Enclosure 3 a list of SACEUR's relevant indicators and warnings in chronological order.
3. (NR) You may wish to give personal copies of this Preliminary Appreciation to Ambassadors and to that end, sufficient copies have been made available to your Private Office.

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Per Authority: INSM-053-89
 By: M. [Signature] Date: 3 MAR 1989
 A.C. DAVIES
 Air Marshal, RAF Ext: 2947 - Room 1 1939
 Director
 International Military Staff

ENCLOSURES

1. Preliminary Appreciation
2. Military Committee Intelligence Assessment
3. SACEUR's Relevant Indicators and Warnings

COPY TO:	MILREPS	CMC	SACEUREP	} One copy each in personally addressed envelope
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ENCLOSURE 1

PRELIMINARY APPRECIATION OF POSSIBLE NATO PRECAUTIONARY AND
PREPARATORY ACTIONS IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ITS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

The Situation

1. The intelligence assessment continues to conclude that the Soviet authorities have made the political decision to carry out necessary preparations for military intervention or an invasion of Poland, and have implemented sufficient military preparations to be able to intervene or invade with great speed and as soon as a decision to do so has been taken. The preparations constitute a marked increase in Warsaw Pact strength and readiness in Eastern Europe.

General Considerations

2. It is assumed that NATO as a defensive alliance would not intervene in the internal affairs of a WP nation or nations. In these circumstances the aims of NATO's response to any Soviet or collective WP threat or actual military action against Poland should be:

a. To demonstrate that NATO is aware of and concerned about such a situation.

b. To improve NATO readiness in response to any increase in WP capability for military action against the Alliance.

c. To prevent the Soviet leadership assuming that NATO would be content to tolerate a position of military disadvantage as a consequence of a Soviet build-up on some future occasion - ostensibly for the purpose of coercing a satellite state.

3. Some initial NATO reaction in advance of an actual Soviet/WP intervention in Poland could usefully serve all three aims. As the consequences of a Soviet armed intervention are incalculable, operations with limited initial intentions could all too easily overspill and might well not be containable within the WP area. If the determinant factor is an assessment of Soviet capabilities rather than any precise knowledge of intentions then there is a need to make use of Alliance intelligence gathering, disseminating and assessment facilities from the earliest possible stage to ensure a sound basis for decisions. Other measures of a precautionary and defensive nature may well be merited by circumstances. Actions such as those identified by measures within the State of Military Vigilance could be considered for selective utilization both in advance of, and at the beginning of, an actual Soviet intervention. These could best safeguard NATO's interests, serve notice on the WP and prepare Alliance public opinion.

Intelligence Measures

4. An initial conclusion to be drawn from the above is that measures should be taken to increase the gathering and reporting of intelligence in order to provide the basis for Alliance assessments, decisions and necessary

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actions. Although the MNCs have power to declare, on their own authority, appropriate measures of Military Vigilance (while keeping the DPC informed), it is essential that the NAC/DPC, advised by the MC, should provide MNCs with guidance on the overall Alliance view of the situation.

5. The Council is, therefore, recommended to formally request nations to intensify intelligence reporting under the provisions of C-M(71)1(Revised) (Exchange of Current Intelligence and Information within the Alliance), to provide the widest possible basis from which politico-military assessments may be developed.

6. In parallel, it is desirable that MNCs be given guidance concerning the extent to which they might reasonably take action to increase intelligence gathering within the framework of current Alliance policy. The situation warrants an intensification of the collection and reporting of intelligence, and it is recommended that MNCs should be advised accordingly.

7. Early consideration should also be given to SACEUR's suggestion that if the situation warranted it, the US could be asked to deploy AWACS aircraft to ACE. Although it would be a more visible precaution than that recommended in para 6 above, it is considered that there are strong arguments for such a deployment, especially in view of the very confused and dangerous air situation which would occur during a Soviet invasion of Poland. The deployment of AWACS aircraft would carry no offensive implications. It is recommended that the NAC/DPC authorize SACEUR to request AWACS support from the United States Military Authorities when he judges this is warranted by the situation.

Alliance Military Posture

8. The only action yet taken which affects Alliance military posture is to order STANAVFORLANT to remain in European waters. Until 10 December STANAVFORLANT will remain operationally ready, subject to routine maintenance. The programme thereafter has not been decided. It is recommended that SACLANT should be advised to keep the Standing Force at sufficient state of readiness to be within 72 hours of the Skagerrak for reasons given at para 12.b below. It is recommended that CINCHAN be advised to keep STANAVFORCHAN at a similar state of readiness, including during the period after the force disperses on 18 December.

9. Further possible actions to improve Alliance military posture in the initial stages are mostly covered by the measures of Military Vigilance. It is recommended that MNCs should be given sufficient frequent guidance on the Alliance assessment of the situation to enable them to be ready to utilize such measures without the need for lengthy consultation about their effect on overall Alliance policy. One element of guidance which might now be given should concern the circumstances in which those actions already proposed by SACEUR, and the types of action discussed above, might be implemented without detriment to overall Alliance policy.

10. A further initial upgrading of the Alliance military posture may be achieved by ordering the execution of preplanned readiness exercises. These may be initiated under an existing contingency plan. They serve to improve the readiness of NATO forces and, since their execution would usually

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be apparent to Soviet intelligence, they would serve to give unobtrusive notice of Alliance concern with present events. It is recommended that SACEUR and nations should be invited to review their readiness to undertake preplanned readiness exercises at short notice. SACLANT and CINCHAN should also be invited to review their ability to demonstrate military readiness. It is also recommended that the NAC/DPC give early consideration to a policy decision that readiness exercises would be appropriate as soon as there is firm evidence of an executive order to WP forces to intervene in Poland.

Precautionary Measures to Deal with the Aftermath of a Soviet Invasion of Poland

11. The situation during a WP invasion of Poland would be confused and dangerous. Some, perhaps many, of the Polish forces and population would resist. Fighting in the air and at sea could occur in many areas remote from Poland itself, as Polish ships and aircraft resisted coercion or attempted to reach refuge. The situation in the Baltic and its airspace would be especially confused and, if the Soviets pursued those taking refuge, violations of territorial waters and airspace would be inevitable. The air situation would be difficult to control, since many Polish aircraft have enough range to fly around and through Warsaw Pact territory to many parts of NATO territory.

12. There is a firm military requirement to define the action to be taken in these circumstances. The main contingencies to be covered are as follows although others will appear as the planning process proceeds:

a. Action to be taken concerning Polish warships, merchant ships, military and civil aircraft which attempted to seek refuge or otherwise expressed resistance to WP actions. This could be developed both as a general Alliance policy and as specific rules for forces under NATO Command.

b. Action to protect those given asylum against WP coercion. Although normally a national task, Alliance assistance might be welcome in securing FRG and Danish territorial waters and airspace in the Baltic, the security of the Danish Straits, and the security of the FRG and Danish Baltic coastlines.

c. Action to give Alliance support to Denmark and the FRG in the face of Soviet demands which might well result from granting asylum to Polish resisters. This could involve the application of existing contingency plans (e.g. ACE Mobile Force, UK Mobile Force), and possibly new ones.

d. Action to be taken by NATO Air Defence forces in a probably confused situation.

13. The NAC/DPC is recommended to approve that contingency planning be now initiated, in consultation with national authorities, to deal with the aftermath of a Soviet invasion of Poland. In the early stages of such planning it will be necessary to obtain political guidance on whether there is to be an overall Alliance policy concerning Polish resisters and refugees, or one confined only to forces under NATO Command. It will also be necessary to obtain the views of Denmark and the FRG on the need for Alliance assistance.

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Conclusion

14. In summary, the Council/DPC are:

- a. Advised that the military situation in Eastern Europe requires early consideration of precautionary and preparatory action.
- b. Advised of the adverse effects of passivity in such a situation, which the Soviets might take as a precedent on future occasions.
- c. Recommended to formally request that nations intensify intelligence reporting to NATO HQ.
- d. Recommended to approve that MNCs be advised that the situation warrants an intensification in the collection and reporting of intelligence.
- e. Recommended that, concerning the deployment of AWACS aircraft, the Council authorize SACEUR to request AWACS support from the United States Military Authorities when he judges this is warranted by the situation.
- f. Recommended to approve that the standing naval forces remain at sufficient state of readiness to enable them to be off the Skagerrak within 72 hours of receiving orders to proceed.
- g. Recommended that MNCs be given guidance on the acceptability, in relation to overall Alliance policy, of the utilization of measures such as those within the state of Military Vigilance.
- h. Recommended that MNCs and nations be invited to review their ability to demonstrate military readiness, including the preplanned readiness exercises applicable to Allied Command Europe.
- i. Recommended to give early consideration to a policy decision on the circumstances in which such exercises would be appropriate.
- j. Recommended to approve that contingency planning be initiated to deal with the aftermath of a Soviet invasion of Poland.

N A T O R E S T R I C T E D

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POLAND

Developments in Poland over the last few months have in general comprised a mixture of political, economic and military activities, the latter leading to a gradual, and primarily covert build-up of military forces. The Soviet Union had undoubtedly prior knowledge of the unsettling developments in Poland before they became known to the rest of the world. It may safely be assumed that the Soviets had taken the basic political decision to initiate significant military preparations even before the dismissal of GIEREK on 5 September 1980.

Confirmed military indications of a Soviet intent to prepare forces for a possible intervention crystallized at the end of October/ beginning of November and were duly reported. These preparations continued step by step with the result that forces, particularly Soviet and predominantly in the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union, are now in a state of high readiness for intervention with little or no tactical warning. It appears that the Soviet preparations have followed the general lines noted at the time of the crises in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These are to maintain a solid defensive posture against the West and at the same time to prepare forces for an intervention. In view of the size of Poland, the nature of its people and their historic grievances against their neighbours, it can be assumed with a fair degree of confidence that an intervention would be effected with large Soviet forces from the East and only token participation by other Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces.

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No matter what kind of military option the Soviets choose, it will be mandatory for them to execute it rapidly, with large forces, whilst simultaneously sealing all Poland's land and sea borders and cutting all lines of communication.

Due to the large number of options available to the Soviets it is almost impossible to speculate on the course of events after a military intervention, but it can certainly be envisaged that large numbers of people and possibly deserters, even Soviet, from the armed forces might try to leave Poland and seek refuge in Western countries. One of the main escape routes would probably be the sea.

In summary it should be stressed that:

- Soviet and Warsaw Pact armed forces in and adjacent to Poland have attained a readiness posture enabling them to intervene in Poland with large forces, with minimal or no tactical warning, once the political decision for tactical deployment is given.

- At present, there are no indications of a Soviet or Warsaw Pact intention to attack NATO. Nevertheless, the significantly increased military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact to wage war should be of considerable concern to us.

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ENCLOSURE 3

SHAPE INDICATORS AND WARNINGS (I AND W)

Date of Activation

22.09.80	Statements to the Soviet population depicting a threat to the security of the USSR, or a Warsaw Pact ally
01.10.80	
08.10.80	Jamming of foreign broadcasts
17.10.80	Effort to promote disorder/instability insensitive/critical geographical areas
20.10.80	Increasing virulent propaganda against NATO's war mongering and brinkmanship
20.10.80	Restriction of travel by press, MA/DA and others to border areas
22.10.80	Scheduling an exercise during a crisis which could serve as a cover for reinforcement or increased readiness
28.10.80	Arrests of dissidents.
03.11.80	Increased readiness
15.11.80	General or partial call-up of conscripts
15.11.80	Postponement of release of conscripts
15.11.80	Evidence that top political leadership has assumed control of the armed forces
25.11.80	Increased activity in railyards/sidings
25.11.80	Recall of reservists. Cancellation of leave. Divisions in Western MDs to higher category and higher readiness
25.11.80	Increased numbers of surface combatants deployed from Baltic fleet homeports
26.11.80	Evacuation of Soviet families from Poland, or non-arrival of families of replacements
28.11.80	High level meetings and travel by VIPs including possible invitations to top Polish military and political leaders to USSR

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Date of Activation

28.11.80	Deployment of forward command posts
29.11.80	Establishment of TRAs in GDR
01.12.80	Increase in propaganda and diplomatic efforts to explain the Soviet position and decoy activities of anti-communist and counter-revolutionaries in Poland. Criticism of Western media in stirring up trouble. Increase in subversion attempts inside Poland
01.12.80	Extensive standdown of flight activity in forward area
01.12.80	Unusual activities by Soviet airborne divisions
01.12.80	Extra signal stations deployed near Polish border

REMARKS

The above indicators are listed chronologically and show only broad major headings, details of which are substantiated by hard intelligence.

NOTE: The latest reports indicate a forthcoming large scale Warsaw Pact Air Defence Exercise and a Ground Forces Exercise in the Western Military Districts. Both are unprecedented at this stage of the training cycle.

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