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2 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE - One copy each in personally addressed envelope

SUBJECT: Military Committee Meeting in Restricted Session, 2 December 1980 (NU)

(NR) At Enclosure is a first draft copy of an in-house study to be discussed by the Military Committee in Restricted Session (1 + 1) at approximately 1630 hours today, 2 December 1980, in the Presentation Room.

A.C. Davies
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Air Marshal, RAF
Director
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ENCLOSURE

Discussion Paper

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This document consists of a
total of six pages including
an Enclosure of five pages

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Discussion paper for DCMC/DIMS Meeting
2 December 1980

1. (NC) This discussion paper is intended initially as a framework for consideration at the meeting. It could then serve as the basis for a paper for the Military Committee when considering the aim, scope and character of subsequent preparations.

2. (NC) Role of the Military Committee.

A distinction should be made between:

a. Measures to increase the gathering and reporting of intelligence, for which the rationale is both political and military.

b. Military measures taken in support of political and diplomatic action, for which the rationale is political. See Annex A for clarification.

c. Military measures, other than those in sub-para 2 a. above, for which a primarily military case can be made.

3. (NC) Individual military measures can be proposed under one or other of the above categories, depending on the effect which it is desired to achieve. The MC and the MNCs could take the initiative in proposing measures with the aims outlined in 2 a. and 2 c. In the case of political aims, category 2 b., their role would mainly be responsive to Council/DPC requests for advice.

4. (NS) Measures to increase the gathering and reporting of intelligence.

a. Reporting under the arrangements in C-M 71(1) Revised could be intensified by request of the Council.

b. The following measures of Military Vigilance are relevant. These may be declared by MNCs on their own initiative, keeping the DPC informed, but MC and DPC guidance might be sought beforehand:

VIA = Intensification of Collection and Reporting of Intelligence

VIB = Intensification of Counter-Intelligence Activities

VOM = Conduct of Reconnaissance/Surveillance (ACLANT and ACCHAN only)

c. Appropriate initial action under the Alerts System would presumably be declaration of VIA ACE-wide.

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of 5 pages including
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5. (NS) Military Measures in support of political and diplomatic action.

a. As explained in Annex A, the MC should initially be prepared to advise on the following possible actions:

(1) Adjusting scope and timing of already scheduled military exercises (there is little scope for this during the Christmas period).

(2) Adjusting programmes and tasks of Standing Naval Forces (for consideration that STANAVFORLANT is about to disperse on 3 December. STANAVFORCHAN will disperse on 18 December).

(3) Execution of preplanned readiness exercises. These involve SACEUR and national action.

b. Measures of Military Vigilance are, in general, covert although discreet publicity or diplomatic action could be used to allow them to convey a political signal.

c. A higher level of support for political and diplomatic action could be given by some of the measures discussed in the following section, although the rationale for them might primarily be military.

6. (NS) Military Measures for which a primarily military case can be made (other than Intelligence measures).

There are three main aims which might generate a military requirement for precautionary action:

a. To increase NATO readiness in proportion to an increasing WP capability for military action against the Alliance.

b. To avoid creating a precedent of passivity in the face of a WP build-up, whatever its ostensible reason, since this might encourage the Soviets at some future time to use the cover of satellite suppression to prepare an offensive against NATO.

c. To prepare for the aftermath of an invasion of Poland.

7. (NS) The aims in sub-paras 2 a. and 2 b. both concern the need to sustain the Alliance military position in relation to that of the WP. The measures required are already to hand in the Alerts system and in Contingency Operation Plans. The main burden on the MC would be to put the case for reaction to capabilities as opposed to reaction to perceived or assumed intentions.

8. (NS) Preparation for the aftermath of an invasion of Poland might include the following contingencies:

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a. Action to be taken concerning Polish warships, merchant ships, military and civil aircraft which attempted to seek refuge or otherwise expressed resistance to WP actions. This could be developed both as a general Alliance policy and as specific rules for forces under NATO Command.

b. Action to protect those given asylum against WP coercion. Although normally a national task, Alliance assistance might be welcome in securing FRG and Danish territorial waters and airspace in the Baltic, the security of the Danish Straits, and the security of the FRG and Danish Baltic coastlines.

c. Action to give Alliance support to Denmark and the FRG in the face of Soviet demands which might well result from granting asylum to Polish resisters. This could involve the application of existing contingency plans (e.g. AMF, UKMF), and possibly new ones.

d. Action to be taken by NATO Air Defence forces in a probably confused situation.

9. (NS) The initial role of the MC, advised by the MNCs, in the preparations discussed in para 8 above would presumably be to obtain Council/DPC approval for contingency planning to be undertaken by NATO authorities, in co-operation with national authorities. The sooner the degree of NATO involvement is clarified the better.

10. (NC) Readiness of the NATO HQ is mainly covered by existing orders. MILREPs might be asked to agree on a criterion for readiness to attend the first MC meeting after a decision to convene. At present, the IMS should usually be able to meet a criterion of about 6 hours (2 hours telephoning and transit, 3 hours preparation for pre-brief) if it is accepted that initial manning would not be optimum. A rigorous readiness roster would be needed to improve on this estimate.

11. (NS) Conclusion.

The following points for early consideration, (though not necessarily early decision) could be put to the MC:

a. Whether Standing Naval Forces should maintain a specified state of readiness during their dispersed periods.

b. Whether SACEUR and nations should be advised to review their readiness to implement preplanned readiness exercises.

c. Whether the Council should be invited to consider requesting increased intelligence reporting under the provisions of C-M 71(1) Revised.

d. Whether SACEUR should, with the concurrence of the DPC, be invited to consider declaration of VIA ACE-wide.

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e. Whether to request Council/DPC approval for NATO military authorities to start contingency planning to deal with the aftermath of a WP invasion of Poland.

f. Whether to establish a criterion for readiness to attend the first MC meeting after a decision to convene.

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ANNEX A

1. (NS) The use of various sorts of political, economic and military measures in support of political and diplomatic moves comes under the general heading of Preventive Measures, on which the current Council document is C-M(79)3. A revision of this document is in progress as a result of experience in WINTEX/CIMEX 79, when there was some confusion over the application of politico-military measures. The revision, which is not yet final, endeavours to clarify matters by putting military actions into a separate category under the heading of "Military Measures with Potential Preventive Effect", and by making it plain that nearly all such measures could equally well be required for military reasons to sustain the Alliance military position. Their use for purely preventive reasons would therefore demand a decision well before the point at which the military situation requires that they be implemented.

2. (NS) The clarification, which is proposed in IMSWM-EKK-208-80 of 12 September 1980, does not, however, affect the substance of preventive action. From the military point of view, this could run up an ascending scale as far as demonstrations of force. If this question were raised the Council or DPC would probably first wish to consider the lower levels of preventive effect. Eliminating actions inapplicable in the Polish context, the remaining possibilities include adjusting the scope and timing of already scheduled military exercises and adjusting the programmes and tasks of the Standing Naval Forces. At a rather higher level the MC could consider recommending the execution of preplanned readiness exercises, which are covered in SACEUR's contingency operation plan 10400 FLYING EAGLE. The OCOF is in reference 1220.8/14-8-1/S-366/75, 1 January 1976.

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of 1 page