

POINT PAPER: Poland Update

(NU) Purpose To provide SACEUR with background information about Poland for his meeting with Secretary General Dr Luns on 2 December 1980.

(NS) Background Discussion

- Political Development

- - The situation in Poland has deteriorated in the last two or three weeks in spite of Solidarity's recent efforts to cool the situation.

- - Soviet/Czech propaganda compares the Polish situation with CSSR in 1968 and produces also similar reasons for their concern.

- - The Soviets are undoubtedly concerned over a possible breakdown of law and order, the Poles ability to deal with this and a progressive erosion of the socialist system in the country.

- - The increased propaganda campaign and some Soviet military preparations may be meant as a final warning to the Polish Party and Government to put their house in order.

- - WP Ministers of Defence are meeting in Bucharest (1 - 3 Dec).

- - The CSCE meeting in Madrid. Xmas break

- Military Developments

- - So far we have had reported

- - - Increased Command, Control and Communication readiness

- - - Some call-up of Soviet reservists and civilian vehicles in Western Military Districts and preparation of equipment.

- - - Restriction of travel to the Soviet/Polish Border Area by Foreign Military Attaches in Moscow.

- - - Some unusual move forward or return to GSFG/NGF of Soviet 2nd year soldiers.

- - - Seven unscheduled Aeroflot flights into NGF bases possibly to provide an improved manning of specialists and/or the removal of Soviet dependents.

- - - Some restrictions on travel between GDR/CSSR and Poland.

- - - Some mobilization of GDR reservists and movement of GDR army units to the border area - such movements only by night.

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- - - Some training by Category C units in Western Military Districts that normally require reservists to deploy.

- - - Temporary Restricted Area 4/80 (292300Z NOV - 092300Z Dec) which includes a strip varying from 35 - 90 kms along the most northerly 85% of the GDR/Polish frontier. The reason could be to screen the activities of the units/formation in the area or their movement towards the border and/or to serve as a clear warning to the Poles.

- - - An unexplained stand down at forward area air forces for various periods over the past 7 days.

- (NS) Possible Scenarios

- - Intervention

- - - The Polish Government and the Unions are brought into direct confrontation and the Militia and/or regular forces are called out.

- - - Polish Authorities are unable to control the situation and request Soviet/WP assistance in conjunction with their own security forces.

- - Invasion I

- - - Situation as above, but Polish Government does not request Soviet/WP assistance.

- - - The Soviets judge the Polish Government will not be able to handle the situation and the Soviets will move in to restore the situation.

- - Invasion II

- - - The Polish Government in conditions of confrontation with the Unions is about to call out Polish forces.

- - - The Soviets however, conclude that, the Polish Government has lost control of the situation and decide to move in pre-emptively to save the situation.

- (NS) Forces available

- - The divisions listed below, are in our view, the most likely Soviet candidates to be used, leaving enough divisions in the areas for security purposes and to fulfil their estimated minimum operational requirements.

- - - Soviet divisions within 100 kilometer band - 13
- - - Soviet divisions within 200 kilometer band around Poland - 15 - 28
- - - Soviet divisions within 300 kilometer band around Poland - 5 - 33

Cumulative

- - - Total 33 divisions, enough for intervention and possibly invasion.

- - Of these 33, 15 divisions in the Western military districts of the USSR are either Category B or C divisions which would need mobilization before commitment. This process has clearly started, but evidence is fragmentary and is not clear which Category B or C divisions are affected.

- - To support the ground forces, a total of 1,357 offensive aircraft are available in the GDR, CSSR and the Western Military Districts within 100 miles of the Polish borders. A total of 440 attack helicopters (HIND/HIP) and 267 assault helicopters (HOOK/HIP) are immediately available in the GDR, CSSR and the Western Military Districts within a range of 100 miles from the Polish borders.

- - Included in the 33 divisions listed above is one airborne division from the Baltic Military District. Another from the Leningrad Military District is also locally available and the remaining four available could be deployed quickly.

- - - A total of 60 CANDID and 61 CUB are available in the Western Military Districts capable of transporting 12,000 paratroopers or 14,000 Motorized Rifle troops.

- - The use of WP Naval and Naval Air Forces is expected to be concentrated on the achievement of maritime surveillance of the Polish coast line, with the option of a partial or full blockade of Polish ports, if deemed necessary.

- - The use of amphibious forces, including the Naval Infantry Regiment at Baltiysk, in specific areas is likely, although it is considered that these would not be used in the initial stages of an invasion.

- - Sufficient naval surface, air, submarine and amphibious units for an effective blockade are available from Soviet Baltic Fleet resources without recourse to the use of GDR or Polish naval forces.

- Although it seems logical for the Soviets to use NSWP forces along with Soviet forces for an intervention/invasion, they may judge that any NSWP participation while easing the problem of locally available forces, may lay these NSWP units open to the "Polish disease". Thus the use of NSWP forces may be circumspect.

(NS) SHAPE Position

Assessment

- The Soviets face a fine decision. That is they have to try and assess the time at which the Poles are likely to lose control or go beyond the degree of tolerance acceptable to them. They therefore have to prepare their forces to at least a minimum level to meet any immediate requirement.

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- It would appear from the evidence available that the Soviets may already have sufficient forces prepared for an intervention in Poland.
- We have had insufficient evidence to say whether they have achieved their desired level of mobilization for invasion and we believe that had they achieved this level, more activity would have been seen. Nations have not yet responded to our specific requests (28 Nov) for expanded reporting on the formations listed above.
- Although we still feel that the Soviets have no wish to take military action, preferring the Poles to solve their own problems, they are a cautious race and will continue their preparations towards the worst case. We believe that they are now using and will continue to use these preparations as a show of force to pressurize the Polish Government/Party and workers.

(NR) Recommendations

- That SACEUR uses the above as background material for his discussions with Dr Luns.

Division Chief Approval _____ Date _____

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