

26 JAN 1963

2

119

NATO SECRET

To: Secretary General
 c.c. Deputy Secretary General
 DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance ✓
 ASG for Political Affairs

From: Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Private Meeting of the Council
 held on Wednesday, 23rd January, 1963, at 12 noon

- I. East/West Relations
- II. Invitation to the Chairman to report on his visits to NATO Capitals.

I. EAST/WEST RELATIONS

The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled the suggestion at the last meeting that the Council should discuss the problem of Berlin and Germany in the light of the Communist Congress which had taken place in East Berlin. His authorities would welcome an early exchange of views, possibly in restricted session, on:

- a) an exchange of views on recent indications of Soviet intentions on Berlin and in the light of this assessment a discussion of Western tactics;
- b) a review of various aspects of political contingency planning - continuing the discussion initiated shortly before the Ministerial Meeting by the consideration of the Four-Power Ambassadorial Working Group in Washington taking also into account the comments on this subject made at the Ministerial Meeting and the method of work outlined in PO/62/716 of November 19, 1962, as well as the problems described in PO/62/647 of October 8, 1962, particularly paragraph 14; and
- c) consideration of a procedure for reviewing the various proposals which have been under consideration, for a possible East-West settlement.

2. The CHAIRMAN said that the International Staff was preparing a paper on Soviet intentions regarding Berlin which it might be possible to circulate as a basis for discussion. On the second point, he said that this was one of the suggestions outstanding from the December Ministerial Meeting on which the staff was preparing a follow-up paper. On the third point, he would welcome suggestions from delegations as to how to proceed.

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3. The United States Delegation have been asked to provide the Secretary General with the texts of their telegrammes.

4. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE thought that the Council should discuss all three subjects at an early meeting. He informed the Council of the contents of telegrammes he had just received on a number of subjects as follows:

(a) Briefing of Four-Power Ambassadorial Group in Washington by Ambassador Thompson on Mr. Khrushchev's visit to East Berlin.

5. The Group had met on 22nd January, with Mr. Thompson in the Chair, to discuss reactions to Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in East Berlin. Generally, it was thought that the purpose of Mr. Khrushchev's main speech was self-evident; however, in de-emphasising the need for a peace treaty, he might have meant to suggest that other interim arrangements were possible. His reference to the ability of East Germany to exert pressure on access routes was ominous, but it seemed that the threat was against West Germany rather than other allied traffic. Nothing in the speech implied a drastic demotion of Mr. Ulbricht. On disarmament, Mr. Khrushchev had said categorically that progress on Berlin and Germany was necessary before any agreement could be reached. Mr. Khrushchev's statement to the Congress that the Soviets would not act as "a rich uncle" to East Germany should be noted.

6. Mr. Thompson had expressed the view personally that recent Soviet attacks on intellectuals, abstract art, etc., might, on the analogy of similar attacks on intellectuals under Stalin, mean a harder Soviet line in other fields. Reports from Moscow of debates in the Press on the subject of art suggested that there was now possibly greater pressure on intellectuals.

7. Mr. Thompson had also informed the Group about the recent talks between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Kohler on Berlin. The Soviets had not changed their position on Berlin and the need for a German settlement.

(b) Analysis of Soviet intentions regarding Berlin in the light of the Communist Congress.

8. The text of this telegramme, as all other telegrammes now referred to, would be held by his delegation for reference by those interested.

(c) State Department assessment of Soviet intentions in the foreign policy field as regards a nuclear test ban.

9. The full significance of the recent Soviet proposals was still uncertain. The Soviets now appeared to be reverting to their earlier acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection, though they still claimed such inspection was unnecessary. Their argument that they were making this proposal in order to produce favourable action by Congress, suggested that they might contemplate withdrawing the offer later on the pretext that the West was not willing to negotiate

seriously. The Soviets might now be interested in obtaining an agreement to cease all tests, but it was not known whether the price they were prepared to pay by way of control arrangements was acceptable to the West.

10. It seemed that Mr. Khrushchev was now, after the Cuban affair, anxious to improve the international atmosphere and to show the correctness of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence (to whom, was not clear). He might think that a test ban was a promising sphere for agreement. Again, he might think a test ban agreement would make any hostile action by the United States against Cuba more difficult; or that his offer might put the West in debt to the Soviets; or that it would improve the atmosphere in the West towards Russia.

11. The Soviets probably felt that their recent tests had resulted in substantial progress and that they could afford to stop testing at least for the time being, provided the United States did the same. Their more forthcoming attitude might be due to the fear that the United States would never again accept an unpoliced moratorium. Again, while Communist China's insistence in the past on becoming a nuclear power had acted as a drag on the Soviet position, the deteriorated relations with China might now make it possible for Moscow to ignore China. Again, the Soviet offer might be aimed at dividing the Western Alliance. Finally, the Soviets might be hoping through a test ban agreement to hold down increases in Soviet expenditure on military research.

12. It should be noted that Mr. Khrushchev had said in Berlin that serious progress on disarmament would depend on progress towards a peace treaty. Here he was perhaps interested in partial disarmament measures, and was hoping to marshal pressure by the unaligned countries on the West in favour of a peace treaty.

(d) United States, United Kingdom and USSR discussions in New-York from 14th to 20th January, 1962, on a nuclear test ban.

13. The United States hoped that these informal discussions might result in recommendations for decisive negotiations towards a test ban treaty. The United States had given its views on national detection systems accompanied by automatic stations to act as a check on national systems. The Soviets had given the United States and the United Kingdom a list of stations on Soviet territory which could give information to an international centre, and had indicated three possible sites for "black boxes". The United States had indicated their criteria for on-site inspections. The Soviets had refused to state their general position, but had insisted on discussing on-site inspection quotas and numbers of "black boxes". They had agreed to accept a maximum of only three "black boxes" as against the United States request for eighteen to twenty.

14. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that in assessing the Berlin situation in the light of Mr. Khrushchev's latest speeches, his authorities considered the most interesting statement to be that a German peace treaty was no longer the main problem, as it had been before the building of the wall. This was the first time that Mr. Khrushchev had argued in public that the wall was beneficial in that it protected East Germany's frontier and could also be used to exert pressure on West Germany.

15. A further point to be noted was that Mr. Khrushchev no longer talked about a de-militarised free city of West Berlin. It seemed that on the question of the presence of troops, Mr. Khrushchev was showing more flexibility in public than he had hitherto in private; possibly he was trying to elicit a Western initiative. The United Kingdom considered that there was nothing in his speeches which justified a change in the views expressed at the December Ministerial Meeting.

16. The new Soviet offer on "black boxes" came nowhere near solving the problem of inspection and ensuring that the Soviets would really honour their undertakings. Proposals on inspection should be, not political gestures as the present Soviet one, but related to scientific realities. At present no scientific agreement existed with the Russians on the composition of "black boxes".

17. The tripartite talks continuing in Washington might reduce the areas of disagreement before the resumption of disarmament discussions in Geneva.

18. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities were also impressed by Mr. Khrushchev's argument that the wall made a peace treaty less urgent. The Council should analyse this argument. It seemed that, though he still used the same propaganda slogans, Mr. Khrushchev was no longer so pre-occupied by a peace treaty. However, the West should remain firm on this issue, since it was Western firmness which had brought about this change in the Soviet attitude.

19. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled his government's desire to see an agreement on a nuclear test ban with the minimum security guarantees. He hoped that the United States and the United Kingdom would keep the Council informed of developments. As regards partial disarmament measures, to which the United States Representative had referred, he thought that the Council should now give the United States its views on the United States paper of 30th November, 1962 on measures to reduce the risk of accidental war.

20. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he would welcome a discussion.

21. It was agreed to resume discussion at the meeting planned for Thursday, 31st January, 1963, at 10.15 a.m.

II. INVITATION TO THE CHAIRMAN TO REPORT ON HIS VISITS TO NATO CAPITALS

22. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked whether, in view of their considerable interest to the Council, the Chairman would consider giving the Council an account of his current round of visits to NATO capitals.

23. The CHAIRMAN said that he would be glad to do so informally in February, when the visits were over.

26th January, 1963-

