

38
DISCA
1948
NATO SECRET
Mr. Gaudreau
Mr. Schenk
1977 1983 1974
Without Enclosure
NATO SECRET
Copy No 4 of 4 copies
1985 1982 1978
1980

To: Secretary General
c.c. Deputy Secretary General
DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance
From: Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a private meeting of the Council held on Friday, 12th October, 1962 at 11.30 a.m.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Document: PO/62/641

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Council go through the questions raised in PO/62/641, paragraph by paragraph. He was informed that the NATO military authorities hoped to reply in the next week to the Canadian and Belgian questions recorded under Section II. He suggested that the Council should aim, if possible, at reaching some kind of agreement on this complex problem by the end of October.

Paragraph 10

2. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made the following reply to the question by the Canadian Representative:

"The tripartite paper did not intend that control would pass to NATO automatically when the Soviets resist a probe or use force per se. The intention as I understand it, was rather to establish the principle that, in order to avoid premature political escalation control should be passed to NATO when it is clearly established that the Soviets are determined to use force in blocking access and a decision is made to reinforce with intent to expand the action on the ground. This transfer would probably have to take place in Phase III, although it is obviously impossible to forecast precisely the circumstances in which it should occur. For possible action in more remote areas, e.g. naval measures, we believe that the concept behind the passage of control to NATO should rest on the criterion of the action reaching that level of intensity of conflict which requires involvement of the entire Alliance military power."

NATO SECRET

3. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that it had been his impression on receiving document CTS 62-9 that the intention was to "raise the threshold" of the transfer of operations to NATO, whereas the Canadian authorities were now suggesting an earlier transfer. The Danish authorities favoured a later transfer in order to avoid involving the whole Alliance in a skirmish over access to Berlin.
4. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked whether under Phase III of the "Preferred Sequence" paper it could be determined that the transfer could be controlled, i.e. would operations take place under a reinforced alert, and would the three powers request action by NATO.
5. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE thought that this was a question for the LIVE OAK planners. The understanding was that before Phase III was entered upon a Reinforced Alert would already have been adopted.
6. Major-General BAKER (Chief of Staff, LIVE OAK) explained that just as the BERCON and MARCON plans were a catalogue, so the LIVE OAK planners looked on the tripartite plans as a catalogue. There would be no automatic progression from one type of tripartite operation to another; the three governments would take a decision in the light of the circumstances, would inform the Council and would ask the Council what governments would agree to do regarding alerts. In the tripartite paper, it was stated that a probe of battalion size would operate under three-Power control, but if it had to be reinforced, then control would be transferred to NATO. He thought that the idea of reinforcement had led to confusion. The object of the battalion would be not to fight its way to Berlin, but to serve as a political expression of the three powers' determination to induce the Soviets to desist from their obstructive action. It would be essentially a political operation. Militarily, he could not see the battalion being reinforced with the object of entering on a superior operation; but he could visualize an attempt being made to extract it when it had achieved its mission. Extraction might require temporary assistance from additional forces, but this was another matter.
7. Before launching a probe by a battalion, the three Powers would probably wish to have a Simple Alert declared throughout the Alliance, with some reinforced measures. If the battalion had to be withdrawn, the next step might - repeat might - be that governments would agree to a probe at divisional level. The intention was that if ever a larger force than a battalion was put into battle, it would be under NATO control.

Paragraph 11

8. The CHAIRMAN noted that the statement by the United States Representative above replied to the question by the Belgian Representative. Given this statement and the clarification by Major-General Baker, he asked whether it could now be concluded that further clarifications on the tripartite paper were no longer necessary.
9. The BELGIAN, CANADIAN and ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES reserved the right to inform their authorities of these statements and seek further instructions as necessary.

10. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE also reserved the right to comment further on the tripartite paper, since he had not yet obtained instructions.

Paragraph 14

11. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he was authorised to state that his authorities fully agreed on the importance of Council consultation on the political contingency plans in parallel with the military plans. Mr. Nitze had brought out the close relationship between the military and political/economic plans now being worked out in Washington and said that the four Powers intended to consult the Council on the latter as well as the former. The United States would consult the Council on plans of concern to NATO as soon as they were developed and it appeared discussion would be useful, and the United States would take full account of the Council's views.

12. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities intended to keep in the closest possible touch with the Council at all stages. It must be realised that in the circumstances envisaged, a considerable state of emergency would exist, in which the Council would probably be meeting virtually continuously and would be in the closest contact with the military authorities. He warned against laying down too precisely in advance the diplomatic activity planned in the different stages with a view to conveying Western intentions to the Soviets. The United Kingdom would consult the Council as fully as possible, and recognised that the Council had both the right and the duty to give advice. His authorities had some plans in connection with the points in para. 14 (b) and (d) which they intended to submit at an early date for the views of the Council.

13. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE entirely supported the comments by the United Kingdom Representative.

14. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE, noting that a considerable amount of material was appearing in the press on what was supposed to be under discussion by the four Powers, pointed out that it was awkward for the Council, at a time when it was being asked to approve military plans in order to show Western determination, to be ignorant of whether in fact the issues reported in the press were under study by the four Powers. All the allies were anxious to cooperate by showing firmness, but he urged the four Powers to take them into their confidence at the earliest possible moment. He thought that the Council should at some time discuss the attitude to be taken by the Alliance if the Soviets signed a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Should this be minimised, as had already been suggested, while at the same time the West should continue to take a firm position on access to Berlin?

15. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that his government approved the military plans in principle provided that the parallelism between military plans and the political/economic plans was borne in mind. He would therefore welcome early information on the latter.

16. The ITALIAN, NETHERLANDS and TURKISH REPRESENTATIVES also asked for a catalogue of political plans.

17. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that the four Powers were still studying the attitude to be taken in the event of a separate peace treaty. They were reviewing the proposals in the document already circulated to the Council at its meeting on 18th September, 1961 (see paragraph 14 (a)) a document which the Council had not yet discussed and on which the four Powers would welcome the views of the Council. As regards the question of diplomatic action, it was impossible to be precise at this stage, but the Council could rest assured that the United States would take all the necessary steps, including direct communication, to ensure that the Soviets suitably interpreted the various measures contemplated. As regards the risk of Soviet miscalculation, he emphasised that mobilisation measures and the declaration of alerts were essential to make clear Western determination to the Soviets. As regards possible action in the United Nations, the four Powers were still studying this question; it might be advisable for the Council to await their suggestions on the action to be taken if the problem of Berlin was referred to the United Nations. The four Powers were studying, both as part of the peace treaty problem and separately, the problem referred to in paragraph 14 (e), and would in due course inform the Council of their suggestions.

18. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE thought that it might be useful to discuss this particular problem in connection with economic plans.

19. The CHAIRMAN, summing up on Sections I - IV of the paper, thought that it was agreed that this was a preliminary exchange of views and that governments should now study the information which had been given. It was agreed that flexibility was necessary in planning, but it was also agreed that the allies, who were committed to support the actions of the three Powers to their conclusion, should know in advance as far as possible to what they were committed. The four Powers were therefore invited to inform the Council at an early date of their political plans.

20. In answer to a suggestion by the Belgian Representative, he agreed that it would be useful for the Council to hold a meeting exclusively on the political aspects of the problem.

Paragraph 27

21. The CHAIRMAN noted that the question of consultation had already been covered in discussion. The Council must ensure at the end of this study that all governments were satisfied that every possibility for consultation had been foreseen.

22. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE repeated that his government considered consultation to be of great importance, especially in an emergency; he hoped that the military authorities would keep the Council informed at all times of the factual situation, as during the last winter when incidents had taken place in the air corridors.

23. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE said that the military authorities were studying the most effective form of liaison to keep the Council constantly informed of developments.

24. The CHAIRMAN accordingly suggested, and it was agreed, that the Council should await proposals from the military authorities regarding the mechanics of consultation.

Paragraph 28

25. The EXECUTIVE SECRETARY pointed out that, though the document PO/56/1085 on the "Council in Emergency", re-circulated as PO/59/404, had been before the Council for a number of years, its main provisions still held good. He drew particular attention to the vital importance of rapid and secure communications between Permanent Representatives and their respective governments.


Paragraph 29

26. The CHAIRMAN said that he would welcome practical suggestions from governments as to how to proceed with regard to the legal problem.

Paragraph 30

27. The CHAIRMAN noted that the proposed measures would be referred to the Council in the near future.

28. It was agreed to continue discussion on Friday, 19th October at 3.15 p.m. [Subsequently changed to Tuesday, 23rd October, at 10.15 a.m.]

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'W. H. G.', written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

16th October, 1962