

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

~~TOP SECRET~~
NATO SECRET
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NISCA
107

39 No 15
OES-CT.S-62-13
(62-13)

1991

CTS 1963

CHEF D'ARCHIVES

12 October 1962

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Dear Colleague:

CTS 1964

At today's private meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador Ignatieff asked the United States delegation to circulate its statement concerning the transfer of control to NATO of Berlin Military Operations. This personal statement, which I based on instructions, is attached for your reference.

Sincerely yours,

Elbridge Durbrow

Elbridge Durbrow
Acting Permanent Representative
of the United States to the North Atlantic Council

- 1989
- 1986
- 1983
- 1977
- 1968
- 1969
- 1970
- 1990
- 1971
- 1993
- 1972
- 1973
- 1994
- 1974
- 1975
- 1976
- 1992
- 1979
- 1980
- 1981
- 1982
- 1984
- 1985

cc: All Delegations
Lord Coleridge
Secretary General
Dep. Sec Gen
J. Gresh
Mr. Hooper

→ Transferred

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SEE: DN
15/04/2009

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STATEMENT MADE TO NAC ON OCTOBER 12, 1962, BY THE U. S.
ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN COMMENTING ON QUESTIONS
REGARDING THE TRANSFER OF CONTROL TO NATO OF BERLIN
MILITARY OPERATIONS (PERSONAL STATEMENT BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS)

The tripartite paper did not intend that control would pass to NATO automatically when the Soviets resist a probe or use force per se. The intention as I understand it, was rather to establish the principle that, in order to avoid premature political escalation control should be passed to NATO when it is clearly established that the Soviets are determined to use force in blocking access and a decision is made to reinforce with intent to expand the action on the ground. This transfer would probably have to take place in Phase III, although it is obviously impossible to forecast precisely the circumstances in which it should occur. For possible action in more remote areas, e.g. naval measures, we believe that the concept behind the passage of control to NATO should rest on the criterion of the action reaching that level of intensity of conflict which requires involvement of the entire Alliance military power.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
OCTOBER 12, 1962

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CEC/USRO, EAST CONTROL NO *RES. CTs 62-13*

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