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Document prepared  
Dear Berlin  
Re 3 Subject Re 4 by  
Council of  
ChinaBERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The purpose of the present paper is to review the Council's discussions ~~so far~~ since the winter recess of Berlin Contingency Planning and to suggest how the Council might handle this problem, which is one of the greatest complexity, in future meetings.

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Section I

At the present time the Council has before it -

- (a) The Supreme Commanders' military contingency plans together with an appraisal of these plans by the Military Committee (COM-479-C2) transmitted in accordance with the instructions given to the NATO military authorities by the Council in Resolution COM(61)104 of November 9th, 1961.
- (b) A paper by the 3 Powers with special responsibilities in Berlin concerning Relationships between NATO and the 3 Powers in the Planning and Control of Berlin Contingency Operations (COM.62/1).
- (c) A quadripartite paper presented by the U.K., U.S., France and Germany on the Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Crisis (GT 62/10).

These three papers form the main basis of the Council's consideration of the Berlin problem. The <sup>formal</sup> status of the paper is slightly different in each case. All three have given rise to comments and requests for clarification on the part of member governments. Although the problems raised under each paper are closely inter-related, the simplest method of approaching the task described in paragraph 1 may be to examine <sup>as far as possible</sup> the follow-up action required under the broad subject heading represented by each of the three papers or sets of papers.

Section II - Military contingency plans.

C-N(61)104 laid down in paragraph 7 that the military contingency plans will be sent to the Standing Group for appraisal in consultation with the Military Committee in accordance with established NATO procedure and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council for approval through Permanent Representatives". The exact form in which such approval is given is clearly of considerable importance. In the Council's discussion so far there seems to be a wide measure of agreement that the plans should be regarded as a "catalogue" of possible measures through which selection could be made by the Alliance in the event that the Berlin situation deteriorated to such a point that military action by NATO forces was indicated. At least one delegation (Belgium) has intimated that it is already in a position to give its approval to the plans on this basis.

~~YUGOSLAVIA~~, it has been represented by another delegation (U.K.) that the first action required by the Council is to determine whether the plans are responsive to the Council's instructions contained in C-N(61)104. The NATO military authorities in paragraph 19 of SGM-479-62 have stated "From a military viewpoint the BERLIN and MARCON plans appear to be responsive to the instructions of the North Atlantic Council and to the needs which those instructions have sought to fulfill".

Another delegation (Canada) has asked for more information about the selective use of nuclear weapons envisaged in the MARCON plans. Specifically, it has been asked "What plans do the military authorities have as to possible targets; as to the use of such weapons on land, sea or in the air, and as to the size of the weapons which might be used?" In formulating this question the Canadian delegation have pointed out that if the selective use of nuclear weapons involved a direct threat to the USSR rather than being directly related to access to Berlin, it might be difficult to differentiate such selective use from the initiation of general hostilities.

Up to the present no other delegation has put forward any specific request for clarification with regard to the plans themselves or the Standing Group appraisal, or indicated that it would like to see any of the proposed plans modified, or new plans developed. It appears therefore that follow-up action is required as set out hereafter.

- (a) Agree that the Major NATO Commanders' contingency plans are responsive to the instructions in C-N(61)10L.
- (b) ~~To note that modifications in existing plans or alternative plans are desired?~~
- (c) Can the NATO military authorities furnish replies to the Canadian enquiries mentioned above? <sup>Should</sup>
- (d) Are any further clarifications desired by other delegations which have not so far commented?
- (e) Subject to satisfaction on the four points enumerated in (a) to (d), it is suggested that the Council may wish to consider whether a formula on the following lines suitably expresses this desire :-

"The Council took note of the Standing Group appraisal and the Berlin contingency plans proposed by the Major NATO Commanders and agreed that these were responsive to the instructions to the NATO military authorities conveyed in Council Resolution C-N(61)10L."

- (f) The Council approved the Major NATO Commanders' plans in the BERUCH and HARROW series on the basis that these represent a catalogue of plans for possible action by NATO forces in the event that the efforts of the 5 Powers to maintain access to Berlin in accordance with the LIVIN GAK plans are unsuccessful - the selection and execution of any one of these plans being subject to a prior political decision by member governments at the time."

- (g) The Council may further wish to consider whether it should delay taking such a decision until the NATO military authorities have replied to the questions referred to in (d) above and to any other

questions which may be put forward, or whether it could give its approval to all such parts of the plan as have provoked no comment, reserving the remainder for a later decision in light of the replies received from the NATO military authorities.

Section III - "Relationships between NATO and the 3 Powers in the Planning and Control of Berlin Contingency Operations"

This question, which is of great importance, since it concerns the conditions and circumstances in which NATO would assume collective responsibility for the conduct of any military operations which might become necessary in connection with the Berlin crisis, was first brought before the Council in March, when the 3 Powers tabled a paper containing their recommendations. At the Council meeting of April 11th a spokesman of the 3 Powers replied to a number of questions put at the first discussion. Following this meeting the Canadian and Italian delegations submitted in writing further comments with a request for clarifications contained in the 3-Power paper.

On 15th September the U.S. delegation circulated on behalf of the 3 Powers certain comments in response to the questions raised (OTS 60/9), and on 18th September transmitted a revised version of their original paper (OTS 62/1) containing amendments in paragraphs 5 and 9(a) (9(b) 2(b) of original document). In the debate on 18th September and in a subsequent letter to the International Staff, the Canadian Representative asked whether it would not be better to have a clearer understanding of the point at which transfer from Tripartite to NATO control would take place, rather than a point which would require calling for NATO reinforcements for a stalled tripartite probe. For example, would it not be better to establish NATO control of military operations as soon as the intention of the Soviet Government to use force to hinder access to Berlin had been established?

In the same debate the Belgian Permanent Representative asked whether the 3 Powers were in agreement with the statement in paragraph 7(a) of P0/62/381 that control of any military operation

concerning access to Berlin should be transferred to NATO.

*What to do?*

It should perhaps be noted that in paragraph 7(a) of PO/62/581 the Secretary General did not intend to suggest modifying the sense of the proposals in the 3 Power paper, but merely to draw attention to the need for an agreement on the subject matter, whether in the terms proposed by the 3 Powers themselves [or, if the 3 Power proposals were not acceptable as they stood, on whatever amended formula was mutually agreeable. Although this is rather a matter for comment by the 3 Powers, it seems possible that the presumption may have given up that there would be some tendency for a tactical progression from the LIVE OAK operations to military action on the lines of the BARBAROSSA plan. As the International Staff understand it, this would not normally be the case. The LIVE OAK plans were designed solely as a test of Soviet intentions, with the purpose of determining whether the Soviets intend to use force to interfere with access to Berlin. Should it be so determined, the normal outcome would be recourse to one or more of the measures described in Phase II of the 4-Power paper "Preferred Sequence of Action", which do not envisage military operations of an active character. It is always possible, however, that the probes of intentions could produce a Soviet military reaction of such violence as to compel the Alliance to undertake defensive military operations. It is in these circumstances that control would pass to NATO in accordance with the 3 Power proposals.]

To sum up, the following action appears to be required under this heading:

- (a) The delegations which sought further clarification following the meeting of 11th April should signify whether the rephrases contained in the 3 Power reply of 15th September are satisfactory to them.
- (b) The 3 Powers should comment in reply to the questions raised by the Canadian and Belgian delegations at the meeting of September 27.

Subject to the delegations concerned receiving replies satisfactory to them on (a) and (b) above ~~and subject to any further discussions by all concerned~~ the Council should agree that NATO and Tripartite planning responsibilities should be defined, and that, subject to a political decision at the time, transfer of control from Tripartite to NATO mechanism should be effected in accordance with the proposals contained in the 3 Power paper of 18 September.

*Section IX - "Preferred sequence of action"*

The tabling of this paper by the 4 Powers and the presentation by Mr. Nitze has had the dual effect of placing LIV: OAK and military contingency plans in a time perspective by suggesting how they might fit into the whole complex of Western action in a Berlin crisis, and of raising some important points for discussion in the non-military sphere of contingency planning over Berlin. As regards the former, the 4 Power paper will, it is hoped, facilitate Council decisions under the five Headings enumerated in Sections II and III of this paper. As regards the latter, the main points on which further discussion or elucidation appears to be desired, may be summarised as follows.

Political contingency plans

A number of Permanent Representatives have referred to the need for the Council ~~to~~ discuss political and other non-military contingency planning in connection with Berlin and have suggested that there should be a catalogue of possible political plans of action in parallel to the military plans. The following specific points have been raised in the course of Council discussion.

(a) What measures should be taken in the event of the signature

by the Soviet Union of a separate peace treaty with the Parche régime? The 4 Powers have indicated that proposals in this sense would shortly be brought before the Council for discussion. Under these circumstances would the Council ~~not~~ be willing to omit the 4 Power draft, or would Permanent

Representatives prefer an exchange of views on this problem in anticipation of the 4 Power proposal?

- (b) ~~In view of~~ What diplomatic measures do the 3 Powers envisage ~~in parallel~~ with LIVE OAK? The 3 Powers will no doubt wish to comment.
- (c) ~~What~~ plans exist for action in the United Nations, whether on ~~as far as the UN is concerned~~ Western initiative or in the event of a Soviet initiative?  
~~(On what basis are the 3 Powers planning to present their case?)~~  
The 3 Powers have indicated that they will have proposals to make on the handling of the Berlin problem in the United Nations.  
Is the Council willing to await the 3 Power proposals, or do Permanent Representatives wish to put forward suggestions in anticipation thereof?
- (d) What precautions should be taken in order to ensure that the Soviets correctly interpret the various possible measures contemplated in the military and non-military field? In particular, what are the plans for keeping open channels of communication with the Soviet Government?

~~Availability~~  
The ~~3~~ Powers may wish to comment on this issue insofar as this problem might arise as a result of action taken under their own responsibility. In a situation where NATO-wide action was involved, the problem of possible Soviet misinterpretation must presumably be taken into account in reaching a decision within the Alliance as and when the need for such a decision arises. The Council may wish to consider in due course placing this consideration on formal record.

- (e) The 4 Powers have undertaken to put before the Council a paper addressed to the particular problem of possible interference with German access to Berlin, e.g. in such fields as visas, Customs control, etc. If the timing is suitable the Council may wish to look at this problem together with that of a separate Soviet/GDR peace treaty, with which it is clearly closely linked.

Economic Contingency Plans

In the 4 Power paper reference is made to the possible application of economic countermeasures under Phase II. Examination of possible countermeasures was initiated in August last year, and following lengthy discussions in the Special Working Group of the Committee of Economic and Political Advisors and in the Council, a large measure of common agreement was obtained.

On 17th April last, the Secretary General circulated a note PO/62/260 taking stock of the results so far obtained and suggesting further action. This note contained a certain number of draft decisions on various issues where there appeared to be common understanding. After a brief discussion at a meeting of the Council on 5th June 1962, some minor amendments were submitted by delegations. These amendments, which did not appear to raise any difficulties, were circulated in PO/62/436 of 19th April. In view of the renewed urgency for obtaining ~~an agreed~~ <sup>understanding</sup> understanding of action to be taken in the non-military field in connection with a Berlin crisis, it is suggested that the subject of economic countermeasures should be placed once again on the agenda of the Council at an early date.

General

It will be recalled that in submitting their paper on the "Preferred sequence of action", the 4 Powers did not wish to suggest that it should be regarded as a formal set of proposals which should receive formal endorsement or approval by the Council. It was presented rather as a background for Council consideration of Berlin military contingency plans and the NATO tripartite relationship problem, with the purpose of seeking the views of member governments and with the hope that it could be accepted as representing a consensus of opinion. It is suggested that, unless any member government is in fundamental disagreement with the concepts underlying the document, particularly as regards the phasing and grouping of possible measures within those phases, the Council may wish to accept this paper as a general framework for its continuing discussion of the general problem of co-ordinating the actions and policies of the Allies in the event of a worsening of the Berlin situation.

## Section V - Miscellaneous

There are certain problems which have been touched on in recent Council discussions and which do not fit conveniently under any of the three major headings so far mentioned. Among these are the following :-

### (a) Alerts

It will be recalled that under paragraph 10(a) of C-N(61)104 the military authorities were instructed to study urgently "appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to the initiation of any tripartite military measures." In submitting their BERCON and MARCON plans, the Major NATO Commanders have complied with this instruction, indicating <sup>the need</sup> a requirement for the declaration of a state of military vigilance, the major part of the simple alert system and selected measures from the reinforced alert system <sup>before certain delegations</sup> ~~before certain~~ <sup>before certain delegations</sup> LIVE OAK and all MARCON plans can be executed. The 4 Power paper on "Preferred sequence of action" indicates where the adoption of alert measures might fit into the scheme of action under Phases I and II.

In recent Council discussions the <sup>signature of the 4 Powers</sup> ~~the~~ Representative (Mr. Nitze) had suggested that "the Council should now give prompt and prior consideration to the whole question of alerts, the powers of governments, their responsibilities to Parliaments, and whether their possibilities of action corresponded to SACHUR's requirements."

The comments of other representatives (which will not be enumerated in detail) implied that the alert problem in the Berlin context raised very sensitive political issues. Inter alia it was pointed out that the setting into motion of the NATO ~~simple~~ alert <sup>for certain delegations</sup> and part of the reinforced alert system would reveal to the Soviets the nature of NATO's preparations for war. It was further suggested that the application of certain alert measures, e.g. mobilisation, could easily in the circumstances give rise to a situation of tension and present <sup>a</sup> risk of political escalation. It also appears to be doubted by some delegations as to whether alert measures <sup>are to be</sup>

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applied to NATO forces across the board, as opposed to, say, units stationed in Germany alone. The general ~~tenor~~ of these observations suggests that a careful examination will need to be made of what alert measures should be applied, and when and where, in the Berlin context in order to achieve at one and the same time the purpose of placing the NATO military forces in a position to implement the BERCON and MARCON plans collectively, and that of conveying to the Soviet Union the necessary warning <sup>without risk of misinterpretation</sup> to discourage further encroachment on Western rights in Berlin.

Meanwhile, since the last Council meeting on Berlin, the Standing Group <sup>have</sup> informed the International Staff that they have under preparation a paper addressed to the specific problem of alerts in connection with Berlin. This paper is expected to be available for distribution within the next two or three weeks. In parallel with the preparation of Berlin contingency plans, the Standing Group have been working on a paper on the general status of <sup>the Supreme</sup> Commanders' negotiations with member countries on the NATO alert systems. This paper, which was circulated to delegations on September under reference SG/M 578/2, gives an assessment of the military effects of the unwillingness, or in some cases inability for constitutional reasons, of member countries to delegate to Major NATO Commanders the powers which they ask in order to make the alert system realistic. Although this report has no direct connection with Berlin, it may nevertheless provide a valuable background to any detailed examination of the Berlin alert problem. It brings out the important fact that ~~not~~ only have member countries placed a ~~repose~~ on the authority of the Major NATO Commanders to declare certain alert measures, but in some cases the legislative means to implement the alert measures within the ~~countries concerned do not at the present time exists~~.

It was with the foregoing in mind that the Secretary General was prompted to suggest at the Council meeting on September 29 that consideration might be given in due course to set up a special working group to look into the alert problems in its application to

Berlin contingency planning. Before a decision is taken, however, the Council should meet as arranged to discuss the Standing Group paper SGM-528-62 on October 11th - the discussion to be preceded by a briefing by representatives of SAGUR and SAGLANT.

Finally it will be recalled that in paragraph 1b(c) of SGM-479-62 the military authorities drew attention to the possible need for activating some of the wartime organisations for shipping in the event that it were decided to implement certain of the maritime contingency plans. Other civilian wartime organisations <sup>on condition</sup> may similarly be involved in the event of any decision to increase the readiness of NATO forces for military intervention.

#### Proposed follow-up action

- (a) Council discussion of the general problems arising from the NATO alert system will take place as planned on 11th October, proceeded by briefings by SAGUR and SAGLANT.
- (b) On receipt of the Standing Group paper on alert measures in the context of Berlin contingency planning, the NATO military authorities should be invited to forward as soon as possible their paper now under preparation on Alert Measures in the context of Berlin Contingency Planning.
- (c) On receipt of this paper the Council should decide whether it would be desirable to set up a special working group with participation of the military authorities and experts as necessary from capitals.

#### (d) Legal implications of MARCON planning

A study prepared by the Legal Adviser to the International Staff, as foreshadowed in paragraph 5(c) of PO/52/561, has now been circulated to delegations under a covering note from the Deputy Secretary General. Consideration of how further to deal with this problem should be deferred until the preliminary comments and reactions of delegations are available. [Among possible forms of action might be the opening of a new legal document or a new document]

(e) Consultation in the Council

A number of Permanent Representatives have drawn particular attention to the problem of keeping the Council informed in an emergency over Berlin, in order that it should be in a position to take any necessary political decisions in full knowledge of latest developments in the political and military fields and of possible consequences of any measures which might be initiated by the 5 Powers. In their paper on NATO/Tripartite Relationships, the 5 Powers have made it clear that, time permitting, they will be ready "to advise and enter into consultation with the North Atlantic Council prior to implementing LIVE OAK plans." Moreover, it is made clear in G-M(61)20; paragraph 8/ that the execution of any of the NATO military contingency plans will be subject to decisions by governments at the time. Finally, to the extent that certain alert measures may require to be taken in connection with both LIVE OAK and BERGEN/MAROC plans, and within the framework of action under phases I and II of the "Preferred Sequence of Action", it is self-evident that all NATO governments will automatically have to be consulted. The problem accordingly appears to be one of mechanism. The requirement is essentially one of establishing a procedure by which the Major NATO Commanders concerned and the 5 or the 4 Powers can maintain regular contact with the Council. This could be achieved either by providing that representatives of the NATO Commanders and of the 5 Powers remain in daily contact with the Secretary General, leaving it to his discretion to convene the Council in the event of a serious deterioration in the situation, or by providing that the Council should meet daily in order to receive an up-to-date situation report from the 5 Powers and military authorities.

The Council may wish to discuss which of the two methods proposed would be more satisfactory, or whether some different arrangements still should be devised. If thought desirable, the decision could be recorded in the form of a Council conclusion.