

~~NATO SECRET~~

To: Secretary General  
c.c. Deputy Secretary General  
DSO/ASG Economics and Finance

From: Executive Secretary

~~Record of a Private Meeting of the Council  
held on 1st February, 1962 at 11.00.~~

### I. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The CHAIRMAN recalled that in September and October, 1961 the Council had discussed at length the question of instructions to the NATO military authorities regarding Berlin contingency planning. These discussions had resulted in documents CO/6/1/76 and Annexes, C-N(G1)10b, in paragraph 9 of which it was laid down that there should be full co-ordination between LIVE OAK and NATO planning. Since then he had on a number of occasions asked General Norstad to give further briefings to the Council, and in the last few days had been in contact with the Permanent Representatives of the four powers concerned on the subject of further developments. It was clear that there existed not only the problem of coordination between LIVE OAK and NATO planning, but closely connected thereto, the problem of the control of Berlin contingency operations. These problems were under study, but the study was not sufficiently advanced for it to be brought before the Council. He hoped to discuss some of their aspects of this question in his forthcoming visit to Washington, and possibly prepare a new document for the Council. In order that the Council might have an adequate basis for its discussion, he proposed today to write to General Norstad inviting him to give a briefing to the Council, if possible on 13th or 14th February, on LIVE OAK and NATO military planning regarding Berlin, covering the same ground as in his briefing to the Military Committee.

2. In answer to a question by the Belgian Representative, he said that he had no doubt that plans existed, but he did not know how far advanced these plans were or how far coordination had taken place. The only useful basis for discussion in the Council would be a statement by General Norstad on the present state of plans.

3. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE confirmed that plans certainly existed.

4. It was accordingly agreed that the Chairman should invite General Norstad to give a briefing on 13th or 14th February.

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## II. NATO DEFENCE POLICY

Document: NDP/62/2.

5. The CHAIRMAN invited preliminary views, either personal or semi-official, on the papers now before the Council, beginning with the problem of the control of nuclear weapons.

6. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he had already indicated his authorities' support for the proposal to begin by studying the problem of control. They welcomed the document NDP/62/2 which was now under detailed study in London. He hoped shortly to have some comments on the substance of the question, and was authorised at this stage to say that, if the Council had to choose a point of departure from the points listed in NDP/62/2, his government inclined to think that the study should begin with the guide-lines for the present to which the Chairman referred in paragraphs 13 and 14. Assuming that the Council was able to work out a satisfactory method and definitions, etc., a result would be achieved which would not only be useful in itself but might perhaps usefully work in with the other methods of handling the problem set out in NDP/62/2 which the Council might study later. He thought it was perhaps the Chairman's preference to begin with these guide-lines. If this was the general feeling of the Council, his authorities would agree. He hoped soon to be able to comment on types of guide-lines.

7. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE, welcoming the document, thought it constituted a correct and logical approach to the problem. In connection with paragraph 12, he asked the Chairman the following three questions:

- (i) Should the restricted group referred to in para.12(a) include, in addition to the nuclear powers, those countries which have accepted nuclear weapons on their territory, particularly fixed installations; or did the Chairman envisage some system of rotation?
- (ii) What should be the principles on which the system of weighted-voting (paragraph 12(c)) should be based, e.g. military contribution, population, geographical situation, possession of nuclear weapons, etc...?
- (iii) As regards the NATO atomic weapons Agency referred to in paragraph 12(d), did this imply a project for a NATO nuclear force?

8. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE asked what was the present system of control regarding the nuclear weapons now in the possession of the forces assigned or co-ordinated to NATO. If a change was necessary, surely the Council must know clearly what the present system was. If an incident were to take place now which resulted in war and the Council was called upon to decide whether nuclear weapons should be used, what was the system under which this decision would be taken?

9. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE, giving the preliminary views of his authorities, thought the document made a very useful contribution towards solving the problem. As regards paragraph 12, his

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authorities considered that the study of political control could be approached only in the abstract, and outside of the four cases quoted in NC 95. It was obvious that, in the first two of these cases, i.e. nuclear surprise attack and nuclear attack after strategic warning, the time available for decision and action, which would be two to fifteen minutes, was quite inadequate for an elaborate system of control. In these two cases, the need to act urgently would be the deciding element. Again, in the third case, i.e. a substantial conventional attack, it might well be necessary for the Major Commanders in certain circumstances to be able to react rapidly, i.e. within fifteen minutes. In the fourth case, that of a hostile local nation which had developed to a stage where the use of nuclear weapons appeared necessary, the situation itself would have dictated the time available for taking a decision. It therefore seemed impossible to establish any general system of control which could meet all the cases and, accordingly, what was necessary was a system capable of dealing with the whole range of possibilities.

10. As regards the proposal for weighted-voting, which was being increasingly mooted, his authorities had considerable doubts on this proposal which, they thought, should be further studied to see how far it was compatible with the principle of equality among all members of the Alliance. So far, even in an urgent situation, it had been possible for the Council to reach agreement under the present system without any major difficulty.

11. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities welcomed the resumption of discussion on the basis of the document by the Chairman, which they had studied from two aspects; firstly the need to indicate a first reaction to help the Chairman in his discussions in Washington, and secondly as regards his far-reaching proposals on the subject of control. In order to save time, he would not now comment on paragraph 12, which his authorities considered required further study before views were expressed. Recalling the views expressed at the last Ministerial Meeting on the need for a rapid decision, he asked what in fact was the present system. Paragraph 7 summarised important points from the statements made by Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk. If the Council considered that the present coverage of Soviet targets provided by the United States and United Kingdom strategic forces should remain, and should not be withdrawn without the agreement of all members of the Alliance, the Council should then proceed to the next step. He agreed with the United Kingdom Representative that the guide-lines referred to in paragraph 13 would represent a good starting point. It was clear that sub-paragraphs 13 (a), (b) and (c) had been very carefully drafted. While they were subject to amendment he thought that, until the Council had reached agreement on the proposals in paragraph 12, it might be said that paragraph 13 represented the common thinking of the members of the Alliance. He hoped that the expression of this view would help the Chairman in his discussions in Washington and that the Council could today agree generally that sub-paragraphs 13 (a), (b) and (c) for the present gave sufficient guide-lines for the situation as a whole. On this basis, the Chairman might be able to obtain elucidations from the United States authorities which would help the Council in its discussions.

12. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that since his authorities were still studying this question, he had been instructed to speak purely with a view to obtaining guidance from the Council for his

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authorities in working out their ideas. He suggested that there were two points for study. In the first place, there was the present situation, i.e. the existence of nuclear weapons in the possession of the forces of the Alliance. Here he agreed with the statement in paragraph 6 that a successful solution of the problems of control raised by the nuclear weapons which already existed within the forces at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commanders, would go a long way towards finding a basis for dealing with the problem of larger and longer range nuclear weapons. He thought that a solution should be found on the basis of the proposals in paragraph 13 for a wide delegation of authority to the President of the United States; such a delegation of authority best corresponded to the realities of the present situation. It should be completed by the assurances suggested in paragraph 7 that these weapons would not be withdrawn without the agreement of all the allies. Commenting on the view expressed by the French Representative that the Council should first clarify what was the present system, he agreed that the system was not clear and was perhaps even non-existent. However, rather than change the present system, he would prefer to establish an acceptable new one.

13. Commenting on paragraph 13, in which it was suggested that the President of the United States would, whenever time and circumstances permitted, consult the Council before implementing the decision to direct or release nuclear weapons for use against a Soviet attack, he asked what form was envisaged for this consultation. Subject to the major proviso that all members of the Alliance would take part in the discussion, he thought that for the purposes of reaching a decision the Council should go as far as possible towards a delegation of authority.

14. The second point for study was the proposed creation of a NATO nuclear force, which he recalled Mr. Speak had always strongly supported. The existence of such a force would mean that the problem of control would become more complicated, and it might be necessary to reconcile the idea of delegation of authority with the proposals in paragraph 12. Here his authorities would not oppose the idea of a system of weighted-voting for reaching a decision, provided again that all members of the Alliance took part in the discussion.

15. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE, speaking personally, made the following points: firstly, he thought it was clear from the Chairman's document that the Council had at present no rôle whatsoever as regards the control of nuclear weapons. This was most surprising given the fact that the Council was the highest authority in the Alliance. Secondly, this regrettable situation could be redressed if the Council immediately considered implementing the proposals in paragraph 13 whereby the President of the United States would commit himself to consulting the Council whenever time and circumstances permitted. While it might be necessary to redraft paragraph 13, he thought whatever the outcome of the Council's discussion the sense of this paragraph should be retained. Its proposals did not contradict those in paragraph 12. Thirdly, as discussions proceeded on the type of control required, the Council should consider the relationship between the control of nuclear weapons with the control of nuclear disarmament. He thought there was general agreement that a system of control could be devised in both these fields, and that it might help the disarmament

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discussions with the Soviets if the Council could develop procedures for the control of nuclear disarmament. Fourthly, the lack of progress on control in these two fields might be due to the fact that the Council was aiming at perfection. The Council might, as a first step, implement the proposals in paragraph 15 and as a second step, consider the feasibility of NATO control over missile systems serving fundamentally tactical purposes and only in the possession of the forces assigned or earmarked to NATO. This would initially limit the Council's rôle to control over certain types of weapons, and control might later be extended to missiles serving fundamentally strategic purposes. He was aware that it was difficult to make distinctions between tactical and strategic weapons but he emphasised that the Council should not allow technological developments to force it into unwelcome decisions.

16. The possible solutions suggested in paragraph 12 raised fundamental issues whose discussion he considered should be postponed to a later date. If the Council were now to restrict its deliberations to the two steps he had suggested, he thought it might be possible to report some progress to Ministers in Athens. It would not be possible to make progress in time for the Athens meeting on the proposals in paragraph 12.

17. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE thought that the proposal in paragraph 15 for delegation of authority to the President of the United States in fact was equivalent to the present system. For the future, the aim of both the United States and the European powers had, he thought, been to give the latter a greater opportunity to participate in the decision to use nuclear weapons. Further, if as regards a possible NATO atomic force, the rules to be followed were to be the same as those in paragraph 15, he did not see what would be the use of setting up this collective force, or, if it were set up, the Council should study the new rules to be applied when it was created.

18. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he had suggested that the Council should deal with the situation at present existing on the basis of the proposals in paragraph 15. Should the Council later agree to the constitution of a NATO nuclear force, it should then take another look at the question of control.

19. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE, speaking personally, welcomed the Chairman's document in that it had broken a dead-lock of some 6 years standing. He agreed with the Turkish Representative that the proposals in paragraph 12 called for considerable study. Paragraph 15 represented a very useful contribution to an immediate solution to the problem, pending a final solution.

20. In answer to a question by the Danish Representative, the BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that Belgium would have no constitutional difficulty in accepting a system of weighted-voting, which had already been adopted for the European Economic Community. However, while this solution might be politically acceptable, on military grounds it might not be rapid enough. Its merit was that it would break the present dead-lock of the system of unanimity.

21. The CHAIRMAN, summarising the discussion, said he thought that the document was generally welcomed as explaining the problem in simple terms and as a suitable basis for further discussion. He had originally drafted the paragraphs in a different order,

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paragraph 15 following immediately after paragraph 7, but had re-drafted it in order to indicate the difficulties set out in paragraph 12. It had been his idea, as suggested by the United Kingdom Representative, that the Council might begin by studying guide-lines as suggested in paragraph 15. He saw paragraph 15 as being closely connected with the assurances described in paragraph 7. He agreed with the view expressed by a number of speakers that the proposals in paragraph 15 did not conflict with those in paragraph 12, which were intended as an elaboration of how consultation could take place. He had stated in December that there were two cases in which a political decision could be taken in theory and in advance of the event: firstly, an all-out Soviet nuclear attack and, secondly, an all-out Soviet conventional attack. He had tried to point out the difficulties of defining the second case. It was probable that a theoretical definition could not be found, and that a decision would have to depend on circumstances, when military advice and a political judgement would be necessary. He proposed in paragraph 15 that, if the Council agreed, the President of the United States would be authorised to act on behalf of the Council on the basis of an agreement which had already been reached long in advance of the event. He doubted whether it would be valuable for the International Staff to prepare a paper on the present situation; much would depend on the readiness of the United States, the United Kingdom and, perhaps, even the French government to provide information on their intentions regarding the use of their nuclear forces. Recalling the comments expressed at earlier meetings to the effect that the Council had little information on the number, location and range of the nuclear warheads at the disposal of the Alliance, he hoped that information would be provided on this subject with a view to facilitating a Council discussion at a later stage.

22. As he saw it, paragraphs 7 and 15 simply formalised the present situation. With regard to the compatibility of paragraphs 12 and 15 and the precise meaning of "consultation" in paragraph 15, he recalled that in the Council discussions on instructions to the NATO military authorities for Berlin emergency planning several expressions had been used to describe the consultation envisaged. What he here had in mind was that the Council should accept the principle of consultation and should later discuss possible methods, for example, a decision taken by a restricted group or based on weighted-voting. Replying to the question by the Italian Representative on paragraph 12(a), he said that he had no special system in mind, and would welcome suggestions, as also on the principles which might govern a system of weighted-voting. As regards any constitutional difficulties which might arise in connection with weighted-voting, he pointed out that the Netherlands had changed its constitution in order to join the European Economic Community. It should be borne in mind in any discussion of weighted-voting that under the present system decision lay, for all practical purposes, with the United States, and that a decision by weighted-voting, or a restricted group, would surely be an improvement. Under the present bilateral stockpiling arrangements, the legal position was that the nuclear weapons stock-piled could be used with the agreement of the two countries concerned. It was vital that in an emergency all countries should be able to say to their parliaments that they had had the opportunity to take part in discussion. He recognised that if time permitted, it was unthinkable that the nuclear powers would not consult their allies on the use of nuclear weapons; what he was aiming at now was a more formal statement of this position. He noted that there was agreement on the suggestion in paragraph 9 that the Council should study as a matter of urgency the modalities

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of control of the nuclear weapons now in the possession of the forces assigned, or earmarked, to NATO. Finally, he considered that the present discussion had been a most useful one. He hoped that the next discussion would concentrate on paragraphs 7 and 13 with reference to the nuclear weapons now available to NATO.

23. It was agreed that the next discussion should take place on Monday, 19th or Tuesday, 20th February.

## II. EAST/WEST RELATIONS

24. Replying to the question raised by the Belgian Representative at the meeting on 31st January, the UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that Mr. Salinger and Mr. Kharlamov had discussed methods of improving the flow of information between the United States and the USSR, and Mr. Salinger had accepted an invitation to visit the USSR. There had been no political discussion of any important issues such as Berlin. For the United States' assessment of the present situation regarding East/West relations, he referred the Council to President Kennedy's press conference as reported in the U.S. Information Service Daily Radio Bulletin.

2nd February, 1962 -