

SECRET

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Record of a Private Meeting on 31st January, 1962
in the Secretary General's Conference Room

Present : The Secretary General
 Mr. Vest
 Permanent Representatives of France
 Germany
 United Kingdom
 United States,

 Plus One

Subject : Berlin Contingency Planning

1. The SECRETARY GENERAL said that, on the basis of brief study of BQD-M-22, it did not appear to be basically inconsistent with PO/61/765 and C-M(61)104. However, there were some difficulties, primarily in points of drafting. For example, paragraph 4a. states that from a military viewpoint it would be desirable that NATO military authorities conduct both planning and operations from the outset and on the other hand 4b. states that responsibility for planning and execution of possible initial military operations should remain tripartite, "from the politico-juridical viewpoint". This latter statement was true for execution, not for planning, he thought.

2. The aspect of the paper which worried him especially was the implication that in a sense the NATO countries were being asked to issue a planning blank-check to the tripartite powers and might be asked suddenly to take responsibility for operations when they had not participated or even been aware of the planning which left them in this predicament. If this exclusion of NATO from the planning stage were rectified, it would be possible to make a much more unified document which in turn would be more palatable to the Council.

3. He noted also that reinforcements are contemplated "through possible division-level support of initial probes". There is some inconsistency here since in the past when t

subject was discussed and when General Norstad was briefing the Council, it was understood that, beginning at division level, the problems were NATO and not Tripartite. There was considerable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the term "possible division-level support". The Secretary General pointed out that this only underscored the fact he needed to discuss the paper with the Four-Power Ambassadors in Washington to ensure complete clarification of the terms in the paper so that proper presentation could be made to the Council.

4. The United States asked the Secretary General if he contemplated amending the document to provide for NATO approval of Tripartite plans and their execution. He replied that the Instructions to the NATO Military Authorities provided for approval of both plans and operations by NATO. He would not say that the present document BQD-N-22 was wrong but it raised problems which would have to be looked at as there would be difficulties. Furthermore, the burden would be inevitably on the Four to explain to the Council what were the "politico-juridical problems" which prevented the desirable military course from being followed which was recommended in paragraph 4.

5. The Secretary General read a proposed letter to General Norstad and said that he proposed to act as follows : send the letter to Norstad to ask him to brief the Council on February 13 or 14; discuss the document with the Four-Power Ambassadors in Washington to clarify it and if necessary, seek new language for the most difficult sections. He had no intention of shelving the document. He would warn the Council at the meeting tomorrow of the existence of this problem and the fact that it would shortly be raised in the Council.

The Four Permanent Representatives agreed that this was the best course to follow.

(1) as regards planning as distinct from execution.