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ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

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LOM 130/61

26 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Standing Group

SUBJECT : Instructions to NATO Military Authorities - Berlin

Reference : FO/61/808

1. The North Atlantic Council at a meeting on 25 October 1961 approved the instructions attached to the reference. These instructions are forwarded at enclosure for appropriate action.

R. H. BARRY

R. H. BARRY
Major General
STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE

26 OCT 1961

Enclosure

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2007

INSTRUCTION TO NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES

1. The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have in accordance with Articles 4 and 6 of the Treaty and in the light of the crisis provoked with regard to the city of Berlin consulted together to decide what steps should be taken to meet the present threat against Berlin.

2. They have agreed that the basic objectives of NATO policy in regard to Berlin are :

- (a) The maintenance of the presence and security of the three Western garrisons in West Berlin.
- (b) The maintenance of the freedom and viability of West Berlin.
- (c) The maintenance of freedom of access to West Berlin.

3. Every effort will be made to attain the foregoing objectives if possible by negotiations and through the application of non-military measures. It is, however, necessary to prepare for the contingency that such measures or negotiations may not in themselves deter the Soviet Union or the so-called "German Democratic Republic" from taking action to block Western access to Berlin or otherwise to infringe on the basic rights of the West in Berlin.

4. They are therefore determined to improve allied military posture as a clear indication of their capability and will to apply appropriate military measures if need be. They have agreed to undertake individually and collectively comparable programmes to build added military strength for Europe.

PURPOSE

5. The purpose of these instructions is to initiate the preparation by the Major Allied Commanders of NATO military plans in order to put the Alliance in a position to cope with actions by the Soviet Bloc in a Berlin crisis.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

6. The following considerations should underlie the preparation of all military plans :

(a) Military actions will have to be integrated into a general, overall strategy applicable as appropriate on a worldwide scale and including as appropriate political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, military and para-military measures. The selective application of these measures, agreed upon both in Europe and on a worldwide basis, is designed to contribute to the purpose of arriving at a settlement of the problem of Berlin while progressively making the Soviets aware of the danger of general war.

(b) Appropriate military measures in case of interference with access to Berlin should be graduated but determined. There should be available a catalogue of plans from which appropriate action could be selected by political authorities in the light of circumstances and with the aim of applying increasing pressure which would present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks in continued denial of access. At the same time

the way these plans would be implemented should leave the Soviet Government as many opportunities as possible to pause and re-assess the desirability of continuing on a dangerous course of action.

(c) Any military operation risks rapid escalation and/or pre-emptive enemy action. Therefore, while the immediate political objective of all actions will be to induce the Soviets to re-open access, military plans must take account of and be consistent with current defensive concepts of NATO strategy. They must, therefore, retain the defence of the Alliance members as a central consideration, and they must not commit capabilities to the prejudice of the overall capacity to defend NATO territory, keeping in mind the risk of a possible crisis created by the Soviets by way of a diversion at any point on the periphery of Allied Command Europe. The magnitude of resources which might be committed in operations at the West's initiative in reaction to Soviet moves would depend on results of the NATO build-up as well as circumstances existing at the time.

(d) The Alliance will stand ready for nuclear action at all times. However, planned recourse to nuclear weapons in these operations can be envisaged only under any one of the three circumstances of :

- (1) prior use by the enemy, .
- (2) the necessity to avoid defeat of major military operations, or
- (3) a specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons selectively in order to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.

PROCEDURE

7. The plans will be sent to the Standing Group for appraisal in consultation with the Military Committee in accordance with established NATO procedure and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council for approval by governments through the Permanent Representatives.

8. The execution of approved plans will be the subject of decisions by governments at the time.

SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES

9. Under the instructions of the governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, General Norstad in his capacity as USCINCEUR has made certain tripartite military contingency plans (LIVE OAK) to enable these governments to carry out their special responsibilities concerning Berlin. There must be full co-ordination between this LIVE OAK planning and NATO planning.

10. For the purpose of providing as great a choice as possible of supplementary alternatives, NATO military plans covering broad land, air or naval measures should be prepared by the major NATO Commanders as appropriate. In each case the expected advantages and estimated risks should be set out in specific terms to accompany plans. In particular, plans to provide for the following should be studied urgently :

- (a) Appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to initiation of any tripartite military measures;
- (b) Expanded non-nuclear air and/or naval operations;
- (c) Expanded non-nuclear ground operations with necessary air support ;
- (d) Selective use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them.