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SECRET

280-1000
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UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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October 6, 1961.

My dear Secretary General,

In your Memorandum PO/61/733 of September 16 you suggested that country comments on SACLANC's and CINCHAN's requirements in the Berlin crisis should be made in writing.

I now have pleasure in enclosing, with apologies for the slight delay, the comments of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I should be grateful if you would arrange for them to be circulated.

*Yours very sincerely
Paul Mason*

His Excellency Mr. D.U. Stikker.

SECRET

SACLANT AND CINCHAN PLANS OF ACTION FOR
THE BERLIN CRISIS

H.M. Government have taken note of the recommendations made by SACLANT and CINCHAN in PO/61/722 and PO/61/730 insofar as they relate to the United Kingdom.

Maritime Forces

2. SACLANT's recommendations would provide him with more U.K. units than his total requirements set out in M.C.70 for Categories A and B for 1963. He also expects units not now earmarked for NATO to be made available to him in the later stages of the build up. It is noted, however, that SACLANT expects Category B units earmarked to him to be brought forward to Category A only on his request.

3. CINCHAN requires Category B and Category C forces to be phased forward to Category A now.

4. The United Kingdom could largely meet SACLANT and CINCHAN requirements but this would involve:-

- (a) withdrawing units from distant stations,
e.g. East of Suez;
- (b) commissioning ships from operational reserve;
- (c) bringing forward units from Fishery Protection,
Trials and Training Squadrons, etc.;
- (d) calling on ships on short refit.

These measures would have serious repercussions on the training and operational efficiency and effectiveness of the Royal Navy.

/ Her Majesty's

Her Majesty's Government would, however, be willing to consider meeting these requirements, at least in part, if a request were made to them to do so as a matter of urgency in furtherance of SACLANT's or CINCHAN's plans.

Merchant Shipping

5. CINCHAN's suggestions that NATO nations should take action to ensure that Allied merchant ships will be able to evacuate major ports requires further consideration. At first sight several difficulties are apparent. For example this action could not be unobtrusive as the cooperation of the ship owners would be needed and the measures would involve them in inconvenience and expense. It would seem necessary to coordinate such arrangements with non-military counter-measures that are being planned.

Infrastructure

6. H.M. Government take note of SACLANT's request for certain infrastructure projects to be completed by certain dates. The United Kingdom consider that they will be able to meet SACLANT's target dates, with the following exceptions:-

Northwood Terminal NA-11 Slice VI - Problem of finding site

Plymouth Terminal NA-28 Slice VII - Production of equipment.

It is now expected that the Anthörn VLF Station, Slice VI should be completed by the summer of 1964.