

Service Experts

ARMY

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Annex follows. Had
in comp. with, I, 2K
P2K paper added.
NATO SECRET

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1. The recommendations in the equipment field are far less specific than those for manning. The reasons for this are:
 - a. logistics is a national responsibility;
 - b. no agreed tables of organisation and equipment are established and SHAPE did not even inform countries what standards in the equipment field are used to evaluate the combat effectiveness of a division, for example. National plans exist, therefore, based on divisions with none, or 200, or 400, or 700 Armoured personnel carriers, while my calculations are based on 750 APC's in a NATO standard division (unofficial data from SHAPE);
 - c. calculations of necessary stocks are based on SHAPE's data, accepted by countries for planning purposes only. However, several countries do not agree with the intensity and damage factors applied and SHAPE has proposed regional conferences to review the planning factors.
2. Therefore any calculation of major equipment requirements can only have value as an indication of the order of magnitude.
3. In the annexed table, the requirement for combat vehicles (APC - approximately two-thirds of the total requirements - light and medium tank and self-propelled artillery) for 1962 is given per country, assuming that at the end of 1963 the TO&E and 30 days of reserves should be available and a start has to be made with the mechanisation and the replacement of outworn equipment.
4. In the table, mention is made of existing plans for procurement and delivery possibilities, for which the Production & Logistics Division gave the details.
5. The general impression is that production possibilities in Europe for delivery in 1962 are still very limited. Even if further contracts were negotiated now and all necessary measures were taken to expedite delivery, no real improvement could be expected before 1964.
6. The only possibility to equip NATO-Europe forces, on the short term, with these and other major items of equipment might be re-allocation of stocks existing in the U.S.A., either as grant or reimbursable aid. It seems to me that the psychological effect of such a measure, both on the Allies and the Russian bloc would be considerable.