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
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**ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION**

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
BUREAU DU REPRÉSENTANT
DU GROUPE PERMANENT

OFFICE OF THE STANDING GROUP
REPRESENTATIVE



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71

SGLP 520/61



MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

SUBJECT : NATO Military Build-up

Reference : PO/61/722

Further information has been received from SACLANT and CINCHAN regarding their requirements as set out in PO/61/722.

Attached are:

Enclosure 1 - A list of SACLANT Infrastructure Projects considered by SACLANT to be essential for completion as a matter of urgency

Enclosure 2 - CINCHAN's amplification of the recommendations contained in Annex III to PO/61/722.

DOWNGRADED TO
Public Disclosure
SER:DN(2010)0001

R.H. Barry

R.H. BARRY
Major General
STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE

- 2 enclosures: 1. Addition to List of SACLANT Infrastructure Projects
- 2. CINCHAN's Amplification of Recommendations

Copies to: DSG/ASG for Economics & Finance (with enclosures)
Executive Secretary (with enclosures)

Note: This memorandum may be downgraded to NATO SECRET when detached from enclosures

2007

Subject: SACLANT Plans of Action in Face of the Berlin Crisis

Reference: PO/61/722 of 6 September 1961

1. In addition to the Infrastructure projects set forth in Annex II to reference, there are a number of extremely urgent communications projects that require the earliest possible completion.
2. It is requested that the following urgent SACLANT communications projects required to improve the posture of SACLANT forces be considered in addition to those set out in reference.
 - (a) For completion by October 1962:
 - (1) Northwood terminal NA-11, Slice 6, United Kingdom
 - (2) Lisbon terminal NA-12, Slice 11, Portugal
 - (3) Ponta Delgada terminal NA-8, Slice 11, Portugal
 - (4) Circuit NA-201, Slice 12, Portugal
 - (b) For completion by November 1962:
 - (1) Terminal NA-72, Slice 6, United Kingdom
 - (2) Terminal NA-74, Slice 6, United Kingdom
 - (3) Terminal NA-15, Slice 7, United Kingdom
 - (4) Strike Fleet Communications, Slice 9 (SHAPE sponsor),
Denmark and Norway
 - (c) For completion by December 1962:
 - (1) Strike Fleet Communications Faeroes, Slice 12, Denmark
 - (2) Plymouth Terminal NA-28, Slice 7, United Kingdom
 - (d) For completion December 1962/May 1963:
 - (1) Bodo terminal NA-74, Slice 6, Norway
 - (2) Bodo terminal NA-85, Slice 6, Norway
 - (3) COMPATFORNOR communications, Slice 7, Norway
 - (e) For earliest possible completion and assignment of highest priority:
 - (1) Anthorn, VLF station, Slice 6, United Kingdom

Amplification of CINCHAN Recommendations

1. CINCHAN wishes to stress the following points in amplification of paragraph 2 of Annex III to PO/61/722:

(a) A NATO military build-up of forces in ACCHAN must be based on the ACCHAN Minimum Force Requirements for 1966, proposed in CINCHAN letter No. CH 001053/6(a) dated 22 December 1960 which represent the essential minimum of forces needed to carry out CINCHAN's mission in war.

(b) Any possible emergency situation resulting from the Berlin question, requiring the implementation of war plans, can only be met in ACCHAN by the provision of this bare minimum, preferably fully phased forward to Category A.

(c) This means that the measures proposed in subparagraphs 2(c) and (d) of Annex III to PO/61/722 call for a build-up of the ACCHAN forces given in subparagraph (d) - all meeting the standards of MC 55/1 - to be fully operational and ready for deployment to war stations by 1 January 1962, unless circumstances require their earlier assignment. It is recognised that some nations may be unable to achieve these figures.

(d)

	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Nether-</u> <u>lands</u>	<u>U.K.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
DDE/DE	NIL	4	16	20	40
MSO	5	5	6	8	24
Admin Escort	4	8	4	24	40
MD	NIL	11	12	17	40
MCM(GP) (under national control)	4	3	5	8	20

(e) Tender (HPS) have not been included in subparagraph (d) above, as it is considered that during the period under review HPS can be operated from shore bases.

2. CINCHAN further proposes that NATO nations take actions to ensure that allied merchant ships will be able to evacuate major ports by taking such preparatory measures as keeping steaming crews, fuel and adequate provisions on board.