

J.S.103/61

NATO SECRET

August 18th. 1961.

From : J. SagneNOTE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERALSubject : Preparation of the Council meeting of the 21st August on Berlin.

On the basis of the general agreement given by the Secretary General to the suggestions contained in Mr. Casardi's letter dated 14th August 1961 and following Mr. Stikker's instructions, the following notes have been prepared :

- Note I : Suggestions as to the actions which might be proposed by the Secretary General to the Council regarding the study and the implementation of military and economic measures, with the relevant draft decisions.
- Note II : Study of the military measures contained in General Norstad's letter to Mr. Stikker, dated August 10. 1961.
- Note III : Study of the economic countermeasures suggested by Mr. Dean Rusk at the meeting of the Council on August 8. 1961.

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J. Sagne.

August 18. 1961

NOTE I

SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE PROPOSED BY THE
SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE COUNCIL REGARDING THE STUDY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC MEASURES

I - Actions as regards military measures

1. At the Council meeting of August 21st, member countries are expected to make known at least the first measures they intend to take in the military field, as suggested by Mr. Stikker. This applies especially to countries other than the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Netherlands which already did so on August 8th.
2. After these statements, the Secretary General might raise the question of a further follow-up, recalling Mr. Rusk's suggestion⁽¹⁾ : "We submit to you this idea: that each government urgently review the situation and decide what it can do. I am sure the Permanent Council, under the Secretary General, can develop procedures that will expedite the taking of common or parallel measures". The Secretary General might point out that while all efforts are welcome and indeed necessary, it is to the common advantage that they should be channelled in the most useful direction and coordinated by the NATO Supreme Commanders concerned.
3. At this stage, the Secretary General would have to make a choice between at least three alternatives. This choice depends somewhat as to whether Mr. Stikker, and the Council, consider that SACEUR should present his requirements in face of the Berlin crisis to the Council - either orally or in writing - and at what stage the CM(55)82 procedure should be introduced. According to the SHAPE representative (whom we met on Wednesday August 16th) General Norstad is ready for any of the three alternatives. He may even be in a position to send to the Secretary General the document containing these requirements before Monday 21st August, for distribution to countries when Mr. Stikker thinks it is advisable to do so.

(1) See American paper, page 8, last paragraph:

4. Thus the alternatives are the following :

Alternative 1 :

- a) The Chair would suggest that, since the NATO Supreme Command, the most directly concerned in the field with Berlin is SACEUR, it might be desirable for the Council to invite SACEUR to present personally to them his evaluation of the military threat NATO might be confronted over Berlin; and to indicate the actions he considers necessary to be taken by NATO countries.
- b) If the Council agreed, SACEUR would be ready to appear on the 24th or the 25th and to deliver at the same time a document containing the specific and urgent requirements for each member country.
- c) These requirements would serve as a guide for NATO countries, who would be requested to consider them and to inform the Council of what actions they are ready to take on that basis.
- d) The Secretary General might then suggest that in order to assure the best possible coordination of the efforts required, together with speedy action, the Council should proceed on the lines established by the resolution CM(55)82,⁽¹⁾ i.e.
 - Within fourteen days, for instance, each member country shall inform the Council and the appropriate NATO military authorities of the measures they have taken or are ready to take in order to implement the measures asked for by SACEUR.
 - within fourteen days after the receipt of this information, the appropriate NATO military authorities will provide for the Council an estimate of the military effects of the measures announced by the governments in comparison with the actions requested to be taken.
 - the Council would then consider both the proposals made by the countries and the report of the appropriate NATO military authorities and recommend the necessary action.

Alternative 2 :

- a) Instead of attending the Council himself, SACEUR would send to the Council by the 24th or 25th his statement of requirements in writing
- b) On the 21st August the Council would decide to use the procedure outlined in CM(55)82 as indicated above in d)

(1) Copy at annex

- c) Instead of a written report by SACEUR on the proposals made by governments, he would deliver orally his report to the Council.
- d) The Council would then take the appropriate action.

Alternative 3 :

- a) The Secretary General would inform the Council that, because of the urgency, he has taken the responsibility of asking SACEUR to put in writing his requirements arising from a possible Berlin crisis. He would have this document distributed to the Council on the 21st.
- b) SACEUR would be asked to meet the Council on the 24th or 25th in order to comment on his requirements and to reply to possible questions.
- c) The suggestion of using the CM(55)82 procedure would then be presented by the Secretary General only on the 24th or 25th.

5. Comments :

- a) Alternative I would certainly bring more pressure on countries through the personal appearance of SACEUR. On the other hand, if the "scenario" is too dramatic, it might have a reverse effect on some countries. The Secretary General might thus wait to make a final choice between the alternatives until he gets the feeling of the Council through the statements expected to be made by the representatives on the 21st.
- b) As a matter of courtesy, if the Secretary General is going to suggest himself to the Council that SACEUR should present his requirements directly to the Council, orally or in writing, he should inform the Standing Group.
- c) The question might be raised as to whether the two other Supreme Commanders (SACLANT and CINCHAM) might not be involved. This is a military question on which the Standing Group might be consulted.
- d) According to SACEUR's letter to the Secretary General dated August 10th, SACEUR is basing its requirements on the first year of the 1962-1966 country programmes, i.e. the so-called M-C-96, whilst Mr. Dean Rusk in his statement of August 8th was only referring to M-C-70. The position taken by SACEUR is the only realistic one⁽¹⁾;

(1) see my note JS.100/61 of August 10th.

however, it might raise questions at least from the United States delegation because of the differences between MC-70 and MC-96.

- e) A study of the measures required by SACEUR may give the feeling to some countries that SACEUR is trying to use the possible Berlin crisis as a way to apply indirect pressure on NATO countries to accept his 1962-1966 programme, thus mixing up emergency actions and long term measures ; countries might think that, on the contrary, the possible Berlin crisis, because of its urgency, should inhibit the taking of measures whose effect could not be felt for one or two years.
- f) If the CM(55)82 procedure is accepted by the Council, it would be necessary to establish some link between this procedure and the present 1961 Annual Review. As already suggested in my note JS.100/61 of August 10th, countries should be requested in their report to the Council on measures taken or to be taken for the possible Berlin crisis to mention separately actions of a permanent or long term character in addition to the plans already described in their reply to the 1961 Annual review questionnaire. Thus it might be possible to take them into account during the 1961 Annual review.

6. A draft decision of the Council on military measures to be taken in the face of a Berlin crisis is annexed.

II - Actions as regards economic countermeasures

7. The Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the Secretary of State of the United States, in agreeing on certain countermeasures to be taken to meet a possible threat to West Berlin, have envisaged two different situations :

- (a) should military and civilian access by air or ground to West Berlin be blocked, they have considered that a total economic embargo against the Soviet bloc would be an appropriate response;
- (b) should the blockade be limited to Allied traffic, they have left the question open as to whether it would be advisable to impose a total economic embargo.

8. This question, as well as the position to be taken to meet other possible contingencies, will be studied by a Four-power working group under the guidance of the Ambassadorial Steering Group. A list of measures which would have to be taken to implement a total economic embargo has already been submitted. The four governments expect all NATO members to agree on these principles and to initiate immediately the necessary legislative and administrative actions required to join promptly in the concerted actions should the contingencies arise.


9. The main question for NATO is, of course, whether all NATO countries are ready to adopt the policy defined by the Four Powers. It seems that they may want to take their decision in the full knowledge of all the implications of an economic and a political nature, both for the Soviet bloc and for themselves, of the economic countermeasures recommended by the Four Powers.

10. To this effect it is suggested that the Council should set up an ad hoc working group composed of the members of the Committees of Political and Economic Advisers; the Chairmen of these two Committees would jointly chair the working group.

11. The working group should study the various aspects of the economic countermeasures envisaged by the Four Powers. They should attempt to assess the political and economic implications of a total economic embargo against the Soviet bloc and also of such more limited specific economic countermeasures which might be appropriate to face various contingencies. Attention should be given to the effects on the individual NATO countries of implementing these measures and the means by which adverse effects on these countries could be averted or mitigated. It could be of great interest to the working group, to fulfil its task, to have available all the background documentation on economic countermeasures on which the Four Power proposals have been based.

12. The findings of the group should be reported to the Council as soon as possible, and at the latest within a month.

13. A draft decision of the Council on economic countermeasures to be taken in the face of a Berlin crisis is annexed.


J. SAGNE

August 18. 1961

NOTE IISTUDY OF THE MILITARY MEASURES CONTAINED IN GENERAL NORSTAD'S
LETTER TO MR. STIKKER, DATED AUGUST 10. 1961

There follow some general comments on the problems raised by General Norstad. In view of the short time available, these comments are necessarily tentative. The Secretary General will also find, annexed, comments on the measures proposed for each country.

2. The actions proposed by General Norstad are of two kinds : emergency measures, the effect of which would be felt in the next few months; and measures of a permanent character, which would only become operative in the long run. These latter are essentially a more rapid implementation of the measures proposed in the 1962-66 country force programmes.

3. The scope of the measures countries will accept depends on their political reactions to the Berlin crisis, and to their governments' assessment of the threat; it thus varies widely between countries. It is for this reason that it is suggested in note No. I that SACEUR should present to the Council, not only his requirements, but his evaluation of the threat which justifies them. On the technical level, however, certain aspects common to most countries, can be distinguished.

Manning

4. Apart from minor administrative savings, and the moving of units already in being to advanced areas, improvement of the manning deficiencies in NATO forces can be made in three ways :-

- (i) Calling up of reservists: This measure increases costs, and in most countries needs the agreement of Parliament, at any rate after the early stages. The impact on the political situation is also considerable.
- (ii) Voluntary recruiting: Some increases in voluntary recruiting may be brought about if the considerable cost can be accepted. Larger increases, by pushing up wage rates, can have in some cases severe economic effects. The effect on manning levels can only be long term.

- (iii) Increase of military service: This nearly always needs Parliamentary approval, and has considerable political implications. Its military effect is not necessarily immediate and would have little effect on shortages of technicians.

Training

5. The measures proposed by SACEUR to improve the state of training and readiness of NATO forces are probably the easiest and most effective for the near future. Cost and organisational difficulties are relatively minor; nevertheless, there will be some problems in finding sufficient training areas.

Equipment

6. To expedite or complete production programmes already decided upon will mean swifter execution of orders already in hand, which generally presents no greater problem than the increase in cost. More drastic increases will involve considerable difficulties other than financial: finding the necessary industrial capacity, starting production lines, reaching agreement on equipment, etc. Some of the measures proposed by SACEUR are likely to be unacceptable to countries because they involve completion of stocks for equipment soon to be discarded (e.g. CF100 and Hunter aircraft).

7. For many countries, an acceptable level of modern equipment is unattainable without aid from other countries. The recent decision of the U.S. Congress to cut the Administration's request for military aid appropriations is, in this context, most unfortunate.

Hardening

8. This measure, proposed for nearly all countries, cannot readily be completed before the end of 1962. It presents problems of technique, finance, and harmonisation with new equipment, which some countries will not be willing to tackle.


Nuclear capability

9. In some countries the effectiveness of forces is gravely hampered by the lack of a nuclear capability. Solution of this problem is perhaps the quickest and most effective method of increasing the combat efficiency of some NATO forces. But it involves overcoming the strong

political opposition in Norway and Denmark to the storage of nuclear warheads for NIKE and Corporal; and persuading the French authorities to reconsider their refusal to accept U.S. atomic warheads, and U.S. aircraft with an atomic capability, on French soil.

Signals

10. The comments made by General Norstad have been considered by the section of the International Staff concerned. It appears that the requirements for additional cryptographic machines and transportable high frequency radio stations have been under consideration by the Military Budget Committee for some time. There are technical problems preventing fulfilment of requirements in both cases, which the Standing Group has under consideration. Until these problems are resolved, the usefulness of the equipment is minimal. In neither case does it seem that progress is impeded by a lack of funds.



J. Sagne.