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Military Build-Up

The military measures discussed by the four Foreign Ministers have a dual purpose. First, they form an integral and essential part of our effort toward peaceful solution of the Berlin problem. They are integral in that we are taking these steps in close association with our political, economic and psychological steps; all will march in cadence toward our policy goals of peace and freedom in Berlin. They are essential because our present military posture clearly has not deterred Khrushchev from embarking on a highly dangerous course. To let him see our unity and to understand his own hazards in pressing along that course, we must act together with cool and realistic vigor to strengthen all Alliance armed forces. The second purpose is to improve our military readiness in case the Russians - who, despite our efforts, can block our access when they choose - do nonetheless continue, and conflict results.

Since forestalling a conflict is our first object, we seek to bring the Soviets into negotiations with a position more reasonable than their present blunt demands. Under Soviet threats, we see no measures in all our package more likely to bring reasonableness than these measures of calm, sober, deliberate military build-up. We do not propose to rattle the saber; we propose to show how quickly it can be drawn from its scabbard in defense of our obligations and rights. Within this framework we suggest prompt military strengthening be considered and carried out by this Alliance as a whole.

Timing is highly important. To influence the Soviets toward reasonableness, the Alliance must promptly begin, we believe, an orderly military build-up. If there is any way, short of the actual use of force, by which the Soviets can be made to realize Western determination, it is by making our strength visibly larger. If we wish, as we certainly do, to have their realization come before rather than after a separate peace treaty, we must start our build-up now. Yet we must also avoid prematurely creating forces we could not politically or economically sustain over the long haul. Called-up reserves are a costly and perishable product. On the other hand, if a conflict should eventually come, we shall badly need those reserves, and it takes months not weeks to get them into battle-worthy condition.

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- In the delicate task of steering among these scattered signposts, we think the best course lies in having a build-up in two phases. In the first, now beginning, NATO's M-Day forces should be brought to MC-70 levels, fully meeting the Commanders' readiness requirements of MC-55/1. This would be particularly important for those countries whose forces are deployed in the central region, but also of importance for all countries. During this first phase must also be laid the groundwork for the second phase, when reserve units should be called up to complete the First Echelon forces. Much can be done ahead of time to smooth and speed the later call-up. If the Soviets persist along their announced lines and fail to negotiate reasonably, so that the Alliance is obliged to carry out the second phase, these prior preparations would be immensely valuable. In fact, these should be among the earlier measures we take, for it is entirely possible that the second phase might have to begin well before the first has been completed.

Our military build-up will be in the first instance an effort to influence Soviet political decisions. In becoming stronger, we seek to change their political judgments about the relative strength of East and West, about the way those relative strengths are changing, about the usefulness of our force in a Berlin situation, and about the determination of the West. To alter these political judgments would in turn alter the limits which Soviet leadership has set upon Soviet actions. Should the crisis mount toward conflict, our military and other measures alike will aim at letting the Soviets see increasing risk to Soviet interests unless they change course. Even if Berlin access is blocked, our initial military actions would still aim to cause Soviet leaders to change their minds. In all this, NATO unity is an essential element of our program. A major Russian purpose now as always is to divide this Alliance, so it is vital that by the visible participation of us all they can see from the beginning the unity which you and I know exists.

What we do must be clearly realistic; it must suit present actualities and the possible evolution from them, so that the Soviets can tell we are serious. Certainly we should not try to deceive them - nor could we - into thinking our useable strength was rising when it was not. We should let the facts speak for themselves. Among these is the fact that we start with the

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 Alliance already possessing substantial military strength, more than is commonly recognized. Our nuclear strength in particular is already great. After searching analyses of how to deal with a developing Berlin situation, we are more than ever convinced that a proper balance in our forces is indispensable.

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 During the review leading to adoption of our program, it seemed to the U.S. Government that a greater number of military alternatives were needed than the present force structure of the Alliance permitted. As we reviewed possible developments over Berlin, it was clear how many more difficulties these could make for Khrushchev and how much more effective they could be for the West if the variety of these possible courses of action and the strengths involved could be expanded. Always we sought ways to let the Soviet leaders see what lay at the end of the road, to show them what is really meant by the Alliance's strength, unity, and determination to keep Berlin free. At the same time, we have kept in mind the existing capabilities of the Alliance as a whole and the defense plans of the military authorities of NATO. Our planning should seek to reinforce, supplement, and extend these capabilities and plans, so that if the Soviets should choose to pursue their acquisitive designs by the use of force, the Alliance will be ready to deal with the problem at all necessary levels.

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 Because the situation can now be visualized somewhat more concretely than formerly in terms of dates and events, and because of our growing strength, military contingency plans are being reviewed. In this review, which will be comprehensive and intense, we count on the growing involvement and support of NATO political and military authorities. The military contingency planning group known as Live Oak is being brought into the SHAPE area, and we can expect close coordination of that planning with NATO as a whole. The problem of Berlin and access to it may in the first instance rest on the occupying powers but beyond the first instance we believe it to be a NATO problem.

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 The West must be prepared across the whole spectrum of military operations. This by no means signifies that we seek military solutions, for the reverse is true. We seek a military build-up at the beginning of our political efforts to solve the crisis, since we believe visible strength and determination must underlie those efforts. But at the same time we expect to exhaust all possibly productive efforts of other sorts before allowing an opportunity for force to be used. We control the nature and timing, however, only of our own actions. But we intend, if at all possible, not to be in the position of firing the first shot.

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We in the West must have a wide choice of courses of action after the first Soviet use of force. No useful ones must be denied us through a rectifiable lack of military strength. As our build-up promptly proceeds, more military operations will be open to us. Although some may never be executed, and recognizing that planning implies no commitment to execute, we should have plans for a large variety of these. One non-violent form of military pressure aimed at persuasion of the Soviets would be deployment exercises of our mobile forces; a more serious one would be the actual deployment of NATO forces to battle-ready positions. Another form of non-violent military action, assuming air access to Berlin is not forcibly interrupted, would include airlifts to supply the garrison and the Berlin population. Should Soviet action make it necessary, such airlifts could be supported by fighter escorts and possibly fighter sweeps. Naval measures of a non-violent nature are possible, such as the harassment of Bloc shipping. More forcible measures would range from mining selected waters to active blockade. Various forms of ground activity possible would extend from MP escort through various sizes of probes of Soviet intentions to major unit operations. Finally, the Soviets would have to consider that, if they expand the military action, the West can at any appropriate time take nuclear action ranging from limited demonstrative use of nuclear weapons through direct nuclear support of ground action to large-scale attack against airbases and missile installations in the USSR.

The forces of the Alliance already possess these military capabilities to at least some degree. Our ability to use them is subject to several severe limitations, the most limiting being that it is obvious to the Soviets that our shortage of conventional strength handicaps any execution of non-nuclear operations. Before certain latent capabilities can become actual alternatives, forces must be added. Our studies of the Berlin problem, just as earlier studies by this Council, have shown convincingly that the Alliance chiefly needs army divisions, tactical air forces, and combat and logistical support units. Lacking them, we might not convince Khrushchev of the dangers he risks until he has passed the point-of-no-return. But if we create those new forces, we get two things. First, we get a better chance of forestalling conflict. Second, we get more instruments to use, should conflict occur, to persuade him toward negotiation before the nuclear decision arises. Such a decision would be a political one shifting the conflict from the level of a Berlin operation to that of a much larger general confrontation.

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Quel avenir!

Today we face an opportunity and a threat, both calling for the same response. The opportunity is the chance to improve the prospects for reasonable negotiations, and the threat is that of war. Before I describe the U.S. response, let me draw some of these points together. We believe that Khrushchev started this crisis because he was not deterred by our present posture. We believe he does not want general war. If he can be brought to see the trail of powder leading toward general war, he may not strike the match. It will be his act that starts hostilities if they come. On our part, we seek ways to show him that trail of powder. We seek more ways than we now have, ways that can be effective at once, as well as ones more suitable to early stages of hostilities. To have these, we must take now certain steps to increase our conventional strength; these are consistent with, and without prejudice to, the program of improving NATO's balanced deterrent and defensive strength. Our measures support the general long-term NATO defense effort. In this connection, we agree with the recently expressed consensus of the Permanent Council that the longer term NATO defense planning should continue to be pursued by the NAC. We seek to persuade him, now if we can, and later if that must be, that he must change the Soviet course of action and negotiate on reasonable terms. Both in its own right and as a background for other political and economic actions, a military build-up is the best means of persuasion we can find.

Regardless of Khrushchev's tactics, we believe the first phase of this build-up must be pressed to completion.

Le programme américain

The U.S. has begun a program to strengthen its military forces. While keeping in mind the global problem, we are improving our contribution to common defense of the NATO area. We are increasing, and preparing to increase even more if that becomes necessary, the forces which can be applied if military actions are required concerning Berlin. The legislative process to support this build-up is already nearly completed, and the virtual unanimity of Congress clearly shows the united determination of the U.S.

The kinds of action contained in this program, some of which have already actually begun, include:

- a. Raising manpower and readiness level of active units, to prepare them for early deployment.

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- b. Increasing airlift and sea-lift capability.
- c. Accelerating production of non-nuclear ammunition, equipment, and stocks.
- d. Preparing for rapid deployment of added ground and air units to the NATO area.
- e. Making stand-by preparations to call up further reserve units of all Services.
- f. Increasing nuclear delivery and other general war readiness levels.

Capital [Through this program the U.S. will become capable this year of deploying six additional division forces and up to 30 additional tactical air squadrons to the NATO area. This represents a deployment greater than our planned contributions to NATO through M⁴³⁰ of a general war. These forces would not actually be deployed unless and until further events and the state of execution of overall Allied plans for dealing with Berlin indicated that such deployment was timely. Nonetheless, their very readiness and availability should bear significantly in the political equation long before their actual deployment was considered.

In addition, our program will provide for such vital collateral military capabilities as:

- a. Increased readiness of our long-range nuclear strike capability, including an accelerated alert status in our Strategic Air Command.
- b. Greatly improved capabilities to conduct anti-submarine warfare and other necessary naval operations.
- c. Retention of the capability to cope with possible acts of limited aggression outside the European area, and a strengthened general war posture.

The main specific actions we have begun are of two kinds, each costing about half of the three and a half billion dollars now being appropriated for the build-up. The first category is of actions in the areas of personnel, units and operations. The chief features are:

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a. Increases in selective service call-ups, and extensions in terms of service of personnel now on active duty.

b. Bringing combat units in Europe to full wartime manning levels as soon as possible, and adding, when necessary, support units.

c. Bringing four active division forces in the U.S. to combat readiness, so that they can be deployed within 30 days. (2 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 1 Marine division are involved, in addition to the 2 airborne divisions, 1 infantry division and 2 Marine divisions now ready for early deployment.)

d. Expanding training and logistical base capacities.

e. Preparing transport and facilities for deployments to Europe.

f. Stand-by preparations to mobilize five additional divisions (2 infantry, 2 armored and 1 Marine) when needed.

g. Increasing amphibious and administrative sea-lift by retention and reactivation of ships not previously planned for the active fleet.

h. Activation of additional naval units for anti-submarine and other missions.

i. Stand-by preparations to increase active fleet personnel strength levels.

j. Retention of twelve tactical air squadrons and six strategic bomber wings and associated tanker units not previously planned for the active force. (Tactical squadrons include 3 fighter-bomber-reconnaissance, and 4 transport.)

k. Preparing to call up twenty-nine reserve fighter-reconnaissance squadrons and eleven reserve transport squadrons.

l. Diversion of Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft to military use.

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m. Preparations to arrange for bases and facilities to support deployment of air units to Europe.

n. Acceleration of ground alert in strategic bomber units.

The second category of actions are those relating to material and supplies, and here the principal features are:

a. Accelerated procurement of material and supplies which will be required to support the foregoing units in possible operations, and which can be delivered in time to have most direct bearing on a Berlin crisis.

b. Tank rebuild, aircraft reworks, and the like.

c. Accelerated production of ammunition and appropriate expansion of the munitions productions base.

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Now what are the steps which all of us in NATO could take? It seems to us that we could all do everything possible to get our Me-Day forces up to MC-70 levels during the first phase, particularly those forces in the Central Region. Visible moves should be made virtually at once by each member, if we are to communicate the sort of unity which may give Khrushchev second thoughts.

not ready!

Much progress can be made in the manpower area, by building up the manning levels of existing units with well-trained, effective men. Many measures could be taken promptly without awaiting parliamentary action, such as fleshing out air units with pilots now assigned to staffs. Some recall of reservists may be involved. Speedy activation of key units now in default is important. A very necessary step seems to us to be to extend the terms of service for conscriptees enough to accomplish the purposes of the Alliance.

(if such an estimate is required) (both 57 Rank !!!

Legislative, administrative, and logistical preparations can be made for the swift processing of reserve units and individuals into a state of combat readiness. For existing units, states of readiness and combat readiness training can be improved.

The military equipment situation can be bettered, too, for both existing units and reserve forces. Besides filling units up to combat standards, we can proceed in establishing balanced

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and appropriate war reserve stocks. Procurement actions can be accelerated, with round-the-clock production established for critically short items. Parliamentary provision of funds and the physical acquisition of needed supplies and equipment are among the best sorts of evidence we can give the Russians of our united determination.

All these actions, and many others which you and your governments will surely discover, can be done with important effect during the first phase, while we are soberly but swiftly building on an accelerating rate toward MC-70 M-Day totals. Meanwhile, the planning and concrete preparations can be underway, and perhaps some mobilization exercises held, with a view to speeding the second phase call-ups. Of course we all hope the second phase, to complete first echelon forces, which as you know would bring us to about 40 divisions in the Central Region, will not have to be carried out. But if we are faced with imminent conflict, we will need those forces badly, and it takes a great deal of time and effort to have them become combat-worthy. We can shorten that time and be stronger at the critical moment, if we act now.

I am glad that I can report to you a general accord on the part of the Four Foreign Ministers with this program, as well as an earnest hope that it will also have your governments' wholehearted support. As we inform you of our own specific measures toward a prompt, orderly military buildup, we also trust that all of us in the Alliance consider together how best this may be done by us all. We realize that every country has special problems that somewhat limit and channel the measures that can be taken. But, in our view, now is indeed the time for extra added effort to surmount our difficulties, if we are to keep the peace.

Ph in the program

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Proposed Committee on Urgent

We submit to you this idea: that each government urgently review the situation and decide what it can do. I am sure the Permanent Council, under the Secretary General, can develop procedures that will expedite the taking of common or parallel measures. I am equally sure we all stand ready to help each other if joint action is the answer to any problem. But I must add that this is a time when each of us must move ahead without waiting to see what others may do. This is a time when leadership in effort needs to be shown by every NATO member.

Common reaction call!

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Searched (Rump)
8 Nov 1961

Docum USA

SOVIET MOTIVES AND INTENTIONSI. Motives and Objectives

Germany and Berlin are now the focus of the world-wide struggle against Soviet efforts to expand on the basis of what Khrushchev considers to be the change in the general balance of forces in favor of the Soviet Union. The brutality with which Khrushchev has renewed the Berlin crisis can be explained in different ways.

a) Internal Motives

It is possible that Khrushchev decided to precipitate his actions for reasons concerned:

- with possible internal pressures of the socialist camp (differences with China, difficulties of the Ulbricht regime);
- or with the need to achieve a success at the time of the 22nd Communist Party Congress.

Nevertheless, the position of the U. S. S. R. within the camp as well as the personal position of Khrushchev appear to be much too solid to suggest that these motives could play a determining role. Moreover, the tension which he has created considerably accentuates internal crises within East Germany.

b) Objectives

For several years Khrushchev has been pursuing simultaneously both primary and more general objectives. He may think that in the present international situation the successes he has gained and certain Western difficulties create a particularly favorable climate for the realization of his objectives.

1) Primary Objectives

- To eliminate the embarrassing aspects of the situation in West Berlin and particularly to stop the flood of refugees;
- To prepare the progressive liquidation of the West Berlin enclave by beginning its separation from the Federal Republic and neutralizing the presence of the Allies in the City;
- To stabilize the East German regime;
- To obtain a certain degree of recognition for this regime.

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2) More General Objectives

- To inflict a major political defeat on the West;
- To make evident the change in the general balance of forces in favor of the Soviet Union;
- To prepare the separation of the Federal Republic from NATO and the neutralization of a divided Germany.

The difficulties which the Communist regime in East Germany faces, at the same time as the constant strengthening of the Federal Republic, could stimulate Khrushchev to take a major step to stop this disequilibrium and to reverse the situation.

c) Method

Since his ultimatum on Berlin, Khrushchev may consider that he possesses quite a powerful means of blackmail against the West. This time he appears to have decided to push his blackmail to the most extreme limits to obtain a success by negotiation, or by a crisis, or by both together.

II. Tactical Intentions

a) The present Soviet tactic is one of intimidation. Khrushchev seeks to convince the West that he is resolved to sign a treaty of peace which would put an end to the occupation regime in Berlin and which would install the "GDR" on the access routes to Berlin. Although it seems very probable that Khrushchev does not wish to push the crisis to the point of war, he is attempting to persuade the Western Powers that he is better prepared than they to accept the risk of war. Khrushchev thus hopes thereby to bring the West to accept his own terms as a result either of negotiation or of unilateral action. This course clearly involves risks of unexpected incidents or miscalculation.

b) It would, therefore, be prudent to presume that Khrushchev is prepared to go very far and to put into effect the program which he has announced even as far as the signature of a separate treaty.

With regard to his calendar, the limiting dates appear to be: on one hand the German elections (September 17) before which it would appear difficult for Khrushchev to find the time, if not to convoke, at least to hold, a peace conference including countries other than those of the socialist camp. On the other hand, Khrushchev has mentioned the end of the year on many occasions. The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party could offer him the occasion to take an initiative.

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It was considered unlikely that the announcement of military preparations and other Western preparations would provoke Khrushchev to accelerate his program. Too brutal an acceleration would carry the risk that he might lose the "reasonable" posture to which he appears to attach importance.

c) In the end, of course, Khrushchev's tactics depend considerably on the attitude of the West.

Since the Vienna meeting of June 4 and up to his conversation with Mr. McCloy on July 26, he has constantly maintained a firm and intransigent line. It may be, nevertheless, that he will make his position more flexible little by little if he considers that the West is prepared to take just as many risks as he is. In this case, Khrushchev could move from a position of not accepting negotiation, except on his own terms (i. e., signing a peace treaty with the two parts of Germany and liquidation of the status of West Berlin) to a position in which he would accept negotiation on more flexible terms.

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