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SGREP Misc. 4433

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8 June 1965

1991

WORKING BACKGROUND PAPER PREPARED FOR USE IN THE  
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PART III

ANNEXES WHICH SUPPORT PART I AND PART II OF  
WORKING PAPERS ON BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1977  
1990  
1971  
1972  
1989

1. This paper is the third document of three that have been prepared to present in brief form the various aspects of Berlin Contingency Planning. Its purpose is to furnish in one document the amplifying information cited in Part I and Part II.

2. Having regard to the requirements for security of the information contained herein, and yet to have documented information readily available for various purposes in a form easy to handle, the paper has been divided into three separate COSMIC TOP SECRET documents:

- a. Part I - Berlin Contingency Planning (see SGREP Misc.No. 4431)
- Part II - Alert Stages/Measures which Support Berlin Contingency Planning (see SGREP Misc. No. 4432)
- Part III - Annexes cited which support Parts I and II

3. Part I and Part II are both documents which can be used either as individual documents or in concert with each other, as needed. For additional amplifying information in conjunction with either Part I or Part II, Part III is required.

4. The information contained in Part III is factual, but should not be used as an official source of reference. The references cited therein are the only official sources for reference.

5. When this document is no longer required, it should be returned to the Registry of the Office of the Standing Group Representative for destruction. Only those persons properly cleared for the information contained herein and with an established "need-to-know" should be permitted to have access to this document.

6. This document contains the following:

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Title	Class	No. of Pages
Cover Note	CTS	2
Annex A - Extract from Recommendation by Governments of France, UK and US concerning Relationships between NATO and Three Powers in Planning and Control of Berlin Contingency Planning	CTS	3
Annex B - SGLP 630/62	NR	2
Annex C - Phasing of Alert Stages/Measures to Preferred Sequence of Military Action in Berlin Conflict (P.12, SGM-593-62(Rev))	CTS	1

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<u>Title</u>	<u>Class</u>	<u>No. of Pages</u>
Annex D - Immediate Planning Requirements of National Authorities, NAC and MNCs in order to Insure Timely Implementation of Alert Stages/Measures in Support of Berlin Contingency Plans (Pages 17, 18, 19 of SGM-593-62(Rev))	CTS	3
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RECOMMENDATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE,  
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES  
CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATO AND THE THREE POWERS  
IN THE PLANNING AND CONTROL OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

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Planning

In ground access contingency planning (but not in operations which are covered below), tripartite (LIVE OAK) responsibility should extend up to and including possible division-level support of initial probes. In air access contingency planning, tripartite (LIVE OAK) responsibility should extend up to and including possible fighter actions in the air corridors to protect air transport operations. Possible ground operations involving forces in excess of a division, and more extensive air operations than those indicated above should be planned by NATO staffs in accordance with the recent Instructions to NATO Military Authorities.

- 7. In order to effect this division of the planning effort:
  - (a) The LIVE OAK staff should remain a joint and separate entity, but General Norstad should coordinate its planning appropriately with that of NATO staffs.
  - (b) Only tripartite NATO commanders directly involved must have complete knowledge of initial (LIVE OAK) operational plans, but General Norstad should inform appropriately the NATO commanders and their staffs of LIVE OAK operational plans.

Operations

NATO forces should be put in an appropriate alert condition prior to tripartite operations. The recent Instructions to Military Authorities directed that plans to this end be developed.

- 9. (a) Initial tests of intentions, both ground and air, and larger elements initially committed, either ground or air, should involve tripartite forces only, under tripartite command:
- (b) In the case of ground access operations, it would be possible (particularly after the buildup) to commit tripartite forces of significant size before the forces of other NATO nations need become involved. However, such forces should operate under NATO command.

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- (c) In the case of air access operations, tripartite forces and command and control mechanisms are adequate to conduct initial tests of intention as long as they are restricted essentially to the geographic limits of the air corridors. However, should operations be required outside of the corridors to maintain air superiority, NATO command and control systems should become involved.

10. Considerations of geography and force deployments give the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany a particular interest in initial operations, and FRG forces possess the greatest capability to support tripartite operations. For these reasons, FRG forces should be considered as immediately available reserves. The German forces, like all other non-tripartite forces, should be committed only in accordance with political decisions and after the NATO Military Authorities have assumed full control of operations.

11. It is essential that appropriate NATO military authorities be kept fully informed as to the progress of all initial operations and fully prepared to direct further operations should the situation require.

12. The transfer of control from tripartite to NATO mechanisms should occur:-

- (a) In the case of ground access operations, when tripartite forces of battalion or greater size had been subjected to armed attack by Soviet or "GDR" forces and required reinforcement. (Initial reinforcement would be by tripartite military units, but under NATO control). Under other possible conditions, the transfer would be a matter for political decision at the time.
- (b) In the case of air access operations, at the point when an escorted flight had been unmistakably engaged in combat by Soviet or "GDR" aircraft or ground defenses, and immediate tripartite response had not caused the Soviets/"GDR" to desist. Under other possible conditions, the transfer would be a matter for political decision at the time.

General

13. In all cases, as provided in earlier understandings and instructions:-

- (a) The Three Governments will be ready, time permitting, to advise and enter into consultation with the North Atlantic Council prior to implementing LIVE OAK plans.

- (b) All plans prepared by NATO commanders will be sent to the Standing Group for appraisal in consultation with the Military Committee in accordance with established NATO procedure and forwarded to the N.A.C. for approval by Governments through the Permanent Representatives.
- (c) The execution of approved plans will be the subject of decisions by Governments at the time.

14. Within these limits, and consistent with basic political purposes, military commanders should have maximum flexibility in both planning and operation:

UNITED STATES DELEGATION

September 15, 1962

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FOR	

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATIONORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORDBureau du Représentant  
du Groupe PermanentOffice of the Standing Group  
RepresentativePlace du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny  
PARIS -XVI°

SGLP 630/62

31 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Major General G.H. BAKER  
Chief of Staff  
LIVE OAKMajor General J.D. STEVENSON  
Assistant Chief of Staff Operations  
SHAPE

SUBJECT : Memo of Understanding

1. This is to confirm and make a matter of record arrangements between General BAKER of LIVE OAK, General STEVENSON of SHAPE and General RICHARDSON of SGREP, with respect to SOPs on appropriate liaison between the agencies concerned during periods of tension or emergency.

2. As stated in the above discussions, the Secretary General and NAC wish to be kept informed of the military situation as it develops by appropriate NATO and national military authorities. In this regard the Secretary General looks to SGREP for the discharge of the following actions in periods of tension or emergency :

- a) Keeping the Secretary General, and through him the Council, informed as to all major developments in the military situation within NATO.
- b) Passing to the Secretary General, and through him to the Council, intelligence information from the Standing Group and Supreme Commands.
- c) Expeditiously processing through the International Staff and the Council requests for political advice received from the Standing Group, or Supreme Commands.
- d) Obtaining promptly from appropriate military authorities information on their plans, and operations, as may be requested by the Secretary General or the Council.

3. In the event a situation develops which might lead major commanders to seek NAC approval of alert measures as a matter of urgency, suitable liaison between SGREP, SHAPE and LIVE OAK, if maintained as the situation develops, will allow SGREP and the Executive Secretary to place on a standby condition delegations and communications, thereby saving time in obtaining a Council meeting and Council action outside duty hours. Suitable liaison as between SHAPE/LIVE OAK and SGREP is not only essential to SGREP in carrying out his responsibilities but can also be of great value to the Commanders concerned should they need Council action in a hurry.

4. To fulfill the above requirement. in times of tension or emergency, both SGREP and the International Staff maintain Duty Officers. The SGREP Duty Officer in times of tension has been directed to advise both SHOC and LIVE OAK Duty Officers of his name and phone number when he goes on duty between 17.00 and 18.00 each day.

The SHOC and LIVE OAK Duty Officers are requested to notify the SGREP Duty Officer in the event of any major military development of a type which warrants alerting Senior Officers in SHAPE. Notification need only consist of advising the SGREP

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Duty Officer that an incident has occurred that may be of interest to SGREP with details where unclassified.

6. Upon receipt of notification of an incident, the SGREP Duty Officer will advise the appropriate SGREP General Officer who will then determine by suitable means the nature and scope of the problem and the action to be taken thereon.

7. In the event of a sustained crisis period of emergency when constant liaison is required SGREP will dispatch a liaison officer from his staff to SHOC or LIVE OAK, as appropriate, to carry out requirements of para. 2 above and in order to leave the SHAPE liaison officer, normally with SGREP, free to keep SACEUR advised of developments in the Council.

8. In addition to the above, the Secretary, SGREP, will see to it that LIVE OAK and SHOC operations both have up to date SGREP Duty Officer rosters, as well as a current list showing names and phone numbers of Duty Officer and General Officer SGREP personnel.

9. It is requested that addressees confirm or adjust as appropriate the contents of this memorandum.

FOR THE STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE



R.C. RICHARDSON III  
Brigadier General

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ENCLOSURE 1

PHASING OF THE ALERT STAGES/MEASURES TO THE PREFERRED SEQUENCE OF MILITARY ACTION  
IN A BERLIN CONFLICT

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ENCLOSURE 1

SEQUENCE PAPER PHASES	I		II	III
SUB - PHASES	A	B	--	--
PHASE DESCRIPTION	INCREASED TENSION	INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS	INTENSE NON-COMBATANT AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY	MILITARY OPERATIONS
ALLIED ACTIONS	PLANNING FOR THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO MEET A VARIETY OF CONTINGENCIES IS BEING CONDUCTED AMONG THE QUADRIPARTITE GOVERNMENTS. THIS PLANNING IS CONTINUOUS AND CONTINUING.		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. INCREASED ALLIED PRESSURE SHORT OF OFFENSIVE COMBAT.</li> <li>2. INTENSE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY</li> <li>3. INCREASED READINESS AND BUILD-UP OF MILITARY FORCES</li> </ol>	POLITICAL AUTHORITIES SELECT APPROPRIATE MILITARY ACTIONS FROM CATALOG OF PLANS (MAJOR LIVE OAK, BERCON AND MARCON)
PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO ALERT SYSTEM	SACEUR'S ALERTING ACTION MAY RANGE FROM WARNINGS TO MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE.	<p>FOR ACE:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SIMPLE ALERT, OR</li> <li>2. SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES (SEE APPENDIX A)</li> </ol> <p>FOR ACLANT/ACCHAN:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. MILITARY VIGILANCE, AND/OR</li> <li>2. SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES (SEE APPENDIX A)</li> </ol>	<p>FOR NATO:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SIMPLE ALERT, SUPPLEMENTED BY</li> <li>2. SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES (SEE APPENDIX B)</li> </ol>	<p>FOR NATO: (PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF BERCON/MARCON PLANS)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. REINFORCED ALERT, SUPPLEMENTED BY</li> <li>2. SELECTED GENERAL ALERT MEASURES</li> </ol>

(PAGE REVISED BY CORRIG. NO. 1, 16 MAY 1963)

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ENCLOSURE 2

IMMEDIATE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, NAC AND MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS IN ORDER TO INSURE TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION OF ALERT STAGES/MEASURES IN SUPPORT OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANS

A SERIAL	B RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C ACTION	D IMMEDIATE PLANNING REQUIREMENT	E REMARKS
<u>PHASE 1 A - INCREASED TENSION</u>				
1.	SACEUR	TAKE NECESSARY ALERTING ACTIONS RANGING FROM WARNINGS TO MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO DECLARATION OF STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE.	AS APPROPRIATE	
2.	NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND NAC	TAKE STEPS TO KEEP INFORMED OF SITUATION AND QUADRIPARTITE ACTIONS	ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES	
<u>PHASE 1 B - INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS</u>				
3.	SACEUR	REQUEST AUTHORITY TO DECLARE SIMPLE ALERT OR TO IMPLEMENT SELECTED MEASURES OF THE SIMPLE ALERT.	NONE	SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES FOR SACEUR, SACLANT AND CINCHAN ARE LISTED IN APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE 1
4.	SACLANT/CINCHAN	DECLARE STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE AND/OR REQUEST AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES	NONE	SAME REMARK AS ABOVE

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A SERIAL	B RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C ACTION	D IMMEDIATE PLANNING REQUIREMENT	E REMARKS
5.	NATIONAL AUTHORITIES	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE 1 B - INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS</u> <u>CONT'D</u></p> <p>AUTHORIZE DECLARATION OF SIMPLE ALERT OR IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES REQUESTED AND IMPLEMENT MEASURES</p> <p>PLACE IN EFFECT GOVERNMENTAL EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES</p>	<p>REVIEW RESERVATIONS ON SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES WITH VIEW TOWARD REMOVING RESERVATIONS</p> <p>NONE*</p>	<p>*IT IS ASSUMED THAT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION BY EACH NATION. IF THEY ARE NOT THEY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED.</p>
6.	NAC	<p>PLACE IN EFFECT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES</p>	<p>NONE*</p>	
7	MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE II - INTENSE NON-COMBATANT AND DIPLOMATIC</u> <u>ACTIVITY</u></p> <p>REQUEST AUTHORITY TO DECLARE A SIMPLE ALERT AND TO IMPLEMENT SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES</p>	<p>DETERMINE REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THIS PHASE</p>	<p>SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES FOR SACEUR, SACLANC AND CINCHAN ARE LISTED IN APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE 1</p>

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ENCLOSURE 2

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A SERIAL	B RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C ACTION	D IMMEDIATE PLANNING REQUIREMENT	E REMARKS
3.	NATIONAL AUTHORITIES	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE II - INTENSE NON-COMBATANT AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY CONT'D</u></p> <p>AUTHORIZE DECLARATION OF SIMPLE ALERT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES REQUESTED AND IMPLEMENT MEASURES</p>	<p>REVIEW RESERVATIONS ON SIMPLE AND REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES WITH VIEW TOWARD REMOVING RESERVATIONS.</p>	
9.	MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE III - MILITARY OPERATIONS</u></p> <p>REQUEST AUTHORITY TO DECLARE REINFORCED ALERT AND TO IMPLEMENT SELECTED GENERAL ALERT MEASURES</p>	<p>DETERMINE GENERAL ALERT MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THIS PHASE</p>	SACEUR FORESEES NO REQUIREMENT
10.	NATIONAL AUTHORITIES	<p>AUTHORIZE DECLARATION OF REINFORCED ALERT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTED GENERAL ALERT MEASURES REQUESTED AND IMPLEMENT MEASURES</p>	<p>REVIEW RESERVATIONS ON THE FORMAL ALERT SYSTEM WITH VIEW TOWARD REMOVING RESERVATIONS</p>	