

deliberately trying to use it for propaganda purposes. The United States would try to find out if this was a genuine effort towards a settlement.

4. The BELGIAN, CANADIAN, DANISH, GREEK, ITALIAN, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWEGIAN, TURKISH and PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVES expressed their satisfaction at the United States intention to continue the contacts informally as indicated, and to keep the Council informed of developments.

II. CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. RUSK AND MR. DOBRYNIN ON 9th FEBRUARY

5. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that, at the request of Mr. Rusk, a conversation had taken place between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Dobrynin on 9th February, 1963. The subjects covered included Laos, nuclear testing, Cuba and exports of large diameter pipe to the Soviet Union. On Laos, Mr. Rusk had spoken about the need for the United States and Soviet Ambassadors to cooperate in helping the Laos government to carry out its commitments. On nuclear testing, he had expressed the hope that progress would be made in Geneva; he suggested the conference might set aside the question of number of inspections in order to progress on other aspects. Regarding the United States resumption of underground testing, he had said that the United States could not permit a new drift towards an unpoliced moratorium. Mr. Dobrynin had said personally that he thought the Geneva discussions had reached a promising stage.

6. Mr. Rusk had said that the Cuban situation was poisoning US-USSR relations; that since January, Castro had been trying to whip up violence in Latin America; that the withdrawal of Soviet forces had stopped, and that new Soviet equipment was arriving. The United States could not admit that Soviet military presence in the Western hemisphere was normal.

7. As regards pipelines, before Mr. Kohler's departure from Moscow, Mr. Gromyko had expressed to him the Soviet concern at United States pressure on certain countries to prevent delivery of large diameter pipes, and said that Mr. Khrushchev himself took a particular interest in this question.

8. The United States government was planning a low-key reply to be delivered by Mr. Kohler in Moscow on 14th February, on the following lines:

- pipe over 19" in diameter has a military and strategic significance. If the international situation improves, the United States will re-examine the situation;
- as regards the alleged pressure on other countries, the determination as to what is strategic material is for decision by the countries concerned in the light of national security requirements;
- the action by NATO countries is taken on their individual responsibility in the light of their own judgement and interests.

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9. It seemed from the Soviet efforts to stop the embargo that this was a question of strategic importance. The United States had no intention of changing its position.

10. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE suggested that, since it was likely that similar representations would be made by Soviet Ambassadors in NATO capitals, the Economic Advisers Committee should study the matter with a view to preparing a coordinated reaction by the Allies. The question might later be referred to the Council as necessary.

11. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE supported this proposal, recalling that it was agreed NATO procedure to consult on such questions.

12. It was agreed that the matter should be referred to the Economic Advisers Committee on the basis of a paper to be circulated by the United States delegation containing the United States reply.

III. PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

13. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would circulate correspondence on the subject of a Soviet proposal in January, 1963, for a bilateral Canadian-USSR agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

15th February, 1963 -

Fritz C. Meunier