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COSMIC TOP SECRET

ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

CTB 1963 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

1990 1991

Bureau du Représentant
du Groupe Permanent

CTB 1964

1965

1966

Office of the Standing Group
Representative

Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
PARIS XVI^e

SGLP 608/62

*No change effective
Memo 1st of 7-8-76*

23 October 1962

MEMORANDUM TO : Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

SUBJECT : Berlin Contingency Planning

The Standing Group requested me to transmit to the Secretary General, for the information of the Council, two statements in respect of Berlin Contingency Planning. These statements, which I made to the Council at their meeting on 23rd October, 1962, at the request of the Secretary General, are attached at Enclosures 1 and 2.

J.M. Guerin
J.M. GUERIN
Lieutenant General
STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE

Enclosures : 1 and 2

Copies to : DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance
Executive Secretary
Directeur du Cabinet

THIS MEMORANDUM WILL BE DOWN GRADED TO NATO SECRET WHEN DETACHED FROM ENCLOSURE.

DOWNGRADED TO *Public Disclosure*
SEE: PDN (2010) 0001

COSMIC TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE N° 1 TO SGLP 608/62

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. In response to the request of the Council, the following answers to questions on selective use of nuclear weapons posed by the Canadian Delegation are transmitted to the Secretary General for the North Atlantic Council.
2. As indicated in the Standing Group appraisal SGM-479-62, selective use of nuclear weapons for demonstration purposes would be primarily political and psychological in nature intended to persuade the Soviets of NATO determination in order to obtain a political decision. They are not currently designed to have significantly military value. However, selective use of nuclear weapons in connection with a particular plan for both demonstration purposes and direct military value, could be an optional course of action. Further the Standing Group has pointed out that in the case of "No Target" demonstration, NATO intentions should be clearly made manifest to the Soviet authorities including the fact that this is a deliberate use and not an error.
3. Accordingly, the general concept for the selective use of nuclear weapons as expressed in the Bercon B series is as follows :

Bercon BI provides a "No Target" and to the extent possible a "No Damage" nuclear demonstration detonated over selected areas preferably near military complex. The objective will be to minimize damage to persons and/or property and yet assure that the explosion is seen from the ground.

Bercon BII consists of an air burst on a military target detonated away from population centers. The strictly military targets include attacking aircraft, airfields, SAM sites, troop concentration, etc.
4. From an operational view point selective use of tactical nuclear weapons in Bercon plans is covered by specific procedures and constraints which provide for employment of nuclear weapons either singly or in limited numbers, for specific purposes, and in specific areas.
5. To minimize danger of escalation to general war, SACEUR's policy is to exercise centralized control of nuclear weapons by retaining for himself the sole authority in ACE for directing their employment in conformity with a specific political decision at the time to employ nuclear weapons selectively.

ENCLOSURE 2 TO SGLP 608/62

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

References : (a) SHAPE 70A/62 24 March 1962 revised by Corrigendum of 10 Sept/62
(b) SCM 479-62, 28 August 1962
(c) SACLANT SER/3011/C-982, 15 August 1962

1. It is understood that, in the consideration of reference documents at the Governmental level, some question has been raised over whether North Atlantic Council current action on Berlin Contingency Plans would imply agreement in advance with the judgement expressed by SACEUR in paragraph 8 of Enclosure 1 of reference (a) that QUOTE when the decision is taken to execute those naval plans which involve a high risk of reprisal action, authority should simultaneously be delegated to the major Commanders concerned to use tactical nuclear weapons at sea in defense against direct and immediate hostile acts of serious proportions UNQUOTE.

2. The Standing Group considers that North Atlantic Council current action on references (a) and (c) will not constitute agreement in advance that such authority will necessarily be given to the major NATO commanders simultaneously with a political decision to order execution of a naval action which involves a high risk of reprisal.

3. The NATO military authorities recognize that the determination of the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea in close defense is to be a matter of specific political judgement at the time and have set forth their position thereon in paragraph 7(b) of enclosure 1 to reference (b) as follows QUOTE specific political authority to use tactical nuclear weapons at sea, for immediate self-defense, should be considered concurrently with political decisions in those maritime measures containing a high risk of reprisal, since the major NATO commanders have expressed a need for this authority.

(It should be noted by the political authorities that some circumstances of the use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea for immediate self-defense would go beyond those envisaged in paragraph 6 (d) of CM(61)104 for planned recourse to nuclear weapons. UNQUOTE.

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