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NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

MCM-120-62

18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
IN PERMANENT SESSION

SUBJECT: Study on Alert Measures in Support
of Berlin Contingency Plans

1. At a meeting in Paris between the Standing Group and the Acting Secretary General just prior to the tour of the Southern European Area, the question of alert measures as they affected the implementation of Berlin Contingency Planning was discussed. As a result of this discussion the Acting Secretary General requested the Standing Group to prepare a paper which set forth the phasing and importance of alert measures which should be instituted in support of the Berlin Contingency Plans. He further requested that the paper be available before the end of October in order to aid the Council in its discussion of the plans.

2. The Standing Group has prepared, without national guidance, a draft memorandum to the Secretary General on this subject. This paper is at Enclosure 1. The draft has also been forwarded to the Major Commanders and their comments have been requested by 25 October 1962.

3. The Standing Group desires to consult with and obtain comments from the members of the Military Committee in Permanent Session on the paper prior to final approval by the Standing Group and dispatch to the Secretary General. In view of the foregoing, the paper will be tabled for discussion at your meeting scheduled for 26 October.

A. H. Sallenger

A. H. SALLENGER
Captain, U.S. Navy
Deputy Secretary

1 ENCLOSURE
1. Draft SGM to SEGEN

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This document consists
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ENCLOSURE 1

SGM- -62

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SUBJECT: Study on Alert Measures in Support of Berlin Contingency Plans

References: a. SGM-479-62
b. SHAPE/70-A/62, 10 Sep 1962
c. SACLANT 3011/C-982, 15 Aug 1962
d. PO/62/593

INTRODUCTION

1 1. The Standing Group in reference a, "Appraisal of Berlin
2 Contingency Plans", have already stressed the necessity for
3 preceding or accompanying NATO military operations with appro-
4 priate alert measures to insure full readiness for any situation
5 which may develop.

6 2. SACEUR and SACLANT by references b and c have indicated
7 in general terms their requirements for alert stages/measures
8 in support of LIVE OAK, BERCON and MARCON plans and have also
9 emphasized the importance of ensuring that the minimum state of
10 readiness is achieved before implementing any action on these
11 plans.

12 3. In addition, the North Atlantic Council have been
13 apprised of the provisions of reference d, "The Preferred
14 Sequence of Military Action in a Berlin Conflict".

2 APPENDICES

- A. Phasing of Alert Stages/Measures to Preferred Sequence of Military Action in a Berlin Conflict w/1 Annex
- B. Immediate Planning Requirements of National Authorities, NAC and Major NATO Commanders in order to Insure Timely Implementation of Alert Stages/Measures in Support of Berlin Contingency Plans

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1 4. In the light of the above, the Standing Group now
2 consider it is necessary:

3 a. To indicate to the North Atlantic Council the
4 importance and phasing of alert stages/measures which
5 should be instituted in support of the current catalogue
6 of Berlin Contingency Plans, and

7 b. To recommend a program of immediate actions
8 required to ensure timely implementation of these alert
9 stages/measures in order to place NATO in the best alert
10 posture in the event of a serious Berlin crisis.

11 5. Further, the Standing Group wish to stress that
12 national agreement to the catalogues of Berlin Contingency
13 Plans should carry with it implicit agreement to the timely
14 execution of alert stages/measures associated with the plans
15 and to lift those national reservations on alert measures which
16 will be necessary in order to carry them out. Additionally,
17 to insure increased readiness, steps should be taken, as
18 necessary, to lift reservations on alert measures essential
19 to carry out possible future actions. This timely readiness
20 is likely to reinforce the desired deterrent effect.

21 THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM

22 6. The aim of the NATO Alert System is to provide guidance
23 for readiness in times of tension, and to ensure transition
24 from peace to war of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
25 whatever the circumstances.

26 7. It is of paramount importance that prior planning and
27 arrangements between Major NATO Commanders and national
28 authorities regarding the implementation of the alert system
29 be made to ensure prompt and successful reaction by NATO forces.

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- 1 8. The NATO Alert System consists of:
- 2 a. The Formal Alert System. This provides for an
- 3 orderly transition from peace to war in circumstances
- 4 marked by a period of deteriorating international relations
- 5 and more or less gradually mounting tensions, possibly
- 6 followed by declared or undeclared hostilities. It
- 7 consists of political and military measures and is
- 8 divided into three stages, Simple Alert, Reinforced Alert
- 9 and General Alert. The Simple Alert normally will be
- 10 declared by the Major NATO Commanders after obtaining
- 11 approval of the governments through their Permanent
- 12 Representatives on the NATO Council. In the event of a
- 13 sudden and acute emergency, however, where the delay
- 14 entailed in obtaining agreement of higher authority might
- 15 endanger their forces, the Major NATO Commanders and their
- 16 immediate subordinate commanders may declare a Simple Alert,
- 17 either throughout their entire commands or in the affected
- 18 areas as necessary. However, Major NATO Commanders and
- 19 their immediate subordinate commanders may act only to the
- 20 extent that authority to do so has been previously delegated
- 21 by governments. The Reinforced Alert will be declared by
- 22 the Major NATO Commanders normally after obtaining the
- 23 approval of governments through their Permanent Representa-
- 24 tives on the Council. In the event that the situation is
- 25 so urgent as to preclude obtaining prior approval through
- 26 the Permanent Representatives to the Council, the Major
- 27 NATO Commanders may, in consultation with the Standing
- 28 Group and with the approval of the individual governments
- 29 concerned, place in effect a Reinforced Alert or specific
- 30 measures of this alert, either throughout their entire
- 31 commands or in the affected areas as necessary. The General

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1 Alert shall be declared only upon the decision of the
2 Council or on the authority of Permanent Representatives
3 acting individually on behalf of their governments.

4 b. The State of Military Vigilance. This is designed
5 for a period of delicate international relations and
6 consists of purely military precautionary measures which
7 can be kept up for a fairly long time without ill effects
8 and which would facilitate a rapid transition, if necessary,
9 to one of the stages of the Formal Alert System or the
10 Counter-Surprise Military system. The Major NATO Commanders
11 may declare the State of Military Vigilance and may order
12 implementation of specific measures of this state subject
13 to the extent that authority to do so has been previously
14 delegated by each government.

15 c. The Counter-Surprise Military System. This comprises
16 those purely military measures which must be taken to enable
17 NATO forces to survive and retain the capability to carry
18 out their missions effectively under circumstances (attack
19 or imminent attack with little or no warning) which cannot
20 be met by the procedures for instituting the Formal Alert
21 System. It is divided into two stages, State ORANGE and
22 State SCARLET. The Major NATO Commanders and their immediate
23 subordinate commanders may declare State ORANGE and State
24 SCARLET and may order implementation of the specific measures
25 of these states, each for his own respective command area,
26 subject to the extent that authority to do so has been
27 previously delegated by each government. Since the time
28 available for the implementation of State SCARLET, measures
29 may be limited to only a few minutes, the Major NATO
30 Commanders may, subject to the prior agreement of the nations
31 concerned, delegate authority to declare State SCARLET to

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1 the Allied Tactical Air Forces and Army Group commanders,
2 and the commanders of comparable Allied naval forces.

3 9. These three systems are complementary and can be combined
4 to the degree necessary to meet the changing circumstances of
5 any crisis that might arise.

6 IMPORTANCE OF ALERT STAGES/MEASURES

7 10. The Standing Group has already emphasized the importance
8 of intensifying NATO and national efforts to resolve the problems
9 which now restrict adequate implementation of the alert measures
10 which are the essential basis for the execution of the Berlin
11 Contingency Plans.

12 11. Further, the concept of LIVE OAK plans is based on
13 the assumption that the West would respond immediately to any
14 interference with Western rights of access to Berlin by the
15 Soviets or GDR. Since any such test of strength carries with it
16 a danger of escalation, which may be very rapid, it follows that
17 appropriate alerting actions must be initiated before any
18 Western response.

19 12. Depending on the degree of risk of escalation, it may
20 be necessary, under certain circumstances, even to delay action
21 until the minimum acceptable state of readiness is achieved.
22 In the case of expanded military operations such as the BERCON/
23 MARCON series, an advanced alert posture will be required to
24 be assumed by NATO so that the necessary preparations can be
25 made to meet any possible Soviet reactions.

26 13. Finally, a state of readiness must be adopted which
27 will convince the Soviets that we are not bluffing.

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1 PHASING OF ALERT STAGES/MEASURES

2 14. The Standing Group has based its phasing of alert stages/
3 measures in support of Berlin Contingency Plans on the phasing
4 outlined in the Preferred Sequence of Military Action paper
5 (reference d).

6 15. It will not be possible to predict in advance the
7 exact sequence of events nor the precise alert stages/measures
8 to be taken during each phase. With this in mind, the following
9 is a further suggested breakdown of the preferred sequence, and
10 the associated alert stages/measures which would allow maximum
11 flexibility in reacting to changing circumstances: (See
12 Appendix A)

13 Phase I A - INCREASED TENSION. There is indication of
14 Soviet/GDR action which will interfere with
15 Allied access rights. Preparations would
16 be made for possible implementation of LIVE
17 OAK probes. SACEUR would take the necessary
18 alerting actions which might range from
19 warnings to major subordinate commanders to
20 declaration of the State of Military
21 Vigilance.

22 Phase I B - INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS. During this phase
23 definite interference with Allied rights
24 occurs. Appropriate Tripartite Action should
25 be taken as agreed by the Four Powers to
26 deter the Soviets from continued interference.
27 Should it be decided to launch the LIVE OAK
28 probes (JACK PINE, FREE STYLE, BACK STROKE)
29 to test Soviet intentions, this would be
30 done under Tripartite Command without waiting

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1 for NATO forces to achieve any formal state
2 of readiness. As soon as a decision has
3 been made to launch the probe(s), SACEUR
4 might declare a Simple Alert or request
5 implementation of selected Simple Alert
6 measures. In case of implementation of
7 JACK PINE air probes, and in view of the
8 risk of rapid escalation, he might declare
9 State ORANGE. SACLANT and CINCHAN might
10 declare a State of Military Vigilance and/
11 or request implementation of selected
12 Simple Alert measures.

13 Phase II - INTENSE NON-COMBATANT AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY.

14 In this phase after the Soviet intention to
15 block access is confirmed, the Allies will
16 bring increasing pressure, short of offensive
17 combat, to bear on the Soviets, coupled with
18 intense diplomatic activity, in an effort
19 to induce them to reopen access. Accompany-
20 ing these actions would be a growing military
21 build-up in preparation for launching a major
22 LIVE OAK and/or BERCON/MARCON operation.
23 NATO Commanders would declare Simple Alert
24 supplemented by requests to implement selected
25 Reinforced Alert Measures.

26 Phase III - MILITARY OPERATIONS. If, despite Allied
27 actions in Phase II, Berlin access has not
28 been restored, the time will have come to
29 draw on the catalog of plans (Major LIVE
30 OAK, BERCON and MARCON) from which

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1 appropriate military action could be selected
2 by political authorities in the light of
3 circumstances. Prior to execution of BERCON/
4 MARCON plans, NATO should be on a Reinforced
5 Alert supplement by selected General Alert
6 measures.

7 CONSEQUENCES OF RESERVATIONS ON ALERT STAGES/MEASURES

8 16. The consequences of the inability of commanders to
9 implement the necessary alert stages/measures due to national
10 reservations are extremely serious and in some cases could not
11 only delay the accomplishment of a particular Contingency Plan
12 but might even jeopardize its success.

13 17. The principal disadvantages stemming from national
14 reservations on alert measures may be summarized as follows:

15 a. Major NATO Commanders will not know in advance
16 if and when the reserved measures will be implemented. Thus
17 intolerable uncertainties, delays and unnecessary increases
18 in signal traffic will result with a consequential overload
19 in communications at the critical period when operations are
20 being initiated.

21 b. The coordinated execution of alert measures by
22 several nations will be rendered extremely difficult since
23 the time of initiating will vary. This will be particularly
24 serious in the case of measures which call for large-scale
25 movement or transportation and could result in serious
26 disorder.

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1 c. Measures in the operational field such as alerting
2 of forces, mobilization of units and preparation of demolitions
3 will be seriously endangered if not implemented in due time. In
4 particular, mobile sea forces whose status, location and intentions
5 are uncertain due to national reservations will not be readily
6 available.

7 d. In the logistic field, many reservations are placed
8 on measures designed to improve the logistic support of forces;
9 execution of these measures often requires a considerable period
10 of time. Any delay in implementation therefore could result in
11 losses and a shortage of logistic support.

12 e. Although all measures do not necessarily carry
13 the same importance, certain measures such as SACEUR's ROB
14 (SACLANT's 250) (assumption of operational command by Major NATO
15 and subordinate commanders) are vitally important since NATO
16 Commanders will have no authority to deploy forces and take
17 other urgent actions until operational command has been granted.

18 18. Finally, the Standing Group desires to emphasize that
19 many alert measures do not become effective for several days and
20 therefore require initiation well ahead of projected operations.
21 The lifting of national reservations at the last minute may
22 well prove disastrous for this reason.

23 ACTIONS REQUIRED

24 19. It is now necessary to consider what planning is
25 required to insure timely, effective and efficient implementation
26 of the alert system. These requirements have been considered
27 from the view point of the responsibilities of national authorities,
28 the North Atlantic Council and Major NATO Commanders and are set
29 out in Appendix B.

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1 20. An analysis of this study emphasizes the importance and
2 urgency of implementing the following actions:

3 a. National authorities and the North Atlantic Council
4 should take steps to set up the procedures and the machinery
5 necessary to keep fully and immediately informed of the
6 situation concerning Berlin, the actions planned by the Quad-
7 ripartite nations and the success or failure of these actions if
8 implemented.

9 b. National authorities should review now, and on a
10 continuing basis their reservations on alert measures with a
11 view to removing all possible reservations on the existing alert
12 system. For those measures from which national authorities
13 are unable to remove reservations until the situation or events
14 dictate their removal, an indication of the time or circumstances
15 under which removal would take place should be communicated to
16 the Major NATO Commanders.

17 c. The North Atlantic Council should urge the setting
18 up of effective arrangements for rapid governmental
19 approval for measures from which reservations cannot, at present,
20 be removed but which are vital for the implementation of Berlin
21 Contingency plans.

22 d. Emergency Operating Procedures not in being in the
23 Ministries of Defense, in other appropriate governmental agencies,
24 and in the North Atlantic Council, should be developed
25 immediately. These procedures should be geared to the alert
26 stages/measures which would enable National Authorities and the
27 North Atlantic Council to function on a 24-hour basis during
28 times of tension and crisis, and should be tested at frequent
29 intervals.

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1 21. The Standing Group conclude that urgent action is
2 required to adopt a graduated sequence of phasing of alerts
3 stages/measures vital for the implementation of Berlin
4 Contingency Plans and to ensure that the current inherent
5 delays and uncertainties in the alert activating machinery
6 be eliminated or at least very considerably reduced.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

8 22. The Standing Group therefore recommends:

9 a. The phasing of alert stages/measures outlined in
10 paragraph 15 and Appendix A be noted as a basis for further
11 detailed planning.

12 b. The actions outlined in paragraph 20 be executed
13 by the proper authorities as a matter of urgency.

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Appendix A to
Enclosure 1

PHASING OF THE ALERT STAGES/MEASURES TO THE PREFERRED SEQUENCE OF MILITARY ACTION
IN A BERLIN CONFLICT

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SEQUENCE PAPER PHASES	I		II	III
SUB-PHASES	A	B	--	--
PHASE DESCRIPTION	INCREASED TENSION	INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS	INTENSE NON-COMBATANT AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY	MILITARY OPERATIONS
ALLIED ACTIONS	PLANNING FOR THE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO MEET A VARIETY OF CONTINGENCIES IS BEING CONDUCTED AMONG THE QUADRIPARTITE GOVERNMENTS. THIS PLANNING IS CONTINUOUS AND CONTINUING.		1. INCREASED ALLIED PRESSURE SHORT OF OFFENSIVE COMBAT. 2. INTENSE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY 3. INCREASED READINESS AND BUILD-UP OF MILITARY FORCES	POLITICAL AUTHORITIES SELECT APPROPRIATE MILITARY ACTIONS FROM CATALOG OF PLANS (MAJOR LIVE OAK, BERCON AND MARCON)
PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO ALERT SYSTEM	SACEUR'S ALERTING ACTION MAY RANGE FROM WARNINGS TO MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO THE DECLARATION OF THE STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE.	FOR ACE: 1. SIMPLE ALERT, OR 2. SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES, AND/OR 3. STATE ORANGE FOR ACLANT/ACCHAN: 1. MILITARY VIGILANCE, AND/OR 2. SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES	FOR NATO: 1. SIMPLE ALERT, SUPPLEMENTED BY 2. SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES (SEE APPENDIX A)	FOR NATO: (PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF BERCON/MARCON PLANS) 1. REINFORCED ALERT, SUPPLEMENTED BY 2. SELECTED GENERAL ALERT MEASURES

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TO BE IMPLEMENTED DURING PHASE II IN
ADDITION TO SIMPLE ALERT

- 1 1. Allied Command Europe:
- 2 RAH Move of additional signal troops
- 3 RAP Preparations for the evacuation of inhabitants
4 of certain operational areas
- 5 RAV Manning of NATO headquarters
- 6 RCP Increase of communications facilities
- 7 RIF Application of censorship to private communica-
8 tions
- 9 RIK Cooperation with the police or control of its
10 activities by military authorities
- 11 RLI Request for implementation of requisitioning
12 procedures and of mutual support agreements
- 13 RLK Preparation for national control of water and
14 air transport
- 15 RLU Activation of bases and other logistic support
16 facilities
- 17 RMD Mobilization and assignment to SACEUR of
18 certain earmarked units
- 19 ROB Assumption of operational command by SACEUR
20 and Major Subordinate Commanders
- 21 ROD Deployment of assigned and earmarked forces
22 and of certain Home Defense Units
- 23 ROH Assumption of operational control of US forces
24 manning SAS sites by the NATO commanders
- 25 ROK Reconnaissance of border and sea areas
- 26 ROL Recommendation for diversion of allied and
27 friendly shipping from certain areas
- 28 RWL Implementation of plans for the deployment of
29 personnel; preparations for the activation of an
30 alternate meteorological communications center;
31 meteorological reconnaissance over non-enemy
32 territory.

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- 1 2. Allied Command Atlantic:
- 2 201 - Manning of NATO headquarters
- 3 210 - Increase of communications facilities
- 4 213 - Preparation for control of electro-magnetic
5 radiations
- 6 214 - Preparation for Electronic Counter-Measures
- 7 240 - Activation of basis and other logistic support
8 facilities
- 9 250 -- Assignment of forces and assumption of operational
10 command
- 11 256 - Reconnaissance of vital areas
- 12 259 - Protective measures to provide security of forces
- 13 264 - Final preparation for offensive naval minelaying
- 14 271 - Recommendation for diversion of allied and
15 friendly shipping from certain areas
- 16 274 - Routes and movements of important ships
- 17 277 - Assumption of control of fishing vessels
- 18 280 - Bringing meteorological units, facilities and
19 supporting services to a state of readiness
20 to commence war operations.

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IMMEDIATE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, NAC AND MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS IN ORDER TO INSURE TIMELY IMPLEMENTATION OF ALERT STAGES/MEASURES IN SUPPORT OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANS

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A SERIAL	B RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C ACTION	D IMMEDIATE PLANNING REQUIREMENT	E REMARKS
1.	SACEUR	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE 1 A - INCREASED TENSION</u></p> TAKE NECESSARY ALERTING ACTIONS RANGING FROM WARNINGS TO MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO DECLARATION OF STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE.	AS APPROPRIATE	
2.	NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND NAC	TAKE STEPS TO KEEP INFORMED OF SITUATION AND QUADRIPARTITE ACTIONS	ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES	
3.	SACEUR	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE 1 B - INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS</u></p> REQUEST AUTHORITY TO DECLARE SIMPLE ALERT OR TO IMPLEMENT SELECTED MEASURES OF THE SIMPLE ALERT. IN CASE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF JACK PINE, STATE ORANGE MAY BE DECLARED.	DETERMINE SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THIS PHASE	
4.	SACLANT/CINCHAN	DECLARE STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE AND/OR REQUEST AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES	DETERMINE SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THIS PHASE	SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES FOR SACLANT ARE 100, 101, 153.

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Appendix B to Enclosure 1

A SERIAL	B RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C ACTION	D IMMEDIATE PLANNING REQUIREMENT	E REMARKS
5.	NATIONAL AUTHORITIES	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE 1 B - INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS</u></p> <p>AUTHORIZE DECLARATION OF SIMPLE ALERT OR IMPLEMENTATION OF SELECTED SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES REQUESTED AND IMPLEMENT MEASURES</p> <p>PLACE IN EFFECT GOVERNMENTAL EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>CONT'D</u></p> <p>REVIEW RESERVATIONS ON SIMPLE ALERT MEASURES WITH VIEW TOWARD REMOVING RESERVATIONS</p> <p>NONE *</p>	<p>*IT IS ASSUMED THAT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION BY EACH NATION. IF THEY ARE NOT THEY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED.</p>
6.	NAC	PLACE IN EFFECT EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES	NONE *	
7.	MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE II - INTENSE NON-COMBATANT AND DIPLOMATIC</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>ACTIVITY</u></p> <p>REQUEST AUTHORITY TO DECLARE A SIMPLE ALERT AND TO IMPLEMENT SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES</p>	DETERMINE REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THIS PHASE	SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES FOR SACEUR AND SACLANT ARE LISTED IN APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE 1.

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A SERIAL	B RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C ACTION	D IMMEDIATE PLANNING REQUIREMENT	E REMARKS
8.	NATIONAL AUTHORITIES	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE II - INTENSE NON-COMBATANT AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY CONT'D</u></p> <p>AUTHORIZE DECLARATION OF SIMPLE ALERT AND IMPL- EMENTATION OF SELECTED REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES REQUESTED AND IMPLEMENT MEASURES</p>	<p>REVIEW RESERVATIONS ON SIMPLE AND REINFORCED ALERT MEASURES WITH VIEW TOWARD REMOVING RESERVATIONS.</p>	
9.	MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>PHASE III - MILITARY OPERATIONS</u></p> <p>REQUEST AUTHORITY TO DECLARE REINFORCED ALERT AND TO IMPLEMENT SELECTED GENERAL ALERT MEASURES.</p>	<p>DETERMINE GENERAL ALERT MEASURES APPLICABLE TO THIS PHASE</p>	
10.	NATIONAL AUTHORITIES	<p>AUTHORIZE DECLARATION OF REINFORCED ALERT AND IM- PLEMENTATION OF SELECTED GENERAL ALERT MEASURES REQUESTED AND IMPLEMENT MEASURES</p>	<p>REVIEW RESERVATIONS ON THE FORMAL ALERT SYSTEM WITH VIEW TOWARD REMOVING RESERVATIONS</p>	