

NATO SECRET

To: Secretary General
 c.c. Deputy Secretary General
 DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance

From: Executive Secretary

Summary Record of a Private Meeting of the
 Council held on Thursday, 27th September, 1962,
 at 10.30 a.m.

NATO DEFENCE POLICY

Document: NDF/62/10

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. COLOMBA) recalled that, at the Council's last meeting on NATO defence policy on 14th September, the Secretary General had undertaken to attempt to work out draft terms of reference for a working group or groups to examine the points raised in the course of discussion. After preliminary soundings with a number of delegations on the basis of a draft which endeavoured to set out a procedure which would satisfy all the various, and to some extent conflicting, desires, conditions and qualifications stated at the last meeting, the Secretary General had come to the conclusion that it was not yet possible to find a systematic approach which would command general support. In short, it was perhaps too ambitious to try to establish a blueprint for the future pattern of Council discussions embracing all the issues arising from the WSA problem.

2. While he thought all were agreed that at some time it would be necessary to look into technical, financial and political issues, he thought more time was needed to enable ideas to mature. This did not mean that the Council should again be inactive and he suggested that it could now at least map out short-term programmes of work. He would accordingly propose that the Council should proceed as follows. First, it should follow up the idea which now seemed to have very general support, of a briefing by General Hersted, in which he would expound the factors which led to the original proposal that a number of WSA's should be included in the forces of Allied Command Europe. He understood that General Hersted would be agreeable to meet with the Council on October 17. It was hoped that General Hersted would at the same time be willing to cover in his presentation the points mentioned in Section II of the Secretary

or indirectly out of Mr. Finletter's statement of 15th June last, he believed that this would help member governments to understand more clearly the basic military issues which would have to be taken into consideration before a decision was finally taken on the numbers, nature and method of deployment of any Missiles X to be introduced into the nuclear defence forces of NATO.

3. In addition to this briefing, the Secretary General hoped it might be possible for the United States and United Kingdom to supplement the information which had already been given to the NATO Nuclear Committee, since it seemed essential that in considering Missile X the picture should be as complete as possible as regards the plans and policies of the external strategic forces.

4. When the Council had heard SACEUR's briefing and any further information in the NATO Nuclear Committee, he believed that it might be easier for member governments to appreciate the consequences which would flow from a decision to meet SACEUR's requirement in whole, in part, or not at all. It was partly ignorance of these consequences that made it so difficult to achieve any headway. The Council would also perhaps be in a position to ascertain which of the points raised in Section II of NDF/62/10 required further discussion by the Council or the NATO Nuclear Committee.

5. When the Council had received this further information, he believed that the time might have come to set up the working group on financial implications for which again there seemed to be widespread support. SACEUR's briefing might help to narrow down the number of hypotheses on which a financial study should be made. He did not know to what extent General Norstad might suggest alternative methods of meeting his operational requirements, but it was certain that if a study group attempted to examine too many possible variants, it would not only take them a very long time, but culminate in a very complicated report.

6. There would then remain the problem as to how to go about examining some of the other questions which had to be looked into in due course and to which reference had been made during the last Council discussion. Among these were questions of command of any NATO MRBM force, its organisation, structure and manning, the way in which individual member countries would contribute with weapon systems and financially, problems of ownership and control, legal problems arising from the foregoing, political factors affecting location and peacetime deployment, and finally the all-embracing question of credibility, which he thought one of the overriding factors and to which due weight must be given in almost every decision affecting MRBMs or Missiles X. As already indicated, it seemed premature at the present stage to try to set up a procedure in advance for the handling of these various questions. The solution in some cases might lie in expert working groups; in others, the Council itself would probably deal with the subject matter direct.

7. In conclusion, he invited comments.

8. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the procedure now proposed by the Secretary General took no account of the last Council discussion or of the various proposals which had been made. Under these circumstances, he proposed now to forward in writing the proposals which he had made at the last meeting. His autho-

rities could accept the idea of a briefing by General Norstad and could also agree to a briefing by General Leunitzer in due course if this was considered necessary, but he emphasized that such briefings should not be considered as a point of departure for the Council's study, but as only one element therein.

9. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that at the last meeting, he had stated that his authorities were not ready to discuss the document before the Council until the NATO military authorities had been consulted. He would welcome a briefing by General Norstad, but he could not take any part in discussion until he had a reply to his proposal that the military Committee and the Standing Group should be consulted in advance of any discussion.

10. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the procedure suggested by the Secretary General raised difficulties. He recalled that Ministers in Athens had instructed the Council to give continuing consideration to this study and that this had been stated in the communiqué. On 18th September, he had suggested that the Council should consider the implications of the U.S. proposals, which as he recalled had been on the table for some considerable time and had been reflected in Mr. Kennedy's Ottawa speech, the speeches of Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Finletter's statement of 15th June. This did not mean that any other point of view should be excluded. He could agree to the Secretary General's suggestion that there should be a briefing by General Norstad, and thought it might also be useful to have briefings from General Leunitzer and the Standing Group. However, the point of departure of the Council's studies ought to be the U.S. proposals.

11. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that a briefing by General Norstad would be valuable, but that it could only constitute one opinion, in the military field, and not the final word. There were many other aspects than the military one, which the Council should discuss in advance of such a briefing. He recalled the ideas he had suggested on 18th September for further study by the Council and/or sub-groups which would facilitate consideration of the most urgent aspects.

12. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the Canadian Representative that the present exercise was a continuing one. The aim at present was to put the whole problem into focus and to see in what way it could best be discussed. He thought that the various issues had been best reflected in NDP/62/0, in which the Secretary General listed a number of proposals to be studied. He recalled that in June, the Secretary General had suggested that, while all aspects of the question must be discussed, the most useful approach would be a step-by-step one. He thought there had then been agreement in the Council that it would be difficult to study the political implications until the military questions were in focus, and that the primary problem now before the Council was how to deal with the military aspect. This had also been the view of the Secretary General in June, expressed in a document - which he had not circulated - in which he suggested that the Council should begin by studying the military requirement. The question now was whether there was a NATO military requirement for MRMs. The Secretary General's original programme in June had been to establish

the military requirement, if it existed, and to do its financial implications before the recess; after the recess, the Council would obtain all the available military evidence supporting the requirement and take a decision on whether, in the light of the political situation, the requirement should be accepted in whole, in part or not at all and, if not at all, what were the alternatives. As he saw it, it had been agreed in June that the exercise must begin by a briefing by SACSEA, since it was he who had stated the requirement. The Council should be given an opportunity at this briefing to ask questions. He considered that this was still an essential first step and that, without it, the Council's study would take place on an unsupported and untested assumption. It did not follow from this that all other questions should be set aside until the Council had examined the implications of this briefing. If, at the same time, the Council decided to set up machinery to examine other proposals, he would not necessarily be opposed to such a procedure. He thought, however, that no basic decision was possible until the Council had heard General Norstad.

13. One possible exception would be a study of the financial implications of a missile force. He would have no objection to the creation of machinery for studying these implications, though he pointed out that any figures studied would be purely notional. It might also be possible to look at other proposals such as those which had been made by the Belgian and the Italian Representatives, but he thought no decisions could be made until the military facts were available.

14. As he understood it, the Secretary General had never suggested any alternative to a step-by-step approach. He welcomed the procedure proposed by the Secretary General, in particular a briefing by General Norstad as soon as possible. This would not exclude a study at the same time of other considerations, for example his paper of 5th August on the functions of the NATO Nuclear Committee. The Committee was far from having received all the information which it hoped to have. He hoped that this information would be made available very soon, and said that he was ready to continue discussion of his paper at very short notice. He thought such a discussion was an essential auxiliary to a study of the military requirement, and that, as said above, it might also be accompanied by a study of the financial implications.

15. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the United Kingdom Representative in supporting the proposals by the Chairman, in particular that for an early briefing by General Norstad. He agreed with the proposals by the Secretary General for carrying out essential technical studies later.

16. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, supporting the Canadian Representative, said that it was his understanding that after the important statement by Mr. Finletter on 15th June, the next step was for governments to comment on this statement, which was clear, carefully delimited, and did not close any doors. He therefore suggested that countries should now give their comments, and that thereafter the Council might decide on procedure. As regards a briefing, he would welcome any comments General Norstad might have to give the Council before he left, though he thought that his views were clearly known to the Council. He emphasized that the best way to approach this study was by taking one question at a time. In his view, the first question should be comments on the US proposal of 15th June.

17. He agreed with the United Kingdom representative that the Council should now proceed to obtain the maximum possible information in the NATO Nuclear Committee.

18. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE, agreeing with the United Kingdom Representative, thought that the proposals by the Secretary General were intended to facilitate Council discussion and not to exclude any particular consideration.

19. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made a number of specific comments: firstly, he would welcome a briefing on 17th October by General Norstad and also possibly a briefing at a later date by General Lemnitzer. Secondly, he welcomed the proposal that the Nuclear Committee should study the rôle of the strategic forces. Thirdly, as regards the creation of a working group on the financial implications of Missile X, he must reserve his position. He agreed that the financial implications of any proposal must be carefully considered, but he thought that it would not be fruitful to begin by studying cost, and that the first study should be to see what the military requirement was. Fourthly, he agreed with the Italian Representative that it would be valuable to have the views of the Military Committee and the Standing Group. Fifthly, he strongly agreed with the Chairman that no rigid procedure should be decided in advance.

20. As regards the repeated suggestions made by the US on the NREB problem, he said that his statement of 15th June contained two elements: firstly, the US government, in examining MC 26/4, had reserved its position on the requirement for 450 land-based NREBs. It had said it was not prepared to support this requirement, but was ready to take part in discussion. Secondly, as a constructive approach, he had repeated Mr. Kennedy's Ottawa proposal to consider a multilateral sea-borne NATO nuclear force, if the Allies so desired. He had therefore invited the views of the Allies on this proposal. Since no reply had yet been received, he thought that it was now necessary for the Council to decide whether it desired such a force. He suggested that the Council should now give a reply indicating at least whether it considered the proposal worth studying.

21. He welcomed the Secretary General's paper NDF/62/10, which as regards NREBs was directed towards the US proposal. He thought that the Secretary General's suggestion that the Council should study the US proposal and the MC 26/4 requirement was quite in order.

22. The Council should not be too rigid as regards future procedures. He welcomed the statement by the Belgian Representative that he would now forward in writing the comments he had made on 18th September on the US proposal. The Council should decide at this stage only the broad issues it desired to study, and not map out exactly how the study should take place.

23. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE agreed that all governments should be invited to comment on the US proposal with a view to further study by the Council.

24. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, noted that it was agreed firstly to hear a briefing from General Norstad on 17th October. This would be an essential element in the process of self-education in which the Council was now engaged. The possibility

should also be borne in mind of requesting additional military advice.

25. Secondly, the Secretary General had suggested that the Nuclear Committee might receive more information from the UK and the US. It would be for the Committee to determine the type of information it desired to receive; the Committee should also study the UK paper of 3rd August.

26. The above constituted a short-term programme. There was then the problem of the procedure for the continuation of the discussion of the questions involved, including, among others, those that had been raised in the course of the discussion by the Belgian, Canadian and Italian Representatives. He agreed with the United Kingdom and United States Representatives that the procedure in which the Council was now engaged was a continuing one of which the short-term programme was but a part. The importance of the United States proposals was obvious and actually the suggestions of the Secretary General, to a large extent, flew from these proposals. In order to make progress as soon as possible, the Belgian government, and possibly, other governments, now intended to forward their comments on the United States proposal to the International Staff. These would be welcome, along with any other suggestions which would contribute to the overall examination of these questions. Likewise, he saw no particular reason why, if the Council so desired, the discussion on this problem could not be resumed before the 17th October.

27. This procedure was agreed.

28. In answer to a question by the German Representative, the CHAIRMAN and the UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE confirmed that the intention was that the information to be communicated to the Nuclear Committee would not be limited to the external strategic forces but would cover all the problems related to nuclear defence. As the Council became more acquainted with the position regarding the strategic forces, it would be better placed to assess the nuclear requirement in ACE.

1st October, 1962