

9th May, 1962

NATO SECRET

REF/CA.62/155

Dear Mr Durbrow,

You will recall that at the private meeting of the Council held on Monday, 16th April, a discussion took place as a follow-up of the statement read at a previous meeting on the 11th April, 1962, by the United States Permanent Representative. This statement was related to a document on the relationships between tripartite and NATO planning (EAD-N-22 - modified, of 23rd February, 1962).

The Chairman suggested on 16th April that instead of opening a fully-fledged discussion the next day, as had been foreseen, delegations who desired clarifications in connexion with the United States statement of 11th April should forward any questions through the International Staff to the Three Powers. These questions and the comments by the Three Powers might be discussed later on at the time of the Council examination of the NATO Commanders' plans, which would shortly be submitted to the Council for approval by governments through the Permanent Representatives. Such a discussion might take place soon after the Athens meeting.

According to this procedure, the International Secretariat has received from the Canadian Delegation some comments, dated 27th April, which you will find in the attachment to this letter. May I ask you to be kind enough to convey the questions put by the Canadian authorities not only to the American authorities in Washington, but also to the French and United Kingdom Delegations to NATO? I would be happy if I could get a tripartite answer to the Canadian request as soon as possible.

.../...

Of course, if we receive any further request for clarification or any other question from other delegations, they will be transmitted at once to your delegation in the same way.

Yours sincerely,

F. D. Gregh

Mr E. Dubrow,
United States Delegation to NATO.

S E C R E T27th April, 1962

The statement made by the United States Permanent Representative at Council's meeting on April 11 has served to remove some of the uncertainties which existed concerning the three-power paper given to the Council on February 23. There are still, however, a number of questions which occur to us.

There may have been some misinterpretation of the intent of our question concerning the meshing of NATO and tripartite planning at an earlier stage than seemed to be contemplated in the three-power paper. Political escalation should, of course, be avoided. However, our question was concerned primarily with planning to ensure that if any tripartite force is actually engaged in hostilities, NATO control mechanisms should be able to take over at any time rather than await the outcome of that engagement. Secondly, we wonder how realistic it would be to set as the point at which the transfer from tripartite to NATO mechanisms would take place the need for reinforcements "when a tripartite force of battalions or greater size has been subjected to attack."

We would welcome further clarification concerning the significance of the phrase, "of greater size" in paragraph 5 (b) 3 (a). It is still not clear what size force would have to require reinforcement before operational control would cease to be tripartite and would become NATO control. What distinction would be made, for example, between forces introduced for "support of initial probes" and as "reinforcements."