

To : Directeur du Cabinet

From: P.D. Gregh

cc. Executive Secretary
SOREP

Berlin Contingency Planning

In accordance with your instructions, Mr. Bendall has revised the brief transmitted to you under cover of my note EAP/CA.62/79 of 22nd February in preparation for the Council discussion next Monday on Berlin Contingency Planning. The brief has been revised mainly to take account of General Norstad's briefing of the Council on February 23rd, when he explained in some detail both LIVE OAK and so-called BERCON plans, and I think made it clear that very full co-ordination does exist as between the LIVE OAK and NATO Planning staffs. In the circumstances there seems little interest in bringing up the point that Tripartite planning (in which NATO as such is not directly involved) apparently goes beyond the point where NATO would be expected to assume control in the event of a hostile Soviet reaction. On the other hand, assuming that the subject is not raised by one of the Permanent Representatives himself and Mr. Stikker thinks it would be desirable to stimulate discussion in the Council, it may be worth raising the question as to what is meant by "other conditions" referred to in paragraphs 5b.(3)(a) and (b) of the document. This is of course the subject of your note PO/62/133 to Mr. Wolf of the U.S. Delegation.

There is another point, which is not mentioned in the attached note, and which may come up as it did in the course of General Norstad's briefing. This is the question of "alert" measures for NATO forces for which the NATO Military Authorities were instructed to prepare plans in C-M(61)104, para 10(a). This presumably means that the conclusion of arrangements ought to be accelerated between the Major Commanders and the Governments. You may recall that during the Secretary General's meeting with the Ambassadorial Group in Washington, the British Representative expressed interest in the progress made with preparations in this field, on which he seemed to think that SACUR was due to report. This is not a point which is immediately relevant to subject matter of the 3 Powers paper under consideration, but it has a connection to the extent that, as explained by General Norstad in his briefing, he would expect to declare at least a "simple alert" in the event of any major element of LIVE OAK plans being put into operation (see paragraphs 16 and 19 of record). The Canadian Permanent Representative, for one, seems to be specially interested (paragraph 18) and it might be as well if the Standing Group Representative were in a position to comment.

The formal position on the "alert" problem as a whole is that the Standing Group are co-ordinating a report for the Council on the progress of negotiations between the Major NATO Commanders and member countries, but that in the meantime the Secretary General

has agreed to write to a number of Permanent Representatives in response to a request by General Norstad for any assistance the Secretary General feels able to give to remedy present deficiencies in the alert system.

F.D. Cregg

BRIEF FOR COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON
3 POWER PAPER OF 27 FEBRUARY CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN NATO AND THE 3 POWERS IN THE PLANNING AND CONTROL
OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
(Questions which might be raised)

This document sets out the views of the 3 Powers on the relationship which should exist in the planning and control of Berlin contingency operations between Tripartite and NATO planning. As is pointed out in paragraph 4 ~~that~~ the essence of the problem is to achieve a solution representing the best balance between two in a sense competing factors.

On the one hand the security interests, common objectives and force of all the NATO nations will be threatened if the Soviet bloc seriously challenges the continued freedom of Berlin, while on the other hand the special and direct responsibility of the 3 Powers for Berlin implies that the planning and execution of possible initial military operations should remain a Tripartite responsibility.

The practical consequence of this duality yet separation of responsibility is that NATO as a whole may become involved in hostilities as a result of operations initiated by the 3 Powers responsible for Berlin, in the planning and conduct of which NATO as such has not participated.

While there appears to be no way of avoiding this situation, I think that the Council would wish first to be satisfied that Tripartite and NATO planning in the Berlin context is fully co-ordinated, and second to be quite clear about the circumstances in which control of any military operations would pass from Tripartite to NATO responsibility.

On the first point - coordination - I believe that the Council's understanding of the problem has greatly increased after hearing General Norstad's detailed description on February 23rd of the various LIVE OAK and BERCON contingency plans. His briefing showed that the closest co-ordination exists between the two sets of planning and between the staffs responsible for them under SACBUR in his dual capacity.

On the second point I wonder whether we could perhaps seek some additional clarification from the representatives of the 3 Powers. As I see it, the 3 are generally responsible for the planning and execution of probe or air escort operations, but NATO may be involved in the support and control of such operations depending upon the reactions of the Soviet forces, which are not really predictable. In certain cases the point at which responsibility would be transferred is defined e.g. in paragraph 5b(3)(a), which states that "when Tripartite forces of battalion or greater size have been subjected to armed attack by Soviet or GDR forces and require reinforcement;". Similarly, in the case of air operations, paragraph 5b.(3)(b) specifies that control would be passed to NATO "at the point when an escorted flight had been unmistakably engaged in combat by Soviet or GDR aircraft or ground defences and immediate Tripartite response had not caused the Soviets to desist". However, it is also recognised in both instances that other possible conditions might arise in which transfer of responsibility to NATO would occur, this being "a matter for political decision at the time". The Council might like to know a little more of the "other conditions" mentioned in this context.