

22nd February 1962

To : Directeur du Cabinet

From: F.D. Clegg

cc. ASG Pol
SGRFP

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning

I attach, as requested, a brief for the Secretary General on the revised version of BGD-M-22 in preparation for a Council discussion of this document. I understand that although it is the intention of the Secretary General that Permanent Representatives of the countries not represented on the Ambassadorial Group in Washington should make the running, he would nevertheless like to have a paper covering some of the main points on which explanation might be sought in case it is necessary for him to stimulate discussion in the Council.

In general the brief covers the same issues as the Secretary General raised with the Ambassadorial Group, since the general effect of the amendments which have been made has been to elude certain potentially contentious questions by cutting them out of the paper altogether. The basic obscurity arising from the fact that three Power responsibility for planning appears to go beyond their responsibility for control of actual operations in case of an armed Soviet reaction, remains. A separate note is annexed analysing the changes in the revised text as compared with the original.

The points made in the brief have however been put in a rather less critical form than was the case when the Secretary General raised them first with the representatives of the three Powers in Paris and later with the Ambassadorial Group. I presume that the Secretary General would not want himself to appear to be "needling" the three Powers responsible for Berlin when the paper comes up for discussion in the Council. We have moreover attempted to prepare the brief in such a way that if necessary parts of it could be read straight out.

Unfortunately the numbering is unchanged and will, I fear, make the handling of discussions in the Council more difficult.

F.D. Clegg

BRIEF for

3 Power Paper of 27 Feb (concern)

COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON BERLIN (Revised)

(Questions which might be raised)

This document sets out the views of the three Powers on the relationship which should exist in the planning and control of Berlin contingency operations between Tripartite and NATO planning. As it is pointed out in paragraph 4 that the essence of the problem is to achieve a solution representing the best balance between two competing factors.

On the one hand the security interests, common objectives and force of all the NATO nations will be threatened if the Soviet bloc seriously challenges the continued freedom of Berlin, while on the other hand the special and direct responsibility of the three Powers for Berlin implies that the planning and execution of possible initial military operations should remain a Tripartite responsibility.

I think that nobody here would question that the responsibility for the execution of initial military plans must be the exclusive responsibility of the three Powers but the extent to which the NATO military authorities should participate in the planning of these operations is perhaps less clearly apparent. I think that Council members would wish to be reassured that their governments are not committing themselves to implementing plans drawn up without their having been consulted at least as to the broad outlines. In other words, the point at which NATO forces might be involved in Berlin operations should as far as possible coincide with the point at which NATO is associated with contingency planning.

It is with these thoughts in mind that I suggest that certain points in document BQD-4-22(Revised) might be made somewhat clearer.

We are told in paragraph 5a.(1) that "in ground access contingency planning, Tripartite responsibility should extend up to and including possible division-level support of initial probes" and in paragraph 5b.(2)(a) it is stated that "in the case of ground access operations, it would be possible (particularly after the

build-up) to commit Tripartite forces of significant size before "the forces of other NATO nations need to become involved." It is added that such forces should operate under NATO command. Further, paragraph 5b.(3)(a) makes it clear that transfer of control from Tripartite to NATO mechanism should take place when Tripartite forces of battalion or greater size are subjected to armed attack by Soviet or "ODR" forces and require reinforcement; initial reinforcement would be by Tripartite military units under NATO control.

Now General Norstad has told us that NATO planning for forces above the level of division is at present conducted on a NATO rather than a Tripartite basis.⁽¹⁾ I think we would wish to know rather more about the scope of Tripartite planning "up to and including possible division level support of initial probes", particularly in view of the fact that control would pass to NATO once Tripartite forces of battalion or greater size had been attacked and required reinforcement.

Similarly, with regard to air access operations, we are told in paragraph 5b.(2)(b) that Tripartite forces and command and control mechanisms are adequate to conduct such operations as long as they are restricted essentially to the geographical limits of the air corridors but, in paragraph 5b.(3)(b) it is specified that control would be passed to NATO "at the point when an escorted flight had been unmistakably engaged in combat by Soviet or ODR aircraft or ground defenses and immediate Tripartite response had not caused the Soviets to desist".

I think we can all understand and approve this latter conclusion but it does seem to me that the statement made in paragraph 5b.(2)(b) that Tripartite forces and control mechanisms are adequate to conduct air access operations as long as they are restricted essentially to the geographical limits of the air corridors needs to be explained a little further.

Generally speaking, the situation appears to be that the three Powers are responsible for the planning and execution of probe or air escort operations but that NATO may be involved in the support of such operations depending upon the reactions of the Soviet forces which are not really predictable. In certain cases, the stage at

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at which NATO would intervene had been defined but it is also recognized that other situations might arise in which control should be transferred to NATO. It is suggested that such cases would be a matter for political decision at the time. The Council might like to know a little more of the "other conditions" mentioned in paragraph 5b.(3) (a) and (b) of the document. Moreover, to the extent that all possible situations cannot be foreseen, it does seem to follow that NATO should be associated to the greatest extent possible with the planning of operations. Admittedly, this might be effected by means of the provision in paragraph 5a.(2)(a) which directs General Norstad to co-ordinate Live Oak planning "appropriately" with that of NATO staff. I think, however, the Council would welcome some further information concerning the degree of co-ordination envisaged between NATO and Tripartite planning.

SECRET

COMPARISON BETWEEN R0D-1-22 (16th January version)
AND REVISED TEXT

16th January versionPara 1, line 1

"The North Atlantic
Council has approved
the basic instructions..."

New version

"... has approved
~~some~~ basic
instructions ..."

Comment

More accurate
description

Para 2, line 7

"It may therefore
appear premature to
consider ..."

"It appears therefore
desirable to
consider ..."

Answers a comment
already made by
Mr. Stikker in
Washington.

Para 2, line 10

"On the other hand
full understanding
and agreement ..."

"Full understanding
and agreement ..."

Drafting change to
bring text into
line with new version
of line 7.

Para 4(a), last sentence

"From the purely
military viewpoint ...
desirable that NATO
Military Authorities
conduct both planning
and operations from the
outset".

This sentence is
dropped in new
version.

Follows Mr. Ritz's
remarks to Mr. Stikker
in Washington that
too much significance
should not be attached
to this phrase.

Para 4(b), line 5

"From the political
juridical viewpoint,
therefore, responsi-
bility for planning and
execution ..."

"Responsibility for
planning and
execution ..."

No doubt an attempt
to forestall questions
concerning the exact
nature of the
"political juridical"
reasons why planning
should be exclusively
a tripartite
responsibility.

16th January versionNew versionCommentPara 5a.(1), lines 1 & 2

"Tripartite responsibility should extend through possible ..."

"... responsibility should extend to and including possible ..."

Explains meaning of American term "through".

Para 5a.(2)(a), line 3

"... but General Horstad should co-ordinate its planning with that of NATO staffs to the extent he considers appropriate"

"... but General Horstad should co-ordinate its planning appropriately with that of NATO staffs".

Slight change but new version implies rather more freedom of action for Horstad in co-ordinating Live Oak NATO planning, and states the question of what is the "extent appropriate".

Para 5a.(2)(b), lines 4 & 5

"... General Horstad should inform the appropriate NATO Commanders ... to the extent he considers necessary".

"... should inform appropriately the NATO Commanders ..."

As above