

même lettre envoyée à :
Repts Permanents de
Royaume-Uni
Etats-Unis
RFA

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cc: H. Casardi

PO, 62, 107

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOP SECRET

14, February 1962

In connection with our discussion this morning concerning present difficulties in the Berlin air corridors, I would like to call your attention to the fact that in PO/61/765, Annex A, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States assured the Council that they would be ready, time permitting, to advise and enter into consultation with the North Atlantic Council prior to implementing LIVE OAK plans. I note also that BQD-M-22, Enclosure 1, suggests that control might well pass to NATO when escorted flights had been unmistakably engaged in combat by Soviet or "SER" aircraft or ground defence and there was a risk of rapid escalation.

In view of the foregoing, it seems to me important that action be speeded up on BQD-M-22 so that it can be given to the Council at a very early date. Otherwise, if the present delicate circumstances continue, I shall feel obliged to inform the Council about its existence because of its relationship to the present emergency.

An identical letter has been sent to the Permanent Representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.

H.E. Mr. Pierre de Lousse
Permanent Representative of
France to the North Atlantic
Council

D.U. Stikker

Précédents: Foy Kohler U.S.A. Dossier de Berlin (special)

*M. Nitze
Henri Alphen
Lord Hoop
Secretary Genl. Shikku - Chancery d'Affaires FRG.*

NATO SECRET

Washington February 7, 1962

Berlin Discussions.

The Secretary General said that before going on to the question of Berlin planning, he should draw attention to the disquiet shown in the Council about the delay in receiving information of the latest Thompson-Gromyko exchanges. Surprise had been expressed that Ambassador Thompson should have presented certain documents to Gromyko without the Council having received previous information and a chance to discuss them. Had the documents been made available to the Council, he did not think that changes would necessarily have been asked for or the operation in any way delayed.

There had been no immediate repercussions in the present instance, but it must be borne in mind that some member countries were very keen on pressing negotiations with the Russians a long way. If a new crisis were to blow up over Berlin, it was extremely important to bring all member countries along behind the Three Powers and this could only be achieved if the former felt that they had been kept very fully informed and had had an ample opportunity to express their views at all stages. Failure to keep the Council in the picture on the development of negotiations could well have negative repercussions on their attitude towards Live Oak.

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BQD-M-22

The Secretary General said that despite the anxiety of at least one Permanent Representative to get BQD-M-22 before the Council without delay, it had seemed to him advisable to wait until he had had the present opportunity to discuss the document with the Ambassadorial Group and also to arrange for a briefing of the Council by General Norstad on the latest stage of Live Oak planning. A briefing had been arranged for February 13 or 14. He thought the document itself would make a useful contribution to the Council's understanding of the Berlin problem, but there were certain points where he thought clarification might be desirable, e.g.:

Para 4-b.

Because the execution of Live Oak must for juridicial reasons be a Tripartite responsibility, it did not seem to follow that planning must also be tripartite - especially since it was stated earlier in the same paragraph that planning of the operation on a NATO basis would be militarily desirable. He himself had no objection to tripartite planning, but he foresaw some difficulties within the Council on this point if the present draft went forward.

Para 5-a.

The meaning of "planning through division level" was not entirely clear. If it meant planning for operations up to division level and beyond, it did not seem compatible with previous statements by General Norstad that planning involving forces larger than a division would be conducted on a NATO basis. There also seemed to be some sort of inconsistency between Three Power planning for division sized operations when responsibility for execution of these plans in case of opposition would fall on NATO as a whole before forces of division strength had been committed. The same thing arose in the

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case of air operations. He foresaw possible complaints from other NATO members that they were issuing some form of blank cheque to the Three Powers to the extent that they would be committed to implementation of operational plans in whose preparation NATO as a whole had had no responsibility.

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In practice most Live Oak planning had been complete since October and instructions to the NATO military authorities provided for the full coordination of Live Oak with NATO planning.

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The Secretary General said that he was not suggesting that BOD-M-22 was inconsistent with previous documents approved by the Council, but merely that he was trying to forewarn the group on the points in the former, which might give rise to difficulties in the Council.

Mr. Nitze, turning to paragraph 5(a) said that this referred to the so-called "Junc-Ball" planning, which dealt with how to assemble a tripartite force on anything from battalion up to division size.

4 { The Secretary General said that he had never heard of "June-Ball" and he was sure that the Council had not either. Without this knowledge the Council might gain the impression that division-size operations were envisaged and this might well cause concern.

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The Secretary General emphasized once again that he was not opposing the arrangement described. It was a question of appearances and possible misapprehensions in the Council, which called for clarification if difficulties were to be avoided. Some member governments had shown dislike of a probe of division strength.

Lord Hood said that there seemed to be three distinct issues involved:

a. The purpose of Live Oak planning was simply to restore access to Berlin in case the Soviets closing the Autobahn or air corridor. The Council was fully aware of the scope and nature of the plans which were described in the Three Powers report (C-M(61)102). If more detailed information was required, he was sure that his government would have no objection to SACEUR giving it to the Council;

b. The decision to put Live Oak plans into effect. Paragraph 8 of the Three Powers report made clear that the Council would be consulted whenever time permitted, Member countries would also be brought in from an early stage to the extent that provision was made for alert measures covering all NATO forces. SACEUR was due to report on the progress made with preparations for an alert;

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c. In the event of a probe having taken place and the force concerned being fired on, the point at which the operation should cease to be a tripartite responsibility and control be transferred to NATO. It was essentially to this problem that the present paper was addressed.

The Secretary General then drew attention to two other minor points in the draft, which might be queried in the Council, e.g.

paragraph 2: after so long a passage of time, the suggestion that it was "premature" to raise the questions of the relationships between NATO and Live Oak planning sounded a little odd;

paragraph 5(a) 2(b) : the exact meaning of the words "as appropriate" in regard to SACEUR responsibility for informing other NATO commanders about Live Oak plans could give rise to questions.

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