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
14 December, 1961.

To : Secretary General.

From : ASG for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure.

Cc. : Deputy Secretary General.
Coordinator for Production and Logistics.

Ref.: SHAPE/188B/61 - 16 November, 1961.




In a letter dated 16 November, 1961, addressed to you, General Norstad referred to a letter, which he wrote under date of September 15, recommending "... that the Council consider, as a matter of urgency, further steps to meet the requirements of an all-out emergency, should such a situation appear imminent". Among the measures which General Norstad feels that the Council should consider is one that concerns this Division, namely:

"Examining the state of readiness of those NATO logistics agencies having a wartime function, such as the various transportation, POL, and supply agencies, with a view to insuring their capability to respond to a wartime condition."

2. In this connection, we have prepared reports as to the state of readiness of the NATO Maintenance Supply Services Agency (NMSSA) and the Central Europe Operating Agency (CEOA). These two reports are attached.

3. Should further information be required, we shall, of course, be glad to do everything possible to obtain it.


Johnson Garrett.

Enc.

NATO MAINTENANCE SUPPLY SERVICES AGENCY (NMSSA)

This agency has no emergency plan in view of the fact that it has no established wartime function. The NMSSA was created as a civilian agency "in order to make the best use of NATO resources and to sustain the common defence" (extract from first paragraph of the NMSSA Charter, document C-M(58)78). There is no other allusion to a wartime function in the Charter of the NMSSA.

2. In accordance with a Council decision taken at the meeting of January 11, 1961 (C-R(61)1), the Armaments Committee has drawn up a proposed modification to the NMSSA Charter with a view to establishing procedures which would enable the NMSSA to provide logistic support to the modern weapons of SACEUR in peace and war, as requested in document MC.86/2(revised). The proposed modification of the NMSSA Charter is contained in Annex I to document AC/74-D/564(revised), which was forwarded, on November 2, 1961, to the Working Group on Logistics in Peace and War for comment and onward transmission to the Council. If the modifications so proposed are approved by the Council, SACEUR will be able, through his representative on the NMSSS Board of Directors, to provide advice and recommendations to the Board, particularly with regard to measures "which in his opinion are significant to the achievement of the peacetime logistic posture which best equips the Alliance to respond effectively to an emergency" (extract from paragraph 3, Annex I to AC/74-D/564(revised)). SACEUR will furthermore "be prepared in time of war or imminent war to accept responsibility for the formulation of directives to the NMSSS" (see paragraph 5, Annex I to AC/74-D/564(revised)).

3. The above provisions do not establish a clear-cut wartime definition for the NMSSA, but they would permit the Board of Directors to decide what NMSSA should do in order to be prepared to support the modern weapons of SACEUR in peace and war. A solution to this question could be reached only after definition by the Council of the wartime status of civilian agencies.

4. Meanwhile, NMSSA has initiated a study looking toward preparation for wartime conditions. This study has been submitted to the Board who, in turn, sent it to the Plans and Policy Committee of NMSSA for examination. It is not anticipated, however, that the Plans and Policy Committee will make its study, nor that the Board will take any decision on this matter, until the Council has approved the modification to the NMSSA Charter referred to above. Even assuming such approval by the Council, the study will undoubtedly take some time, and it is therefore difficult to predict when an emergency plan for NMSSA may be reached. This being the case, it appears highly probable that NMSSA would find itself in a position making it necessary to cease activity should an emergency occur before a plan for wartime conditions has been adopted. In addition to other problems which would have to be faced, there is at present no provision which prevents the mobilisation of NMSSA personnel by their respective countries.

5. At the present time, NMSSA is prepared to support only a relatively minor group of weapons and weapons systems, and this only under peacetime conditions. Their present support is concentrated principally on five aircraft, which are not of the most up-to-date type, and on NIKE missiles and HONEST JOHN rockets, with which NATO European units are armed. The present rate of delivery against urgent requests is not satisfactory as it is apparently possible to supply only about 58% of necessary spare parts for the five aircraft on an urgent basis, and only 78% for the NIKE and HONEST JOHN.

Conclusions

6. The following conclusions may be drawn from the study which has been made in this connection:

- (1) A solution of this problem can only be approached after the definition by the Council of the wartime status of civilian agencies.
- (2) Approval by the Council of the proposed change in the NMSSA Charter must be obtained before a study with regard to emergency procedures can be undertaken and completed.
- (3) A considerably improved delivery capability must be attained in order that NMSSA may be effective in wartime.
- (4) Member nations should give instructions to their respective representatives on the Board of Directors with a view to making the organization work efficiently and effectively.
- (5) Consideration should be given to mobilisation of personnel under wartime conditions.

CENTRAL EUROPE OPERATING AGENCY (CEOA)

The CEOA is the operating agency of the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) which, in turn, consists of the Central Europe Pipeline Policy Committee (CEPPC), the Central Europe Pipeline Office (CEPO), and the national agencies and divisions. CEOA has an emergency plan. According to its Charter (Part I of the Annex to C-M(56)129), the Central Europe Pipeline System, of which CEOA is the operating agency "must be so controlled in peace as to ensure that it will meet SACEUR's wartime requirements without loss of time". The emergency plan indicates the part of the Central Europe Pipelines network which is to be in operation on D-day, and gives the loading and discharging facilities available at each depot, indicating also the booster stations which may be placed in service. The situation with regard to the line-fill and the stocks on hand on D-day are not shown in the plan as it is not possible for them to be pre-determined.

2. With regard to stocks, an average of 90% for non-port depots and 70% for port depots has been used as the basic assumption for movement plans. The plan also indicates, for the week D to D+6, the resupplies, requests for deliveries and uplifts, movements plans, and specified routing and standardisation layout of requests. It provides for liaison and communications systems and pump station functioning, in addition to a command organisation and replacement of CEOA by one of the Divisions of the Central Europe Pipeline System (i.e. Division 4) should communications be disrupted or the CEOA Headquarters destroyed.

3. Steps have also been taken for the mobilisation of the personnel. CEOA has obtained the agreement of the respective nations to the exemption from mobilisation of personnel deemed essential for wartime operation. A revised list is currently under consideration by the nations. However, except for the General Manager and his assistant, there is nothing in the present contracts which requires personnel to remain at CEOA in wartime, although Belgian nationals have already been informed that they will remain at their posts in the event of war. With the exception of five additional schedulers, CEOA is adequately staffed to perform its wartime mission. These schedulers are considered essential, and will be employed and trained on approval of the necessary funds by the Central Europe Pipeline Policy Committee. In the case of Division 4, the personnel are currently entirely military and wartime mobilisation plans will keep them at their posts and supplement them with additional staff. Therefore, the permanency of the staffing is assured.

4. The facilities of CEOA are adequate for wartime operation with the important exception that there are no means provided for coding and decoding messages. This deficiency also exists at Division 4, and a study on the matter is under preparation by CEOA.

5. On the declaration of a state of "military vigilance" all necessary measures will be taken for the immediate implementation of the emergency plan, short of actually putting it into execution. This applies particularly to work to be completed, such as pipeline connections to airfields and depots, and to bringing into service of principal telephone and telegraph circuits. On receipt of the declaration of one of the "states of alerts", the emergency plan will be executed forthwith.

6. As a result of this analysis of the emergency plan of CEOA, it may be concluded that, when the problems of wartime staffing and facilities for coding and decoding have been solved- and these are already under study - CEOA will have full capability to face an all-out emergency, should such a situation occur. However, CEOA is only a part of the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS), as indicated at the

beginning of this study, and it cannot work alone. The functioning of the pipeline system in Central Europe is carried through Divisions which must be organised in such a way as to ensure the operational and technical efficiency of the system as a whole. Therefore, it is not sufficient for CEOA to be ready if the Divisions are not, but the Divisions are a national responsibility and, consequently, the examination of their capacity to face an emergency does not come within the scope of the present study. It is considered necessary, therefore, that such a study be undertaken for the Central Europe Pipeline System as a whole in order that a true evaluation may be made of its capability to face an emergency.

Conclusions

7. The following conclusions may be drawn from the study which has been made in this connection:

- (1) A true evaluation of the preparedness of CEOA to face an all-out emergency can only be made within the framework of the Central Europe Pipeline System.
- (2) CEOA itself cannot be considered as being capable of coping with such an emergency until such time as full-strength wartime personnel and coding and decoding facilities are guaranteed.