



NATO SECRET

13th October 1961

E&F/CA.61/452

Note for the Secretary General

The Greek Delegation's views on Annex B to PO/61/765

The Council will meet next Tuesday to resume its discussion of the instructions to the NATO military authorities in light of the Berlin crisis. As you will remember, the Greek Delegation has suggested two amendments to Annex B of PO/61/765. I have discussed with Mr. Melas, on your instructions, the way in which we could take care of his amendments, and as I informed you in my note E&F/CA.61/438, the proposal I presented to the Greek Permanent Representative in regard to his first amendment was accepted by him. This amendment has therefore been reproduced in PO/61/789 (see Annex and the amendment to para 6c, 3rd sentence).

As I informed you in my note quoted above, Mr. Melas stated that he would try to explain to his authorities that it would be better for them not to insist on the second amendment. I have just received a personal letter from Mr. Melas stating that his authorities have agreed to abandon their second amendment as it had been presented to the Council on October 2nd. However, Mr. Melas has received instructions to ask if it would be possible to add a sentence to the paragraph d3, which would therefore be read as follows: (The words underlined constitute the addition asked by the Greek authorities)

"6d(3)

A specific political decision to employ nuclear weapons selectively in order to demonstrate the will and ability of the Alliance to use them in facing the actions of the Soviet bloc described in paragraph 6 of the first part of the Political Directive of 1956 (C-2(56)138 Final)(1)

Mr. Molas adds that this amendment does not bring about in any way a new idea and is certainly not in contradiction with the interpretation of Mr. Finletter of this paragraph 6d(3) (Refer to 19/61/739, page 2, quoting the personal views expressed by Mr. Finletter).

Finally, Mr. Molas expressed the views of his authorities, to the effect that "What is understood without being said, is even better when said".

In order to enable you to weigh the implications of this addition, I wish to recall that paragraph 6 of Part I of the Political Directive consists of an analysis of the "possibilities of action by the Soviet leaders through the use of conventional arms which would in varying degree entail the risk of deteriorating into a major war." In summary form the six possible actions are described under the following headings :

- (a) General attacks against NATO
- (b) Local attacks against NATO
- (c) Attacks against peripheral non-NATO countries
- (d) Insurrections and guerrilla
- (e) Indirect intervention outside of NATO area
- (f) Soviet intervention in satellites

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(1) In French:

"décision politique spéciale d'employer des armes nucléaires de façon sélective afin de démontrer que l'Alliance a la volonté et les moyens de les utiliser pour faire face aux actions du Bloc Soviétique décrites au paragraphe 6 de la première partie des Directives Politiques de 1956 (C-2(56)138 Final)."

In my humble opinion the addition asked for by the Greek Delegation is of no value and I think Mr. Melas is right in stating that to accept his amendment would not really mean any change in the implication of paragraph 6d(3); it might nevertheless raise a lot of questions in the minds of several delegations. I wonder, therefore, if the best thing would not be for you to have a talk with Mr. Melas before the next meeting of the Council on Tuesday, 17th October. He might, I hope, be convinced by your arguments that his authorities, having already agreed to delete their second amendment presented on October 2nd, would be well advised not to press for this new addition.

F.D. Gregh